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SUMMARY 
This dissertation deals with the moral permissibility of 
abortion. It is argued that abortion is morally justifiable 
when the pregnancy is a result of ;r-ape (but only during the 
first trimester of pregnancy), when the pregnancy threatens 
the woman's life or long-term health, or when tests indicate 
to a high degree of scientific certainty that the foetus will 
be abnormal to such an extent, so as never to be capable of 
acquiring any human characteristics other than basic 
biological properties. 
Potential is adopted as a suitable criterion by which a 
being acquires a serious right to life. Rationality is 
examined closely, but shown to be inadequate since it leads to 
inconsistencies and does not accord with our general belie 
and sentiments. 
It is argued that all living beings have some right to 
life, but that sentient beings have more moral standing than 
nonsentient ones. Potential is argued to be the sui table 
comparison criterion when comparing beings of different 
species, and sentience when comparing beings of the same 
species. 
The dissertation is rights-oriented and reasons are given 
why this approach was adopted in favour of a virtue-oriented 
one. It is argued that a rights-oriented approach is more 
precise. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The problem of abortion has been intensely debated, resulting 
in the conceptual issues being fairly well laid out. There 
have been interesting attempts to solve the normative and 
practical disagreements remaining. Almost everyone agrees 
that the fundamental issue in justifying abortion is the moral 
status of the foetus, although considerable disagreement 
exists as to what this status is. Extreme conservatives on 
the abortion issue, such as Don Marquis, 1 contend that from 
conception a human being has full moral standing and hence has 
a serious right to life. On the other side of the abortion 
2 
continuum are extreme liberals, such as Mary Anne Warren, who 
argue that at least until birth the foetus has almost no moral 
standing and lacks a serious right to life. Moderates on the 
issue adopt some position between these two extremes. Still 
3 
others, such as Judith Jarvis Thomson, adopt either the 
conservative or liberal view, and then endeavour to show that 
8 
such a view does not lead to the consequences its proponents 
assume. 
The central concern of this dissertation will be the 
moral permissibility, the moral justification of an abortion. 
Can the practice of abortion be morally justi ed? If so, is 
this justification restricted by certain qualifications? Is 
it, for instance, only permissible when the foetus 4 has not yet 
developed beyond a specific stage or the pregnancy is the 
result of rape? 
The. position I shall adopt and defend may concisely be 
formulated as follows: 
(l)By voluntarily engaging in sexual intercourse, a 
couple either explicitly, or implicitly, accept 
responsibility for a resulting pregnancy, even if the 
pregnancy was not planned. 
(2)If the pregnancy did not come about by voluntary 
sexual intercourse (such as through rape) , the pregnant 
woman is not compelled to accept the pregnancy and bear 
the child, since she neither implicitly nor explicitly 
consented to becoming pregnant. Abortions resulting from 
rape are, therefore, morally justifiable if the 
restrictions under point 3 are ful lled. 
(3)All living beings have a right to li but 
sentient beings have a stronger right to life than 
nonsentient ones. Scientific evidence indicates that a 
foetus becomes sentient soon after the end of the first 
5 
trimester of pregnancy. An early-term foetus is 
therefore not yet sentient thus giving it a weaker right 
to life than a more developed foetus. An abortion 
consequent to rape should be undertaken during the least 
objectionable stage (when the developing foetus has a 
relatively weak right to life), which is before its 
becoming sentient. 
( 4) A woman consenting to a pregnancy consents to a 
relatively normal pregnancy. A "normal" pregnancy is one 
9 
that has 
does not 
Should the 
seriously 
a fairly normal 
threaten her li 
pregnant woman's 
threatened, she 
course 
nor 
life 
also 
of development, i.e. 
her long-term health. 
or long-term health be 
has a right to an 
abortion. She has this ght, even if she willingly 
initiated her pregnancy. She, however, did not willingly 
initiate an "abnormal" pregnancy, and thus has the right 
to terminate it at any stage of pregnancy; but this 
should be undertaken as early as possible after the 
difficulties have arisen. 
(5)I shall further argue that an abortion is 
justified when it becomes evident that the child will be 
severely mentally retarded. This is, however, only 
justifiable when the being will never attain any human 
characteristics other than the biological and will 
probably have a life filled with only pain and suffering. 
As should be clear from the foregoing points, my 
treatment and defence of abortion shall be rights-oriented. 
This means that I shall investigate and establish criteria by 
which a being may attain a right to life or may be regarded as 
a moral person. For this reason I shall begin by examining 
the criterion of rationality. It has often been assumed that 
only a rational being can have a right to life, only a 
rational being can be a moral person. I shall examine 
rationality as a possible criterion determining a being's 
right to life, paying special attention to the arguments put 
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forward by Michael Tooley. He, among others, argues that a 
being has a right to li only if it desires to have a 
continued existence. In order to desire a continued 
existence, it must be conscious and possess the concepts 
involving this desire, conditions that are not satisfied by 
foetuses. He concludes from this that foetuses do not have a 
right to 
permissible. 
life and hence abortion is always morally 
Were Tooley's arguments to be acceptable, then 
abortion would always be morally justifiable, not only when 
10 
the pregnancy is a result of rape, when the pregnancy is a 
threat towards the mother, or when the developing being is 
severely malformed. I shall reject Tooley's arguments, 
showing that his position cannot be consistently held, 
therefore, a position adopting rationality as the criterion 
determining a being's right to life is inconsistent. 
On the opposite side of the abortion spectrum we find 
philosophers arguing that abortion is not morally defensible, 
or only defensible under rare conditions, such as when the 
life of . the mother is endangered by the pregnancy and a 
continuation of the pregnancy is likely to result in the death 
of both mother and child. These philosophers may argue that 
even though a foetus is not yet a person, it has the potential 
for becoming one, and therefore already has a right to life. 
7 
I shall turn to John Noonan's arguments as they are often 
regarded as an adequate defence of a being's intrinsic worth 
based on its potentiality. Most of his arguments can be 
rebutted, even the dramatic shift in potential between a 
spermatozoon and a zygote (on which basis his argument rests) 
if the potential of the female egg cell is taken into account. 
Having shown the difficulties Noonan runs into in employing 
potential to reject the moral permissibility of abortion, I 
shall introduce an important distinction, namely between 
"possible persons," "potential persons," "beings having the 
capacity ·for personhood," and "actual persons." I shall not 
reject potentiality as a suitable criterion determining 
whether or not a being has a right to life. In order to be 
capable of defending potentiality, I shall employ the 
distinction between potential, possible, and actual persons, 
and having the capacity for personhood. In order to do so, I 
8 
shall employ Langerak' s "Potentiality principle," which 
states: 
11 
"If, the normal course of its development, a being 
will acquire a person's claim to life, then by virtue of 
that fact, it already has some claim to li , 
Once the potentiality principle has been explained, I shall 
examine whether an abortion can be justified under normal 
circumstances. I shall argue that once a relationship has 
been established between the mother and the zygote, even 
though this relationship is initially only a physical one, an 
abortion is not morally justifiable. I shall therefore argue 
that once implantation of the fertilised egg has taken place, 
terminating the new life is under normal circumstances not 
morally justifiable. 
Once I have rejected rationality and adopted potential as 
the criterion determining a being's right to life, I shall 
examine specific cases in which a pregnancy may be terminated. 
These are cases in which the pregnancy did not come about by 
mutual consent (implicit or explicit}, or the pregnancy does 
not proceed normally (posing a serious threat to the mother), 
or it is determined that the foetus will be abnormal to such a 
degree as to attain no human characteristics other than the 
biological. In that chapter I shall also argue point 1 above, 
that a couple voluntarily engaging in sexual intercourse, 
explicitly or implicitly consent taking responsibility for a 
possible pregnancy that may occur. 
In Chapter 4 I shall focus on the arguments put forward 
by Judith Jarvis Thomson pertaining to points 2 and 4 above. 
Thomson endeavours to argue that even if the foetus is a 
9 
person, cannot override the rights of the mother to 
determine what happens in and to her body. She states, 
however, at the end of her article, that a foetus is not a 
person and hence abortion is always morally permissible. I 
10 
shall turn to the arguments by Jane English, showing that it 
is not the case that nonpersons have no rights. In some 
instances they even have a right to life. 
12 
In Chapter 5, I shall turn to the issue of sentience to 
defend the claim that sentient beings have a stronger right to 
11 
life than nonsentient ones. The arguments of L. W. Sumner 
will be elucidated. Contrary to Sumner, however, I shall 
argue that sentience cannot serve both as an inclusion and a 
comparison criterion. I shall argue that "being ive" ought 
to be adopted as the criterion of inclusion, "sentience" as 
the criterion of comparison within a given species, and 
"potential" as a comparison criterion between different 
species. Theories attempting to employ only one criterion run 
the sk of oversimplification, purchasing simplicity at the 
price of accuracy. Turning to abortion, I shall agree with 
Sumner that a late-term abortion is more serious than an 
early-term one, a phenomenon that may be explained by 
employing "sentience." Unlike Sumner, however, I shall not 
argue that abortions are always permissible if the foetus is 
still pre-sentient. Since I shall already have argued that 
abortion due to rape is morally defensible, I shall then 
qualify this permission by arguing that an abortion due to 
rape ought to be performed during the morally least 
objectionable period (when the foetus has the weakest right to 
life), which is during the pre-sentient period. 
In order to defend point 5 above, it will be necessary 
r me to first examine whether life is always meaningful. Is 
it morally defensible to abort a foetus that will never 
acquire any personhood status, such as an anencephalic infant? 
I shall argue that li is not to be sustained under all 
rcumstances, that their are lives filled with nothing but 
pain and suffering. I shall defend the stance that abortion 
is permissible, even during the late stages of pregnancy, if 
it becomes evident that the child will be severely mentally 
retarded, so as never to be capable of acquiring any 
significant human characteristics other than the biological. 
12 
Anencephalies are an example. My 
however, ·morally justify the abortion 
arguments shall 
of all foetuses 
not, 
with 
13 
congenital problems. Even many children with Down's Syndrome, 
for instance, can live meaningful, although (by comparison) 
simple lives. 
As I have already stated, I 
oriented approach to deal with the 
have adopted a rights-
issue of abortion. In 
recent decades, however, a growing number of philosophers have 
questioned the adequacy of such an approach, claiming that the 
traditional approaches of modern ethics are incapable of 
providing adequate descriptions, explanations, and guidelines 
of ethical conduct. They argue that these shortcomings can be 
overcome by returning to a virtue-oriented approach. In 
Chapter 7 I shall examine virtue ethics, its nature, 
advantages and disadvantages, as well as the arguments by 
13 
Rosalind Hursthouse, who applies virtue ethics to the issue 
abortion. I shall then also explain why I have adopted a 
rights-oriented approach to deal with the issue of abortion. 
Before beginning with a rejection of rationality, I wish 
to mention a few points ~egarding the literature I have used. 
The reader will become aware that I have used a substantial 
amount of literature from the 1970s as the basis of my 
arguments. Examples are Tooley ( 1972) , Noonan (197 0) , and 
Thomson (1971). The reason for my doing so can be defended. 
In my opinion they can be seen as paradigms representing their 
respective approaches towards abortion. Philosophers still 
frequently refer to ato and Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Kant 
and Mill, to mention only a few. There is hardly a book 
dealing with depth psychology that does not refer to Freud, 
Jung, or Adler, and zoologists still frequently refer to 
Darwin. ·Although much has been written on abortion since the 
1970s, I believe that no writer has surpassed the ones I have 
chosen in their respective approaches. Tooley's text is 
undoubtedly the most important in attempting to establish a 
being 1 s right to li on the basis of rationality. Noonan 1 s 
text is paradigmatic in arguing against abortion on the basis 
of probability. Using such texts as paradigms should not 
create the opinion that these texts are beyond cri cism. 
14 
Psychology may again serve as an example, where 
Jung's or Adler's views are hardly ever used without 
Freud's, 
least 
some modi cations. Similarly, Tooley's, 
Thomson's views are rejected or modi ed by 
Gensler (1986), Singer (1993), Langerak (1979), 
Noonan' s and 
the views of 
Levin (1985), 
and Marquis (1989), to mention only a few. A look at the 
bibliography shows that less than a third of the texts 
consulted were from the 1970s, slightly more than a third from 
the 1980s, and approximately a third from the 1990s. From the 
foregoing I also do not wish to give the impression that all 
paradigmatic texts are from the 1970s. Sumner's (1985) and 
Hursthouse's (1991) texts are also paradigmatic, which is also 
reflected in this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REJECTION OF RATIONALITY AS 
THE DETERMINING CRITERION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I shall examine rationality as a possible 
criterion determining a being's right to life. It is often 
assumed that we humans are distinguished from other living 
beings by our rationality. And this rationality, s ability 
to reason, gives us a right to li Were this simply to be the 
case, many humans at both ends of life's continuum, foetuses, 
infants, the comatose, the senile, and the mentally deranged, 
would not qualify as beings with a right to life. Influential 
philosophers, however, such as Michael Tooley and Peter Singer, 1 
to mention only two, have attempted to defend the criterion of 
rationality as the determining criterion determining a being's 
right to li 
16 
The standard conservative argument against abortion may 
concisely be stated as follows: 
Premise 1: It is wrong to kill an innocent human being. 
Premise 2: The foetus is an innocent human being. 
Conclusion: Therefore, it is wrong to kill a foetus. 
Attempts at dismissing this argument have assumed different 
forms: often the validity of one of the premises is denied, very 
often the second one. Sometimes both premises are accepted, but 
it is denied that the conclusion follows from them. 
It is often assumed that the term "human" is beyond 
dispute 1 that it has only one possible meaning. This is, 
however, not the case. Let us suppose we were visited by beings 
from another planet that exhibit characteristics that would 
allow us to label them as rational beings. Would they be 
humans? Some would assert their humanity on the grounds of their 
rationality, while others would deny that they are humans 
because they are not members of the species Homo sapiens. 
Perhaps we may say that the aliens are human in one sense, whi 
not in another. What about the foetus? The foetus is not yet 
capable of exhibiting rationality, but is a member of the 
species Homo sapiens. In a biology laboratory clear 
distinctions are made between human foetuses and, for instance, 
cat foetuses. In the genetic sense, therefore, the foetus is 
human. In a census, foetuses are not counted as being part of 
the population. In the population census sense then, the foetus 
is not .human. 
A human2 li has been claimed to begin at various points. 
Various points have been put forward at which a being receives 
rights, especially the right to life. I shall use the term 
"person" to stand for a being possessing a right to life. When 
then does a human being become a person? Here too, various 
points on the continuum of development have been proposed -
conception, implantation of the zygote, quickening, birth, and 
when the being becomes self-conscious and rational, to name only 
17 
a few. How are we to determine which criterion to adopt? This 
is a conceptual problem, one that cannot be resolved by 
scientific investigations. Scientific findings can determine 
whether a specific individual is a person in some specified 
sense, for example, that a being is rational, but cannot assist 
us determining which criterion, or set of criteria to employ. 
If, for this investigation, we assume that only persons have a 
serious right to life, then the above standard conservative 
argument can be restated as follows: 
Premise 1: It is wrong to kill an innocent person. 
Premise 2: The foetus is an innocent person. 
Conclusion: Therefore, is wrong to kill a foetus. 
In this chapter I shall be primarily concerned with the 
criterion of rationality, especi ly with the arguments put 
forward by Michael Tooley (1972a). Tooley attempts to argue for 
a moral jus fication of abortion, as well as infanticide, by 
denying the validity of the second premise (denying that the 
foetus is a person) , and thereby dismissing the conclusion. I 
shall argue that Tooley's views, the acceptance of abortion 
under normal circumstances, cannot be consistently held. In 
order to do so, the universalisability principle, the 
prescriptivity principle, and a version of the Golden Rule will 
be employed. Subsequent to this I shall provide two examples of 
murder to illustrate that Tooley's arguments would compel us to 
endorse such conduct as morally acceptable, since it would not 
be the killing of a rational being, a being with the capacity to 
desire a continuous existence. Adopting rationality as the 
criterion determining a being's right to life would not only be 
inconsistent, but would also not accord with our general 
feelings, sentiments and attitudes. 
Section 2. 2 begins with a detailed exposition of Tooley's 
arguments. Tooley deemed it necessary to qualify a premise of 
his argument (2.3), and in 2.4 the implications of Tooley's 
argument are presented. I then turn to an evaluation and 
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criticism of Tooley's argument, showing in 2.5 that a weakness 
of his argument is that one premise requires qualifications. I 
argue that more qualifications can be given than Tooley claims. 
In section 2.6 I argue that arguing for a being's right to li 
by employing rationality as the table criterion leads to 
inconsistency, and in 2. 7 I show that even if it were not to 
lead to inconsistency, it would still lead to unacceptable 
consequences. 
2. 2 TOOLEY' S DEFENCE OF ABORTION AND 
INFANTICIDE 
Michael Tooley endeavours to discover a condition that any 
organism must satisfy to have a right to life. It will become 
evident that the condition he settles upon is not met by 
foetuses and infants, which leads him to the conclusion that 
foetuses and infants do not have a right to life. Therefore, 
unless there are objections other than claiming that foetuses 
and infants have a right to life, the practices of abortion and 
infanticide are morally justified. 
It is very difficult, if not impossible, Tooley maintains, 
to formulate an acceptable liberal position on abortion without 
simultaneously examining the question of infanticide. At what 
stage in the development of a human being is it permissible to 
destroy it? At what point on the continuum of development can a 
line be drawn that is justifiable and does not appear arbitrary? 
Tooley clearly points out that the conservative's objection is 
not that since there is a continuous development from conception 
to birth, one is compelled to conclude that if it is mo ly 
unjustifiable to kill a new-born baby, then it is similarly 
morally unjustifiable to de roy a zygote, or a being at any 
intermediate stage. Rather, the conservative insis that if we 
judge the lling of a new-born baby as morally unjustifiable, 
but justify the killing of a zygote, or a human being at any 
19 
ermediate stage, then a clear, nonarbitrary difference must 
be shown between a new-born baby and a zygote, or a being at any 
intermediate stage (Tooley 1972a: 221). The conservative raises 
a similar point when confronting someone defending the practice 
of infanticide, asking what relevant difference between an adult 
human being and a new-born baby can be pointed out that gives 
the former a right to life, but not the latter. 
In the case of abortion, Tooley denies that any of numerous 
events, such as quickening, can be taken as relevant cut-off 
points, since he denies that any of these points represents a 
morally significant change in the being's development. On the 
other hand, if one wishes to defend infanticide, one needs to 
gain a clear view of what makes a being a person, what gives a 
being a right to life (Tooley 1972a: 221). If every foetus is a 
person, maintains Tooley, then abortion would be jus ed only 
under very extreme circumstances, such as to save the li of 
the mother. But, he further argues, if the tus is not a 
person, then there can be no plausible moral objection to 
killing 
For the purposes of his argument, Tooley uses the term 
"person" synonymously with "X has a serious moral right to 
life." He believes that for a being to have rights, it does not 
automat ly follow that it so has a right to life. He 
grounds this claim by maintaining that given choice of being 
tortured for an hour, or being killed, almost 1 people would 
choose the former. Thus, it seems correct to say that it is 
worse to kill an adult human being than to torture one for an 
hour. On the other hand, he denies that it is seriously wrong 
to kill a new-born kitten, but believes it seriously wrong 
morally to torture one for an hour. This suggests that new-born 
kittens may have a right to not being tortured for an hour, 
without having a serious right to life. It seems to be the case 
that an individual has a ght to something if· he wants that 
thing, and it would be wrong for others to deprive him of it. 
Therefore, if a ki does not want to have a series of 
sensations inflicted on it, does not want to be tortured, then 
20 
kitten has a right not to have those sensations inflicted 
on it, has a right not to be tortured. Tooley hereby maintains 
to have given a basis for the claim that it does not 
automatically follow that every being that has rights also has a 
ght to li (Tooley 1972a: 223). He also distinguishes 
between the terms "person" and "human being," arguing that these 
terms are not synonymous, · and therefore not interchangeable. 
Certainly a new-born baby, a foetus, and even an embryo are all 
human beings, i.e. they all belong to the human species. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that they are also 
persons. A being's qualifying as a person depends on whether or 
not the being in question has a right to life. Having made this 
distinction, it needs to be stressed that the dispute regarding 
abortion can be a factual or a moral question. It may be 
occupied with whether a given being has the properties in 
question, or the dispute may focus on the properties a being 
must have in order to be a person, order to have a right to 
life. The disagreement, therefore, need not be a factual one 
(Tooley 1972a: 224). 
Proceeding to the central question, what properties should 
a being have in order to have a right to life? At what stage in 
the development of an organism belonging to the species Homo 
sapiens does it exhibit these properties, thereby having a right 
to life, and hence qualify as a person? The first question 
raises a moral issue. By answering it one lays down the 
principles one ought to accept when conferring the right to li 
upon a being. The second question is factual. By answering it 
the identification of the propert s decided upon is merely a 
descriptive matter. 
Tooley claims that an organism has a serious right to li 
"only if it possesses the concept of a self as a continuing 
subject of experiences and other mental states, and believes 
that it is itself such a continuing entity" (Tooley 1972a: 225). 
Now, to ascribe a right to an individual to as some prima 
facie obligations of other indi victuals to act, or to refrain 
from acting in certain ways. These obligations are conditional 
21 
however, being dependent on the individual to whom the right is 
ascribed, depending on the individual's having certain desires 
pertaining to that right. Therefore, "A has a right to X" means 
"A desires X, and others are under an obligation to refrain from 
actions that would deprive A of X." Let us examine for the 
moment, whether a being, such as a machine, that lacks 
consciousness can have desires, and hence possess rights. The 
answer depends on the definition we are prepared to adopt. If 
we interpret desires in solely behaviouristic terms, then a 
machine may indeed have desires. A chess computer, such as the 
now famous "Deep Blue" makes moves and adopts strategies that, 
according to its computational abilities, give it the best 
chances of defeating its opponent. Behaviouristically we may 
say, "Deep Blue has the desire to win." With this definition of 
"desire," an object that lacks consciousness can have rights. 
If desires are states necessarily standing in relation to 
certain states of consciousness, however, then computers or 
machines lacking consciousness can by definition not have 
rights. Tooley adopts the latter definition (Tooley 1972a: 225-
226). The above formulation may now be restated as follows: "A 
has a right to X" is roughly synonymous with "A is a subject of 
experiences and other mental states, A is capable of desiring X, 
and if A does so, then others are under a prima facie obligation 
to refrain from actions that would deprive A of X." This 
formulation is then applied to the concept of a "right to life." 
When one speaks of a right to life, Tooley argues, one 
speaks of more than just the right to a continued biological 
existence, one speaks of a right to continue having experiences 
and other mental states. He illustrates this with an example. 
If medical technology should at some time in the future make it 
possible to reprogram a being's brain, giving him a new set of 
attitudes, memories and behavioural responses, most people would 
believe that a person will have been destroyed, even though no 
biological element will have been harmed in the process. 
The final stage in the argument is merely to question what 
characteristics a being must have in order to be capable of 
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desiring to continue existing as a subject of experiences and 
other mental states. Fundamental to this is the fact that the 
things a being can desire are limited by the concepts it 
possesses. One can only desire a proposition to be true if one 
understands the proposition, but in order to understand a 
proposition, one needs to understand the concepts involved. 
Thus one's range of possible desires is limited by the concepts 
one possesses. An entity, therefore, cannot desire that 
continued experiences and other mental states exist unless that 
entity possesses the concepts involved. An entity also cannot 
desire that it itself continue existing as a subject of 
experiences and other mental states unless it believes that it 
is presently such a subject. A necessary condition for a being 
having a right to life is, therefore, for that being to have the 
concept of a "self" as a continuous subject of experiences, and 
that it believes that it is itself such an entity (Tooley 1972a: 
22 6-227) . Tooley therefore argued, a being can only have a 
right to X if it desires that X, and in order to do so, it must 
possess the concepts involved. Foetuses and infants do not 
possess the concepts to desire a continued existence. 
Therefore, foetuses and infants do not have a right to life, and 
abortion and infanticide are morally acceptable practices. 
2.3 TOOLEY QUALIFIES A PREMISE 
Having drawn his conclusion, Tooley feels compelled to qualify a 
number of claims made in order for his theory to stand up to 
anticipated criticisms. It may be objected that if a person 
does not desire something then one cannot violate his right to 
it. This may firstly occur when a person's desires are 
incongruent as a result of emotional disturbance. For example, 
an adult may fall into a temporal state of depression during 
which he expresses the wish that he were dead. In such a case 
one would violate that person's right to life if one were to 
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kill him or her. Secondly, a previously conscious individual 
who is temporarily unconscious still has a right to life. 
Tooley insists that it can be argued that the person would have 
certain desires if he or she now were conscious, and thus still 
has a right to life. Thirdly, when a person's desires have been 
distorted by indoctrination or conditioning, he does not loose 
his ght to li A person brainwashed in such a manner in 
order for him to believe that he would be rewarded if he were 
sacrificially offered, still has a right to life, even though he 
may not presently express the appropriate desire. Here too it 
may be said that the person would desire to live if he were not 
indoctrinated or conditioned. Thus, an individual's right to 
life cannot only be olated if the being now desires to live, 
but so if the being would desire to live if it were not for 
(1) his present state of emotional imbalance, (2) temporal 
unconsciousness, or (3) his having been conditioned (Tooley 
1972a: 227). But, Tooley maintains that these exceptions do not 
weaken his argument of a being's being capable of possessing the 
concepts in order to have the desire. He insists that his 
argument does not require the desire to be present in order for 
a being to have a ght to life, but rather the capability of 
possessing the concepts involved (Tooley 1972a: 228). 
2.4 IMPLICATION OF TOOLEY'S ARGUMENT 
The implication of Tooley's argument for foetuses and infants is 
clear. Neither foetuses nor infants are capable of possessing 
the concepts involved in a right to li , and thus cannot desire 
to have a continued existence. Tooley claims to have given a 
moral justi cation of both abortion and infanticide. 
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2. 5 TOOLEY'S QUALIFICATIONS DESERVE 
CRITICISM 
Tooley recognises that persons have a right to li But only 
beings that are rational can be persons, and hence have such a 
right. The human foetus, even though may develop into a 
rational being, is not classified as a person by Tooley, and 
therefore has no right to life; it currently has no more rights 
than the foetus of a rat, or any other animal. A foetus cannot 
have a right to li because rights are conceptually linked to 
desires, therefore a being is only capable of having rights if 
it has desires. Tooley argues: 
Premise 1: A being can have a right to X only if that 
being desires X. 
Premise 
because for 
concept of 
have} . 
2: No foetus de res continuous existence 
this the foetus would have to possess the 
a continuous self (a concept it cannot yet 
Conclusion: Therefore, no foetus has a right to a 
continued existence, i.e. no foetus has a right to life. 
In order to make the first premise accord with our general 
attitudes towards rights, Tooley deems it necessary to add 
qualifications. A being has a right to X only if it desires X, 
or else it would desire X if were not for ( 1} emotional 
imbalance, (2) temporal unconsciousness, or (3} conditioning to 
desire otherwise. 
Gensler3 (1986: 97} correctly points out that we need 
further qualifications if the rst premise is to harmonise with 
our general intuitions. If we maintain that the dead have 
certain rights, for instance, the ght to have their wills 
carried out, then we must add (4} the being did des X when 
was alive. If we believe that an infant has the right not to be 
given a disease, then we must add, or (5} the being would desire 
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X, if it had the necessary concepts. If we accept s latter 
point, then we cannot agree with Tooley that a being can only 
desire something of which it possesses the concepts. Now if we 
believe that foetuses and infants have a right to li , then we 
might add (6) or if a being has the potential of growing into a 
rational being and then would desire to have had X. 4 
The problem of Tooley's argument is that the first premise 
needs quali cations. Which qualifications to accept is itself 
a conceptual issue, and may vary with our present desires, 
intuitions and beliefs. 
2.6 THE RATIONALITY CRITERION LEADS TO 
INCONSISTENCY 
Gensler (1986: 99) has successfully argued for consistency 
when arguing about abortion, showing that Tooley's ews may not 
be consistent. He employs the universalisability principle and 
the prescriptivity principle, and a third consistency 
requirement derived from these two principles - a version of the 
Golden Rule. An example is. used to illustrate these principles, 
as well as how the third follows from the other two: 
( 1) If you are consistent and think that it would be 
acceptable to do action A to X, then you would think that 
it would be appropri for action A to be done to you in 
relevantly similar circumstances. 
(2) If you are consistent and think that it would be 
acceptable for someone to do A to you in relevantly similar 
circumstances, then you will consent to someone doing A to 
you in relevantly similar circumstances. 
(3)Therefore, if you are consistent and think that it 
would be acceptable to do A to X, then you will consent to 
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someone doing A to you in relevantly similar circumstances. 
(GR) . 
The first premise is justified by the universalisability 
principle, which demands that we make similar moral judgements 
about similar situations, regardless of the people involved. 
Thus, if I believe that it is acceptable for someone to assault 
Smith, but do not believe that it is acceptable for someone to 
assault me in relevantly similar circumstances, I am 
inconsistent and violate the universalisability principle. The 
second premise is justi ed by the prescriptivity principle, 
which demands that our ethical beliefs are kept in harmony with 
the rest of our lives. Thus, if I believe that an action would 
be acceptable, but deny that it ought to be done, then I violate 
the prescripti vi ty principle and am inconsistent. The 
conclusion is a form of the Golden Rule (GR}. If I think 
would be acceptable to assault Smith, but I do not consent or 
approve being as saul ted in similar circumstances, I am 
inconsistent and violate GR (Gensler 1986: 99-100). 
Most people do not consent to being assaulted under normal 
rcumstances, and therefore would not be consistent if they 
held that assaulting under normal circumstances is permissible, 
because thereby they would violate the consistency principle 
(GR) . This argument illustrates that one would be inconsistent 
if one held a certain desire or belief and formulated an ethical 
view that would not accord with the given belief or desire. A 
person could escape the conclusion if he did not care whether he 
were assaulted or not. In such a case the second premise would 
not hold. This investigation will assume that the reader does 
not desire to be assaulted,. blinded or killed. If the contrary 
should be the case, then the conclusions drawn will not apply to 
him or her. 
A similar argument may be given pertaining to abortion. 
Imagine for a moment that you were aborted as a foetus. If you 
do not like the idea, then you cannot consistently hold that 
abortions ought to be permi.ssible. Or we could say, as Tooley 
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would like us to do, that as an ignorant foetus you did not know 
enough, did not possess the relevant concepts, in order to have 
been against the abortion. In the latter case the argument 
would not hold. Before proceeding to abortion, it is necessary 
to examine the workings of GR more closely. 
GR is concerned with my present reaction to a hypothetical 
case, and not how I would react if I were in the hypothetical 
situation (Gensler 1986: 100). The following examples will add 
clarity: 
( la) Issue: Do I think it permissible to assault X 
while X is asleep? 
(lb)Right question: Do I now consent to my being 
assaulted while asleep? 
(lc) Wrong question: If I were assaulted while asleep, 
would I consent to the action while asleep? 
(2a) Issue: Do I think it permissible to violate X' s 
will after his death? 
(2b)Right question: Do I now consent to my will being 
violated after my death? 
(2c) Wrong question: If my will is violated after my 
death, would I then, when dead, consent to this action? 
The point I here wish to make is that in order to be consistent 
in answering "yes" to the issue, I must also answer "yes" to the 
right question. I must also be willing to answer "no" to the 
wrong question. It must be kept in mind that GR is concerned 
with my present reaction towards a hypothetical case, and not my 
actual reaction the hypothetical situation. GR is not 
concerned with the "wrong question." Let us examine a case with 
a foetus. 
(3a)Issue: Do I think it permissible to blind X while 
X is a foetus? 
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(3b) Right question: Do I now consent to the idea of 
having been blinded whi I was a foetus? 
(3c)Wrong question: If I were blinded while a foetus, 
would I then, while a foetus, have consented to my having 
been blinded. 
Gensler asks us to imagine that a sadistic mother injected 
herself with a substance that would cause blindness in her 
developing foetus, but would do no harm to herself. Could this 
be acceptable? Could you assent to your mother having done this 
to you? The answer is almost certainly an emphatic "no!" The 
"no" is equally as emphatic regardless of the stage of pregnancy 
at which the injection would have been administered. If you are 
consistent and believe that blinding a foetus is permissible, 
then you will equally believe that blinding you while you were a 
foetus would have been permissible. But you do not believe, 
under normal circumstances, that blinding you while you were a 
foetus would have been permissible, therefore, you do not 
believe that blinding a foetus under normal circumstances is 
permissible. 
premise will 
assented or 
Applying the 
difficulties. 
development. 
It may be assumed that for most people the second 
be true - most people can be presumed not to have 
approved of this act having been done to them. 
Golden Rule to the foetus poses no special 
It may be applied to any stage of our 
Critics may respond that the above argument presumes that 
my present self and my foetus are identical. This need not be 
the case. The questions could be reworded in order not to 
presuppose this, without any detriment being done to the 
argument. "Do I now consent to having been blinded while a 
foetus?" can be rewritten as "do I now consent to the foetus 
having been destroyed from which I developed?" (Gensler 1986: 
102) . 5 I cannot will the destruction of any component in the 
chain of events that lead to my existence. To be consistent, 
therefore, I cannot also not be indifferent to the existence of 
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my ancestors, since I would not now exist if they had not 
existed. 
In the case of abortion we need merely substitute the 
blindness drug with a lethal drug to arrive at a similar 
conclusion when applying GR. The sadistic mother of our example 
could have killed the foetus by using the lethal injection, or 
other method of abortion. Do we think that this would have been 
acceptable? Can we assent to this having been done? Could you 
have approved of the action, or assented to it your own case? 
Again the answer is normally an emphat "no!" This "no" does 
not vary in emphasis depending on when the abortion is 
performed. It is equally emphatic when considering any stage 
a development has begun (Gensler 1986: 103). 
If you believe that abortion is permissible under normal 
circumstances, and wish to be consistent, you must believe that 
would have been acceptable for you to have been aborted under 
normal circumstances. 
( 4a} If you are consistent and believe that abortion 
ought to be permissible under normal circumstances, then 
you will consent to the idea of your having been aborted 
under normal circumstances (GR} . 
( 4b} You do not consent to your having been aborted 
under normal circumstances. 
(4c) Therefore, if you are consistent, you will not 
hold abortion to be permissible under normal circumstances. 
It may again be presumed that for most people the second premise 
is true. Most people will not consent or agree to the idea of 
an abortion having been done to them. Most people who are 
consistent will therefore not agree that abortion is morally 
permissible. 
The question that needs to be answered is whether a person 
opposed to infanticide and the blindness drug can consistently 
hold that under normal circumstances it would have been 
acceptable if he had been aborted. Such a person could be 
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consistent, but the consistency would have unusual consequences. 
Imagine someone with the following beliefs: 
(5a) It is wrong to blind an adult, child, infant, or 
foetus. 
(5b) It is wrong to kill an adult, child, or infant; 
but it is permissible to kill a foetus. 
To be consistent the person would have to answer the following 
questions as follows: 
"Do you consent to being blinded now?" 
"No." 
"Do you consent to the idea of having been blinded as a 
child?" 
"No." 
"Do you consent to the idea of having been blinded as an 
infant?" 
"No." 
"Do you consent to the idea of having been blinded as a 
foetus?" 
"No." 
"Do you consent to your being killed now?" 
"No." 
"Do you consent to having been killed as a child?" 
"No." 
"Do you consent to having been killed as an infant?" 
"No." 
"Do you consent to having been killed as a foetus?" 
"Yes." 
Is it not odd that the person disapproves of being blinded at 
the various times, and disapproves of being killed at the first 
three times, but is indifferent to being killed at the last? He 
opposes the blinding at each time because the effect would be 
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the same, he would be blind. He opposes killing at the first 
three times because the ef would be the same, he would not 
be alive. But nor would he be alive if were killed at the 
fourth time, as a foetus. The "yes" here is somewhat strange. 
A person who does not bel his li to be worth living could 
well answer "yes" at any of the other stages as well (Gens 
1986: 104). 
·Gensler (1986: 105) anticipates another line of criticism. 
If you believe that it would have been wrong for you to have 
been aborted, would it not be equally wrong if you would not 
have been conceived, if your actual development would not have 
been allowed to initiate? The result would have been the same, 
you would not now be alive, there would be no you. If we are 
against abortion, ought we not also to be against any prevention 
of conception? Gensler admits that his rst reaction to his 
parents not having allowed his development by practising 
contraception, for instance, is negative at the outset. 
Subsequent to reflection, however, the universalising 
requirement forces him to change his reaction. If I maintain 
that it had been wrong for an abortion to have been done in my 
case, then I must also maintain that it is wrong for an abortion 
to be performed 'in any relevantly similar situation. I can 
maintain that in general it is wrong to perform an abortion. 
Similarly, if I maintain that it is wrong to prevent conception 
by abstinence or contraception, then I would have to maintain 
that it is wrong in all relevantly similar circumstances. I 
cannot hold, however, that in general it is wrong to prevent a 
new human li to begin developing. The consequences would be 
over population of a yet inconceivable extent. It should 
therefore be evident that one cannot will as a universal law a 
general prohibition against abortion, but not one against 
initiation of human life. 
The above has shown that 
criterion determining a being's 
into conflict with consistency. 
defending 
right to 
rationality as the 
life generally comes 
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2. 7 RATIONALITY AS A CRITERION WOULD LEAD 
TO UNACCEPTABLE CONSEQUENCES 
As we have seen, Tooley argues for rationality as the criterion 
by which a being receives personhood status, receives a right to 
life. It has been shown that such a stance can, under normal 
circumstances, not usually be consistently held. But let us 
once again assume for the moment that rationality is a suitable 
criterion for conferring the right to li on a being, and that 
therefore, abortion and infanticide are. acceptable practices. 
For the moment, I shall only be concerned with infanticide. 
Could we get used to such practices under normal.circumstances, 
seeing them as "normal" behaviour? I quote two striking examples 
by Michel Foucault: 
"In Paris in 1827, Henriette Cornier, a servant, goes to 
the neighbour of her employers and insists that the 
neighbour leaves her daughter with her for a time. The 
neighbour hesitates, agrees, then, when she returns for the 
child, ette Cornier has just killed her and has cut 
o her head which she had thrown out the window. 
In Vienna, Catherine Ziegler kills her illegitimate 
child. On the stand, she explains that her act was the 
result of an irresistible force. She is acquitted on 
grounds of insanity. She is released from prison. But she 
declares that it would be better if she were kept there, 
for will do it again. Ten months later, she gives 
birth to a child which she kills immediately, and she 
declares at the trial that she became pregnant for the sole 
purpose of killing her child. She is condemned to death 
and executed" (Philp 1994: 71). 
If we were to accept Tooley's definition of personhood, as 
well as the implications of his theory, then neither Henriette 
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Cornier nor Catherine Ziegler could be convicted or condemned 
for any serious offence. Henriette Cornier may be charged with 
destruction of property, but certainly not for murder. It could 
not be murder, since the being was not yet a person, was not yet 
rational. Catherine Ziegler too would not be guilty of any 
serious offence. Indeed, her case it may be argued that she 
not even guilty of any crime, s the infants she killed 
were her own, therefore did not even violate a property 
offence against another. Such would be the implications of 
Tooley's theory. Surely we cannot will such practices to become 
universally acceptable? I am convinced that the conclusions 
drawn from ethical theories must always be in balance with our 
feelings and sentiments. Accepting rationality as the criterion 
determining a being's right to life has consequences that are 
normally not congruent with our feelings and sentiments. Social 
contract theories, especially the theory formulated by John 
Rawls 6 .(1971), stress this point. Rawls maintains, if we were to 
draw up a set of rules from behind a veil of ignorance for a 
society, we would decide in such a manner that our decisions 
would not conflict with our general beliefs and attitudes. 
2.8 SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE 
In this chapter rationality was examined as a criterion 
determining a being's right to life. Special focus was thereby 
taken on the arguments of Michael Tooley. Tooley argued, a 
being can only have a right to X if it desires that X, and in 
order to do so it must possess the concepts involved. Foetuses 
and infants do not possess the concepts to desire a continued 
existence. Therefore, foetuses and infants do not have a right 
to life, a.nd abortion and infanticide are morally acceptable 
practices. 
In order to silence possible criti sms, Tooley deemed it 
necessary to qualify the rst premise of his argument. He did 
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so by maintaining that a being does not only have a right to X 
if it presently desires X, but still has a right to X if the 
being would desire X, were it not for his or her being asleep, 
temporarily unconscious, or conditioned to desire otherwise. I 
showed that a weakness in Tooley's argument is that his first 
premise requires qualifications, and other qualifications, other 
than Tooley's may be added. For instance, a being has a right 
to X if, in the normal course of its development, it will 
acquire the capability to desire X. 
It has also been argued that to defend the practice of 
abortion (and infanticide) , is to be inconsistent. The 
uni versalisabili ty principle, the prescripti vi ty principle, and 
a version of the Golden rule were applied. If I find the 
practice of abortion acceptable, I must, if I wish to be 
consistent, believe that it would have been acceptable if I were 
to have been aborted. 
Finally, I showed that Tooley's defence of abortion and 
infanticide would have practical consequences we would normally 
label absolutely unacceptable. A theory dealing with applied 
ethics should have conclusions that accord with our general 
beliefs, feelings, and sentiments. 
Having rejected rationality as a sui table criterion 
determining a being's right to life, it is necessary to examine 
potential. In the next chapter, I shall defend potential as a 
suitable criterion. If we return to the qualifications 
necessary for Tooley's first premise, it was shown that a 
possible qualification could also be that a being has a right to 
X if, in the normal course of its development, it would attain 
the concepts for desiring X. To endorse this qualification is 
to endorse a being's potential regarding rationality. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A DEFENCE OF POTENTIAL 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Let us now focus our attention on potential. The question that 
needs to be answered is, whether potential can be suitably 
employed to defend a being's serious right to life. I shall 
argue in a later chapter that all living beings have some right 
to life, but the issue currently under investigation is, when 
does a being have a serious right to life. By "serious right" 
is meant "cannot be overridden without significant 
justification." Is the claim that a foetus has a serious right 
to life in virtue of its potential to develop . into a person 
defensible? Before proceeding any further, let us first ask what 
potential is. What do we mean by "potentiality?" 
"Potentiality," or "latent ability," is a second-order capacity 
of an object or being to acquire, develop, or regain another 
(first-order) capacity. A normal new-born infant has the 
potentiality to speak English, meaning that it has the capacity 
to acquire the ability to speak English. Dogs, chimpanzees, or 
36 
dolphins, for example, do not have this potential (Honderich 
1995) . In this chapter, when speaking of the potential of a 
foetus, reference is made to the being's :inherent ability to 
develop into a person (a human being that can reason, 
communicate, participate in the social community of humans, 
etc.). 
In this chapter I shall defend potential, arguing that it 
is a sui table criterion determining a being's serious right to 
life. 
I shall first turn to the arguments of John Noonan1 (1970a), 
who made a laudable effort to defend potential, and is often 
cited as having given a theory defending a being's right based 
on potential. A detailed exposition of his arguments is given 
in 3.2. Noonan's achievements will be highlighted (3.3), but I 
shall also argue that most. of his arguments can be rebutted, 
even the dramatic shift in potential from a spermatozoon and a 
zygote (which forms the core of his argument), if the potential 
of the female egg cell is taken into account. Having shown the 
difficulties Noonan failed to confront, I shall make an 
important distinction ( 3. 4), namely between "possible persons," 
"potential persons," "beings having the capacity for 
personhood," and "actual persons." An important principle, the 
potentiality principle, will also be introduced. Based on these 
arguments, I shall argue that an abortion is under normal 
circumstances not morally defensible. Once implantation has 
taken place the developing foetus has a serious right to life 
based on its inherent potential. Abortion prior to 
implantation, such as by using a morning-after pill, or an 
intrauterine device (IUD), will be shown to be morally 
acceptable, since the potential of the being is not yet 
activated, the genetic plan has not yet begun to unfold. In 
later chapters I shall argue that the foetus's serious right to 
life can be overridden by the right of the mother to determine 
what happens in and to her body if the pregnancy is a result of 
rape (did not come about by a voluntary act), or does not 
develop "normally" (poses a threat to the mother's life or long-
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term health) . I shall also argue that if the foetus does not 
have the potential to acquire any human characteristics other 
than the mere biological, an abortion is also acceptable. But 
these latter points shall be defended later. Let us now turn to 
Noonan's arguments. 
3.2 Noonan's DEFENCE OF POTENTIAL 
John T. Noonan (1970a) identifies "how to determine the 
humanity of a being" as the most fundamental question concerning 
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abortion. He examines several criteria (viability, experience, 
the sentiments of adults, communication), rejecting them in 
favour of the criterion of probability. 
Noonan points out that viability is often considered as the 
threshold prior to which a being is not considered human, while 
beyond it is. In this regard the life of the foetus is 
absolutely dependent on the life of the mother. 
dependence exists, the being is denied human 
As long as this 
status. One 
difficulty regarding this approach is that advances in applied 
medical science,may increase the viability of a foetus at ever 
earlier periods. It is not inconceivable for a foetus to become 
viable at any stage in its development being capable of 
developing normally within an incubator. Successful experiments 
in this regard have already been undertaken with some animals. 
This elasticity of viability poses a real problem. Mere length 
of existence does not determine viability. The viability of a 
foetus depends on its anatomical and functional development. 
Weight and length are more reliable guides to its development 
than age, but weight and length vary from foetus to foetus. In 
addition, foetuses of different racial groups vary in viability. 
There is evidence suggesting that some foetuses of black races 
reach viability sooner than some white foetuses. 3 If viability 
is therefore to be the determining criterion, then a being's 
right to life would vary with race and many other variables. 
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The most important objection to this approach is that dependence 
is not ended by viability. Even a five-year-old child is still 
completely dependent on the care of another if it is to survive. 
A young child or an old foetus will surely die if left without 
care, just as the young foetus would if detached from the mother 
(Noonan 1970a: 215-216). Therefore, Noonan rejects the 
criterion of viability for determining the humanity of a being. 
A second distinction frequently employed is experience. A 
being who has experienced, who knows joy and suffering and has 
memories, is regarded more human than a being who has not. This 
distinction also does not furnish us with an adequate standard 
of differentiation. An eight-week-old embryo responds to 
stimulation, and hence is capable of experiencing, even if only 
in a very basic manner. At an earlier stage the zygote is also 
alive and responsive to its environment. If experience were to 
be the standard for determining human status, we would be 
compelled to withdraw or at least reduce the level of humanity 
of a person with sudden memory-loss (Noonan 1970a: 216). 
Furthermore, this distinction would leave an older foetus, or a 
young child, with the status of being an "unformed inhuman 
thing." If experience is to be the criterion determining a 
being's humanity, then different degrees of experience might 
serve to distinguish different levels of humanity. A person who 
has learned and loved may then be regarded as more human than 
one who has not. 
A third distinction between human and nonhuman beings is 
sometimes made by appealing to the sentiments of adults. Adults 
do not usually mourn over the death of their foetus to the same 
degree as they would over their five-year-old child. The foetus 
is an unnamed "it" until birth, and does not have a distinct 
personality until at least the fourth month of existence, when 
its presence becomes noticeable through movements in the womb. 
But feeling is also not a reliable, universal guide for 
identifying humanity. People of other races and cultures have 
often been seen as subhuman due to their superficial 
differences, for example of skin colour, language, and religion. 
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Moreover, the death of an adolescent is generally mourned to a 
greater extent than the death of a neonate, or a very old person 
(Noonan 1970a: 216). The difference in loss felt, or the 
intensity of the grief experienced, depends on the 
potentialities destroyed, or the experiences terminated. There 
seems not to be any marked difference between an infant, young 
child, adolescent or grandfather. 
A· distinction is also made in terms of sensation 
experienced by the parents. The embryo is felt only after about 
the fourth month after conception, and is seen only at birth. 
Needless to say, what can be neither seen nor felt is different 
to what is tangible. If the foetus cannot be perceived or 
touched at all, it cannot be perceived as human. Experience 
shows, however, that sight is less reliable than feeling in 
establishing human status. The evil of racial discrimination 
was given foundation when by sight colour became an appropriate 
index for declaring who is human. Noonan appropriately points 
out that touch furnishes similar difficulties; a person who is 
confined out of touch through sickness is not thereby considered 
any less human (Noonan 1970a, 216-217). 
The final distinction Noonan rejects is that of social 
visibility. The foetus is not perceived as communicating with 
others, and therefore cannot be said to be a member of the 
social community. As moral rules are made to apply between 
members of a society interacting with one another, moral rules 
do not apply to foetuses, since they do not interact with 
members of society. This argument maintains that because the 
foetus is excluded from the society of humans, it is also 
excluded from the humanity of humans. If such an argument were 
to be sound, the precarious potential would be created in which 
large groups could be dehumanised by denying them any status in 
their society (Noonan 1970a: 217) . This has unfortunately been 
the fate of many people, and 
eighty-four" by George Orwell. 4 
denied almost all human rights. 
is well portrayed in "Nineteen-
In the Roman Empire, slaves were 
The most appalling example can 
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be found in Germany under Hitler. All Jews were categorically 
labelled as subhuman, thus leaving them with no human rights. 
Having rejected the appeals to viability, experience, 
visibility, and feeling, Noonan puts forward the following 
consideration. "Moral judgements often rest on distinctions, 
but if these are not to appear arbitrary, fiat, they should 
relate to some difference in probability" (Noonan 1970a: 218) . 
Life may be regarded as a continuity, of which the early stages 
have a far lower probability of developing further than do the 
later ones. In every normal ejaculation, for instance, there 
are at least 200-million spermatozoa, only one of which may 
unite with an ovum to form .a zygote. Once sperm and ovum have 
united at conception, the likelihood of spontaneous abortion 
occurring is about one in five. At conception there is hence a 
huge leap in probability, 
potentiality in a being's 
.accompanied by 
life. Noonan 
an immense 
emphasises 
surge in 
that the 
argument based on probability does not seek to establish 
humanity, but that it may establish an objective discontinuity 
that may be considered in moral discourse. In everyday 
activities we generally base our actions and decisions on 
probabilities, and in law and morals accountability is often 
established by taking the probabilities of negligence or 
prudence into account. If you shoot at a movement in a forest, 
knowing that the chance of hitting a person is 200-million to 
one, no reasonable person will hold you accountable for 
negligence. If the chance is four out of five, few will be 
willing to acquit you from blame. The probabilities as they 
exist, do not show the humanity of the embryo, just as the 
probability of the movement in the trees being a person is not 
absolutely certain. The argument focuses on the decisional 
element in any moral judgement and assumes that part of the task 
of the moralist is drawing lines. The difference in probability 
on either side of the line is evidence for the nonarbitrariness 
of the line drawn. By destroying a spermatozoon, one destroys a 
being that had less than a one in 200-million chance of 
developing into a being with a human genetic code, with a heart 
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and functioning nervous system, with the ability to reason and 
experience pleasure and pain. If one destroys a foetus, one 
destroys a being already endowed with the genetic human code, 
able to respond to stimuli, possessing a heart and central 
nervous system, and one that had a roughly eighty percent chance 
of developing further into a being capable of being sustained 
outside the womb, and developing further into a reasoning being. 
The positive argument for drawing the line at conception, beyond 
which destruction would be reckless behaviour, is that at 
conception the being receives the genetic code. "It is this 
genetic information, which determines his or her 
characteristics, which is the biological carrier of the 
possibility of human wisdom, which makes him or her a self-
evolving being" (Noonan 1970a: 219). A being with a human 
genetic code is man. 
To regard the foetus as having equal rights with other 
human beings is not to decide every instance in which abortions 
may be undertaken. To assert that the foetus is human is to 
assert the foetus's right to choose its own destiny, which could 
not be taken from it by another person's decision. Human beings 
with equal rights often come into conflict with one another, and 
some decision must be made as to whose interests ought to enjoy 
preference. Noonan maintains that cases of conflict involving 
the foetus are different only in two respects, namely, that the 
foetus is totally unable to defend its own interests, and the 
fact that the right of the foetus regularly at stake is the 
right to life itself (Noonan 1970a: 219). Catholic doctrine 
approved of abortions only if they were not a direct result of 
the action performed. An example is removing a cancerous 
uterus. The theologians employed the terms "direct" and 
"indirect." Therefore the principle of "Double effect" was 
employed, which demands 
(1)an action ought only to be performed if it is good 
in itself, or at least indifferent; 
(2)only the good consequences of the act are intended; 
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( 3) the good consequences are not the effect of the 
evil; and 
(4)the good consequences are commensurate with the 
evil consequences (Sterba 1997: 118) 
They used these spatial metaphors to draw lines, or balance 
values. Noonan maintains that the metaphors point out that for 
the moral questions at issue, comparisons were necessary. "The 
principle of double effect was no doctrine fallen from heaven, 
but a method of analysis valid where two relative values were 
being compared" (Noonan 1970a: 219). Not even Catholic 
teachings gave the life of the innocent an absolute value. The 
infant's life was always given a value greater than zero, 
independent and separate from the lives of the parents. Even 
though the foetus is human, the interests of the mother could 
override its interests if her life was at stake. Her interests 
were only regarded as overriding in the case of an ectopic 
pregnancy or a cancerous uterus. In both cases the chance of 
the foetus surviving is extremely small. Here too, abortion may 
be seen to have been justified on the basis of probability 
(Noonan 1970a: 219-220). 
Noonan has therefore argued against abortion on the basis 
of the being's probability. Only when the mother's life is 
endangered by the pregnancy does he acknowledge the moral 
permissibility of performing an abortion. Without the abortion 
the foetus would also only have a very slight chance of 
surviving. Noonan's views are therefore commensurate with the 
doctrine of double effect. 
To summarise Noonan's arguments: He challenges defenders of 
abortion to draw any line after conception that would not be 
arbitrary in determining a human being's serious right to life. 
He employs the criterion of probability to argue for conception 
as the point at which a human being receives its serious right 
to life. At this point the being receives its full genetic 
code, the code that determines his humanity and controls the 
unique development of the being. 
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3.3 EVALUATION AND CRITICISM 
Noonan is correct in rejecting an arbitrary point on the line of 
development of a human being, such as viability, since such a 
line may vary depending on the extent of medical technology, 
methods and techniques available, and from foetus to foetus. If 
viability were adopted as the criterion, as has indeed been done 
by some legal systems, 5 then we are left with the strange 
position, wherein a foetus of six months today would have a 
serious right to life in most medically advanced countries, 
while three decades ago such a being would not have had such a 
right. Such a criterion could also not have universal relevance 
today, since medical equipment would make a foetus viable at six 
months in one country, whereas the lack of such equipment would 
render it not viable in another. Consistent reasoning in such a 
case would compel us to grant a six-month-old foetus a serious 
right to life in one country, while not in another, depending on 
the state of medical care in the country in question. The 
location of the mother does not change the nature of the foetus, 
so why should it affect its right to life? The liberal response 
may be that the nonviable foetus is totally dependent on the 
mother, and the mother has the right to decide over the life of 
the developing child. Such an argument is also not acceptable, 
and must be rebutted, since a being that is totally dependent on 
another has not forfeited all his rights to the other. A hiker 
seriously injured in the mountains may be totally dependent on 
his companion to get help. An aged mother may be totally 
dependent on her daughter. A baby is totally dependent on its 
mother, if no other person is there to give assistance. I am 
sure that almost everyone will agree that none of these 
relationships involving dependence would justify killing the 
dependent person on the grounds of his or her dependence. 
If viability is not appropriate, then quickening (the time 
at which the foetus's movements first become perceptible) is 
equally inappropriate. Quickening is merely the time at which 
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the foetus is first felt to move of its own accord. 
Scientifically speaking, however, it does not mark any 
significant change in the foetus's development. Ultrasound 
studies have shown that the foetus moves long before the mother 
is able to feel its movements. In addition, the capacity for 
physical movement ought never to be a criterion employed for 
determining a person's serious right to life. We do not usually 
believe that paralysed people no longer have a right to go on 
living. 
On the basis of only its actual characteristics, many 
opponents of abortion will agree that the foetus compares 
unfavourably with nonhuman animals. A contemporary philosopher, 
Peter Singer, arguing on similar lines to Michael Tooley, 
writes: 
" For on any fair comparison of morally relevant 
characteristics, like rationality, self-consciousness, 
awareness, autonomy, pleasure and pain, and so on, the 
calf, the pig, and the much derided chicken, come out well 
ahead of the foetus at any stage of pregnancy. While if we 
make the comparison with a foetus of less than three 
months, a fish would show more signs of consciousness. My 
suggestion then is that we accord the life of a foetus no 
greater value than the life of a nonhuman animal at a 
similar level of rationality, self-consciousness, 
awareness, capacity to feel, etc. Since no foetus is a 
person, no foetus has the same claim to life as a person" 
(Singer 1993: 151) 
When we consider the potential of a foetus to become a human 
being, however, membership of the species Homo sapiens is 
important. Seen in this light, even Singer admits that the 
foetus "surpasses any chicken, pig, or calf" (Singer 1993: 151). 
Examining the argument pertaining to potential, which 
Noonan employs, its main elements may be stated as follows: 
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Premise 1: It is wrong to kill a potential person. 
Premise 2: The foetus is a potential person. 
Conclusion: Therefore, it is wrong to perform an abortion. 
The second premise of this argument is stronger than the 
second premise of the argument dealing with actual persons 
because, whereas it can and has frequently been questioned, and 
denied by some that the foetus is a person, it cannot be denied 
that the foetus is a potential person. This second premise is 
true, whether by person we mean "member of the species Homo 
sapiens," "being capable of rational thought," "being capable of 
sentience," or any other characteristic, or set of 
characteristics persons generally acquire during their 
development. Critics of the argument from potential contend, 
however, that the stronger second premise of this argument is 
acquired only by a weakening of the first premise. They 
challenge the contention that the killing of a potential person 
is just or almost as wrong as killing an actual person. 
"It is of course true that the potential rationality, self-
consciousness, and so on, of a foetal Homo sapiens 
surpasses that of a cow or pig, but it does not follow that 
the foetus has a stronger claim to life" (Singer 1993: 
153). 
Critics such as Singer deny that there is a rule that 
grants any potential X the same rights as an actual X, and they 
substantiate their objections with numerous examples. To pull 
out a sprouting acorn is not equivalent to cutting down a fully 
grown oak. Dropping a live chicken into a pot of boiling water 
is not tantamount to dropping its egg into the same water. Your 
being a potential president of your country does not now give 
you the same rights as the president. As a medical student, you 
do not now have the same rights as a doctor. When faced with a 
potential X, the critics demand that specific reasons be given 
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why this potential X should now be granted the same rights as an 
actual X. 
Opponents of abortion sometimes counter the refutation of 
the argument from potential by arguing that the potential of a 
foetus does not give it certain rights, but that to destroy such 
a foetus is to deprive the world of a future rational and self-
conscious being. If rational and self-conscious beings are 
intrinsically valuable, then to deprive the world of such beings 
is wrong. Not much deliberation is needed to see that this 
argument does not argue against the performing of all abortions, 
or even to abort a pregnancy that is inconveniently timed. Not 
all abortions deprive the world of rational and self-conscious 
beings; Suppose a woman learns that she is pregnant six months 
before she is to go on a long-awaited trip to Greece. She is 
married, has no children at present, and firmly intends to have 
a child soon after returning from her long-awaited trip. The 
pregnancy is unwanted only because it is inconveniently timed. 
Opponents of abortion would judge an abortion under such 
circumstances particularly outrageous, since neither the life 
nor the health of the mother is at stake, only her trip to 
Greece. If abortion is wrong only because it deprives the world 
of a future rational, self-conscious person, then this abortion 
is not· wrong. It would do no more than delay the entry of a 
rational, self-conscious person into the world. This argument 
against abortion would also compel us to condemn other 
practices, such as contraception and abstinence on days when the 
woman is likely to be fertile, and celibacy, if we wish to be 
consistent. 
With the argument from potential it is sometimes argued 
that modern genetics has determined that the fusion of sperm and 
ovum creates a never to be repeated informational speck, and 
therefore all destruction of foetal life is to be classified as 
murder. Why should this, this alone, lead us to this 
conclusion? A canine foetus is also absolutely unique, with a 
genetic makeup that is never again to be repeated. This 
argument implies that it is as wrong to abort a canine foetus as 
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a human one. When identical twins are conceived the genetic 
code is exactly repeated. Yet the value of twins is not less 
due to their genetic duplicity. The first successful cloning of 
a sheep, "Dolly," in Scotland, and subsequent success with a 
higher primate in the USA, has brought the once considered 
fictional reality of human cloning to a possibly near reality. 
If a person were to be cloned, surely we would not value him or 
her less, accord him or her less rights, because of his or her 
scientifically induced duplicity. Surely, the existence of 
identical twins and the possibility of human cloning do not 
diminish the seriousness of abortion. Cloning could make it 
possible for the woman wishing to travel to Greece to abort the 
foetus, have a cell-sample taken from the aborted foetus, and 
have a cell re-implanted after her return. Surely, this cannot 
satisfy the opponents of abortion, who argue that abortion 
destroys a genetically unique individual. 
Although I have here pointed out some problems involved in 
arguing against abortion on the grounds of the developing person 
having a unique, or at least very special genetic constitution, 
I do believe that the human genetic constitution can serve as a 
basis for arguing against most abortions. The fact that the 
actualised genetic code gives us a potential for developing into 
a person is important. Before I give my arguments for this 
position, however, further objections need to be considered to 
Noonan's line of reasoning. 
As we have seen, Noonan argues for our moral reasoning to 
be based on the difference in probabilities before and after 
conception. If a spermatozoon is destroyed, one destroys a 
being that had a chance of no more than one in 200-million of 
developing into a rational being, possessing the human genetic 
code, a heart, central nervous system, and capable of 
experiencing pleasure and pain. If an embryo is destroyed, one 
destroys a being already possessing the human genetic code, 
which had a four in five likelihood of developing further into a 
baby outside the womb, and who in time would exhibit 
rationality. Peter Singer ( 1993: 161-163) attempts to dismiss 
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Noonan's arguments on factual grounds. Singer states that 
Noonan's figures for embryo survival are no longer accurate. 
This is confirmed by Louw: 
"It is estimated that up to 50 % of all fertilised egg 
cells are spontaneously aborted during the first few weeks, 
usually without the mother ever knowing that she was 
pregnant. Of the zygotes that survive the first three to 
four weeks after fertilisation, a further 10 to 25 % are 
spontaneously aborted, an occurrence known in lay terms as 
a "miscarriage"" (Louw 1991: 101-102). 
If pregnancy is diagnosed within fourteen days of fertilisation, 
the probability of a birth resulting is 25 to 30 percent. Only 
at about six weeks after fertilisation does the probability 
increase to above 80 percent. Singer claims: 
" once we substitute the real probabilities of 
embryos, at various stages of their existence, becoming 
persons, Noonan's argument no longer supports the moment of 
fertilisation as the time at which the embryo gains a 
significantly different moral status. Indeed, if we were 
to require an 80 percent probability of further development 
into a baby (the figure Noonan himself mentions), we would 
have to wait until nearly six weeks after fertilisation, 
before the embryo would have the significance Noonan wants 
to claim for it" (singer 1993: 161-162). 
It here needs to be pointed out that Singer's argument 
against Noonan is not as significant as he claims. Even if at 
conception the embryo has a probability of only 25 to 30 percent 
of developing further into a baby, and become a feeling, 
thinking, rational human being, the shift in probability at 
conception is still most impressive, if we keep in mind that a 
spermatozoon has only an approximate chance of at most one in 
200-million. Even if, to return to Noonan's example, the 
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probability of my random shot into the bushes has a one four 
(25 percent) probability of killing a person, I would most 
certainly be held accountable for my action, while at one in 
200-million I would almost certainly be acquitted from blame. 
Noonan neglects considering the female contribution in 
fertilisation. In contrast to the 200-million to 500-million 
sperms released by the male in every ejaculation, the woman 
usually only releases one egg cell per month. At birth the 
female has approximately 400000 rudimentary egg cells, many of 
which will, however, atrophy before she reaches puberty. At the 
beginning of puberty she has only about 150 000 egg cells le 
and only about 400 will reach maturity between puberty and the 
menopause. During ovulation, which takes place about every 28 
days in reproductive females, an egg cell is released when a 
mature follicle (a sac surrounding the egg cell) bursts (Louw 
1991: 101) . It thus becomes evident that the female egg cell 
does not compete with others for fertilisation, since usually 
only one is released per month, and even if more than one is 
released, they do not compete with each other, and may both be 
fertilised, in which case nonidentical twins may develop. If we 
adopt Noonan's 1 of reasoning about potentiality, then the 
female egg cell must have a signi cantly higher moral value 
than a male spermatozoon, since the female egg cell has a much 
higher probability of developing further. In the case of the 
female egg cell, no significant shift probability occurs at 
conception. Before conception only one egg cell is in the 
running, just as after conception. The implications of Noonan's 
argument lead us to conclude that the destruction of a female 
egg cell is morally more serious than destroying a male sperm 
cell. Why should there be a difference? Neither has the 
capacity of developing further if not involved in a highly 
significant event - the fusing with an opposite sex cell. 
Peter Singer (1993: 162) illustrates one further dif culty 
in Noonan's reasoning. Medical s ence has developed a means of 
overcoming male infertility resulting from a low sperm count. 
The female egg cell is removed from the woman's body. A single 
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spermatozoon is then micro- ected under the outer layer of the 
egg. If we now compare the probability of the embryo becoming a 
person, together with the egg and single spermatozoon, picked up 
by the needle, about to be injected into the egg becoming a 
person, it is not possible to make any sharp distinction between 
the two. Once the scientist picks up a single spermatozoon, its 
probability of developing further is ready significantly 
increased. Must we therefore conclude that it would be wrong to 
stop the procedure once the spermatozoon has been picked up? I 
am sure that almost no one will answer in the affirmative. 
3. 4 A DEFENCE OF POTENTIAL WITH AN ADDED 
DISTINCTION 
Although the foregoing has shown that arguing from probability, 
as Noonan has done, poses dif culties not easily overcome, I 
shall claim that the argument based on probability has 
significance if it is not used 
preconception and post-conception. 
to make added dist ions. 
as a comparison between 
In doing so is necessary 
Edward A. Langerak6 (1979: 287) formulates the potentiality 
principle as follows: 
"If, in the normal course of its development, a being will 
acquire a person's claim to life, then by virtue of that 
fact, it already has some claim to life." 
To clarify this princ le it is necessary to distinguish between 
"possible persons," "potential persons," "beings having the 
capacity for personhood," and "actual persons." 
An "actual person" is a being fulfilling a necessary 
condition, or set of necessary conditions for personhood, 
whatever that may be. Thereby, his claim to personhood, his 
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serious ght to life, is as strong as that of normal adult 
persons. 
A being has a "capacity for personhood," if it presently 
does not exhibit that capacity, but has previously undergone 
ficient development to be capable of presently exhibiting 
such a capacity. A temporarily unconscious person, or a person 
asleep can be described as having a "capacity for personhood." 
A "potential person" is a being is not yet an actual 
person, but will become one in the normal course of its 
development. Infants, foetuses, and a fertilised egg already 
implanted in the mother's womb can be labelled "potential 
persons," because if their· development proceeds normally, they 
will become actual persons. By "normal development" is here 
meant the teleological . function, not the statistical 
probability. If the natural function of "a" is to become "A", 
then it is highly probable that without interference "a" will 
become "A". 
A "possible person" is a being that could, if certain 
causally possible conditions are realised, become an actual 
person. Female egg cells and male spermatozoa are possible 
persons. y will only be able to develop towards, and 
ultimately become an actual person, if a speci possible 
causal event is realised, namely their fusion at conception and 
implantation. 
It is important to distinguish between the class of 
potential and possible persons on the one hand, and future 
persons on the other. "Future persons" are persons that do not 
now exist, but will be actual persons the future. Possible 
and potential persons need not necess ly become actual persons 
fact many do not). 
The di inction between a "possible person" and a 
"potential person" is of utmost importance, since the 
potentiality principle asserts that the latter, but not the 
former, has a claim to li The principle is consistent in 
granting full personhood to beings with a capacity for 
personhood. Potential persons and actual persons are not on a 
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par. People asleep are not endangered by the 
"potential persons," since they are not potential 
have the capacity for personhood. 
category of 
persons but 
The potentiality principle asserts that a potential person 
has a claim to life, even if it is one weaker than that of an 
actual person. The unique status of the potential person has to 
do with its predetermined tendency, its inherent thrust. A 
potential person is more than just a set of blueprints, it is an 
organism, a being that will itself develop into an actual 
person, towards which it is already developing. Its 
predetermined tendency does, however, not already give it the 
rights it will have in the future, rights it will have as an 
actual person. In addition., I agree with Langerak (1979: 289), 
maintaining that those agreeing with the potentiality principle 
assert some derivative relationship between the rights 7 a being 
will have in the normal course of its development, and those 
that it has in the present. As actual persons we are oriented 
to our past and our future by our self-consciousness so that we 
may be described as being our past as well as our present. From 
an internal perspective, a law student may now already see 
himself as the lawyer he strives to become, not just as a law 
student. This is also true from an external point of view, a 
point of view that extends to humans that are not yet actual 
persons. When we see a young child, for instance, we may see 
within that child something of the adult it will, in the normal 
course of its development, become, as well as something of the 
infant or baby that it once was (Langerak 1979: 289). It may be 
assumed that in this temporal perception an explanation is to be 
found for the respect we feel towards former persons, for 
example, the respect we feel towards the dead, as well as former 
presidents, and the like. The respect we have for former 
persons, presidents, and the like, is not equal to the respect 
we have for actual persons and presidents, but is proportional 
to, and derivative from the latter. Similarly, perceiving 
humans in a temporal context accounts for the respect many feel 
humans deserve by virtue of their potential. A potential 
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president, for instance, is not merely a possible president. He 
or she has already won the election, but has not yet been sworn 
in on some arbitrarily determined date. He or she is not yet 
Commander in Chief of the armed forces, but in the course of 
normal developments "will," not "could," be. The potential 
president receives much of the respect shown the actual 
president, and this respect is derivative from the high office 
he will attain in the normal course of developments. Now, those 
who argue that presidents are not to be respected merely by 
virtue of their high office, should agree that some respect 
granted persons derives from their "office of personhood," apart 
from their achievements. Langerak points out that traditionally 
the respect involving a claim to life derives from what persons 
are, rather than what they achieve or fail to achieve. 
Therefore, perceiving humans in a temporal context should elicit 
some respect for former and potential persons, respect that is 
derivative from and proportional to, though not identical with, 
the respect elicited by the actual persons they were or will 
become (Langerak 1979: 289). 
Many may endorse this argument, feeling that it accounts 
for our repulsion from keeping former persons alive to use their 
organs when they are needed. Whatever we may assert about 
former persons, one thing is absolutely clear, they were once 
actual persons. Potential persons, however, are not yet actual 
persons, and there is no guarantee that they will become actual 
persons. Even when we do perceive persons in a temporal 
context, the contingency of the "not yet" makes the class of 
potential persons asymmetrical with the class of former persons. 
This realisation necessitates our questioning what the moral 
significance of the predetermined tendency of potential persons 
is. Although potential persons are not guaranteed personhood, 
they are distinguished from possible persons by a dramatic shift 
in probability. As Langerak points out (1979: 289), this 
difference is similar to that between a possible president and a 
potential president. In a democracy, everyone is a possible 
president, but only few of us ever become potential presidents. 
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"The potentiality principle asks us to respect the 
potential person by virtue not of what it could be, but 
what it will be the normal course of its development" 
(Langerak 1979: 289). 
Let us for the moment consider people in an irreversible coma. 
Most people will agree that the irreversibility of the coma is 
seldom, if ever, absolutely certain. We generally bel 
however, that it is morally irresponsible to allow the rare, 
miraculous recovery to prevent one from acting on the best 
medical prognosis when no reasonable hope of recove is 
present. To shut off a respirator when there is an even chance, 
or even a chance of only one in fifty of recovery, may be seen 
as morally wrong, but not when the probability of recovery tends 
to zero. Judgements of high probability are o the only kind 
we have in an uncertain world. Therefore, dramatic shifts in 
probability are morally signi cant. In this regard, Noonan is 
correct, although he is incorrect in arguing that an abortion 
has a high probability of killing a person. As should be ear 
from the argument, it rather kills a human being that has a high 
probability of becoming an actual person, but is still a 
potential person. I therefore maintain that the high 
probability potenti persons becoming actual persons is 
morally signi cant for those of us perceiving humans in a 
tempo context. 
With the potentiality principle it has been argued that the 
unborn human being, by virtue of its potenti i ty to become a 
person in the normal course of developments, deserves respect 
and has a serious right to life. It is important to mention 
that the genetic code gives potential persons their value. The 
genetic code will, in the normal course of developments, bring 
forth an actual person. It is not the genetic code itself that 
is of value, but the potent with which it endows the being. 
Human cancer cells, for instance, also have the human genetic 
code, yet we do not believe it immoral to destroy such cells 
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potential person, is irresponsible if no signi cant reasons are 
available. The significance between the implanted and the not 
yet implanted zygote is that the former has bonded with the 
mother, and thereby established a relationship with the mother, 
a relationship that enables the developing organism to unfold 
its potential. 
3.5 SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE 
This chapter began by examining the arguments expounded by John 
T. Noonan in an effort to establish a foetus's serious right 
life based on its potential. His reasons for rejecting the 
teria of viability, experience, the sentiments of adults, and 
communication were elucidated. In favour of these criteria, 
Noonan attempted to defend the criterion of potential. The core 
of his argument was found to depend on the dramatic shift in 
potential of a spermatozoon at conception. It was shown, 
however, that Noonan's claim is not as significant as he claimed 
it to be, because he failed to take the female egg cell into 
account. female egg cell does not experience such a shift 
in potential. Halting the procedure of micro-injecting a sperm 
into a. female egg cell was also shown not to be immoral, 
although the sperm cell now already had experienced a dramat 
shift in potential, if seen from Noonan's perspective. 
The argument put forward by opponents of abortion, claiming 
that the abortion of a human foetus is to deprive the world of a 
unique, rational being, also cannot be upheld. I argued that 
genetic duplicity, as in mono-zygotic twins or cloned 
individuals, would not diminish the value of an individual. In 
addition, removing the genetic code from a foetus to be cloned 
later so does not satisfy the proponents of the above 
argument. 
Despite numerous criticisms directed at 
attempts to defend potential, I argued that the 
the initial 
criterion of 
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developed a dependency relationship with the mother (Louw 1991: 
119) . 
Until the developing being has established this 
relationship of dependence with its mother, it is not morally 
wrong to employ measures that will avoid an implantation. Even 
contraceptives that act as abortive agents in the strict sense, 
such as the morning after pill or the intrauterine device (IUD), 
are morally acceptable. Why are these acceptable? Why is it 
permissible to prevent the implantation of a fertilised ovum? As 
is by now clear, the potentiality principle demands that a human 
being be respected and granted a serious right to life when it 
becomes a potential person. But when does a being become a 
potential person? When does the genetic code become activated 
towards developing into a person? As has already been mentioned, 
fertilisation alone is not sufficient for the ovum to actualise 
its potential; implantation is necessary. It is well-known that 
cell division begins soon after sperm and ovum fuse. Scientific 
evidence suggests, however, that prior to implantation the cells 
of the zygote are not activated towards becoming a person. 
Every higher animal starts life as a fertilised ovum, the 
process of fertilisation and implantation initiates the process 
by which a new individual develops (Callahan 1970: 380). 
Abortion before implantation, before development is 
properly activated, as is the case with a morning-after pill, or 
by using an intrauterine device (IUD), would therefore not 
necessarily be the destruction of a potential person, but only a 
possible person, and can therefore be seen as morally 
unobjectionable. 
Although it is likely that less than half of all fertilised 
egg cells develop into babies, the implanted zygote already 
deserves respect and has a serious right to life. This 
statistical bias in favour of potential life is not irrational. 
As has been previously mentioned, turning off the respirator of 
a comatose patient that had an even chance, or even only a one 
in fifty chance of recovering, is morally irresponsible and 
indefensible. Similarly, aborting the implanted zygote, a 
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because their potential is not directed towards a positive 
result. Therefore, it cannot be argued that a fertilised ovum 
has a special value merely because it possesses the human 
genetic code. Such a code alone is not sufficient. This point 
can be illustrated with another example. Suppose an ovum is 
externally fertilised in a laboratory, as is now routinely done, 
before implanting the fertilised egg back into the woman's body. 
If the scientist were accidentally to drop one such fertilised 
ovum, would we accuse him of having accidentally destroyed a 
potential person? I believe not. Fertilisation is a necessary 
condition for potential personhood, but is not a sufficient 
condition. In order for the fertilised ovum to be able to 
develop further in a systematic manner, implantation is 
imperative. 
But now, it needs to be asked, how strong is a foetus's 
serious right to life? I presume that most people will agree 
(even those arguing for the permissibility of abortion at any 
stage of pregnancy) that late-term abortions are more difficult 
to justify than early-term ones. Although th~ potentiality 
principle accounts for the unborn human deserving respect and 
having· rights, it is not able to account for the difference 
perceived between a young foetus and an almost mature one. The 
criterion of sentience, explaining the difference, will be 
discussed in a later chapter. 
Approximately 24 to 36 hours after a spermatozoon and an 
egg cell unite, cell division begins. While cell division takes 
place, the cell mass travels along the Fallopian tube and 
reaches the uterus after three to four days. After the zygote 
has reached the uterus it floats freely for two to three days in 
the fluid of the uterine cavity before attaching itself to the 
wall of the uterus a process known as implantation, which 
lasts for about 24 hours. It has now established a connection 
to the mother, enabling it to be nourished by her body and 
thereby develop further. The new individual is no longer an 
independent and free-floating organism, but has instead 
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potential can successfully be defended. The potentiality 
principle was introduced, specifying that a being has a 
potenti to develop into an X, if, in the course of its normal 
development, it will become an X. In virtue of its potential, 
it derives its value from the value it will have as an actual X. 
The distinctions between "possible persons," "potential 
persons," "beings having the capacity for personhood," and 
"actual persons" was made. The potentiality principle asserts 
that a.foetus has a serious right to life, even if it is weaker 
than the right of an actual person. 
Having established that foetuses possess a serious right to 
life in virtue of the potential, in virtue of the being 
potential persons, the que ion was necessarily asked, at what 
stage they become potential persons, at what point their genetic 
potential becomes actualised. Scientific findings indicated 
that only after implantation, not immediately after conception, 
the genetic plan begins to unfold. 8 Therefore, a. rtilised egg 
prior to implantation cannot yet be considered as a potential 
person, but only as a possible one, and hence the use of devices 
or pills that prohibit implantation of a lised egg are 
morally unobjectionable. Although potential is a suitable 
criterion for conferring a serious ght to li upon a 
potential person, this criterion is not capable. of adequately 
explaining why we bel a late-term abortion, for instance, to 
be morally more serious than an early-term one. In Chapter 4 I 
shall argue that sentience is the terion explaining this 
belief, and is the suitable criterion for comparing beings of 
the same species at di rent levels of development. 
Having established a foetus's serious right to life, the 
task of arguing for the permissibility of abortions under 
specific conditions now lies ahead. For instance, I claim that 
it is mo ly acceptable to perform an abortion when the 
pregnancy is the result of rape, or when the pregnancy seriously 
threatens the long-term well-being of the mother. I shall 
defend these claims in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DEFENDING ABORTIONS OF 
HOSTILE PREGNANCIES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having established the foetus's serious ght to li in virtue 
of its potential, I am now faced with defending the position 
that abortion is sometimes justified. In this chapter I shall 
argue that an abortion is morally justifiable when the pregnancy 
threatens the li or long-term health of the pregnant woman, or 
when the pregnancy is the result of rape. 
I shall first turn to the arguments of Jane English (1975) 
and Judith Jarvis Thomson (1971a), both arguing for the 
permissibility of abortion under certain circumstances. English 
employs the self-defence model to abortion, while Thomson argues 
from numerous analogies, especially a now famous violinist 
analogy. 
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The main focus of this chapter will be pregnancies I regard 
as hostile. By "hostile" I mean pregnancies that are the result 
of rape, or pregnane that threaten the li or long-term 
health of the mother. The former are hostile because they are 
an intrusion, i.e. the pregnancy was in no way consented to by 
the woman. The latter are hostile because even if the woman 
willed the pregnancy, she willed a normal pregnancy, and not a 
threatening one. 
In 4. 2 and 4. 3 I introduce the approaches of Jane English 
and Judith s Thomson respectively. These approaches are 
then applied to different situations. In 4. 4 the extreme anti-
abortion view is discussed.. This is the view that abortion is 
never morally justifiable, not even to save the life of the 
pregnant woman. In 4.5 Thomson's and English's views regarding 
the performing of an abortion on behalf of a third party are 
discussed. The issue is important, because if we hold that a 
woman is entitled to an abortion, it also needs to be clear 
whether someone may perform for her. It will become evident 
that intervention on behalf of a third party is fully justified, 
and often even required. The focus is then shifted to subtler 
cases in which the life of the pregnant woman is not endangered, 
but only her long-term health may be affected. Thomson also 
asks, what is involved in having a right to life. Does the 
right to life entail being given the bare minimum to survive? 
What if one has no right td be given what is needed to survive? 
This is examined in 4. 7. Following this, in 4. 8, Thomson asks 
whether the foetus has a right to use the mother's body. She 
argues that it does not. In 4.9 I make clear that Thomson 
argues that there are conceivable cases in which it would be 
indecent to abort a foetus, but it would never violate its 
rights. Section 4 .1 0 deals with cri cism of the foregoing 
sections. I do agree with the foregoing, however, that an 
abortion is justifiable when the life or long-term health of the 
pregnant woman is endangered, or when the pregnancy is the 
result of rape. At the end of her argument, Thomson reminds us 
that she only assumed the personhood status of foetuses for the 
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purpose of her investigation, but that she regards foetuses as 
nonpersons, and hence their abortion is never morally 
problematic. In 4. 11 is therefore necessary to examine the 
validity of her assumption, and I shall argue that nonpersons 
have rights too, and sometimes even a right to life. 
4.2 ENGLISH AND THE SELF-DEFENCE MODEL 
1 
What makes a person? Jane English (1975: 249) li s numerous 
factors constituting a person. To be a person is to be 
descended of humans, to have a specif genetic makeup typical 
of humans, human limbs and bodily organs, being capable of 
locomotion, breathing, eating, sleeping, i.e. biological 
factors. ence, consciousness, having the concept of a 
self, having interests and desires, the ability learn a 
language, use tools, to j , to be angry, to love and to enjoy, 
i.e. psychological factors. There are factors of rationality, 
namely to reason and draw conclusions, the ability to learn from 
past experiences, to be able to generalise, and to act 
prudentially. Social factors are identifiable, such as the 
ability to work in groups, to adapt to the needs .and demands of 
others, to recognise the interests of others, to .see oneself as 
one among many, and the ability to give and evoke sympathy, 
encouragement, and love from others. Being subject to the law 
and being protected by it, having the ability to claim legal 
rights. and enter contracts, having a name and citizenship are 
examples of legal factors. We cannot identify a specific core 
of factors that needs to be present order for a being to 
qualify as a person. Persons generally exhibit rationality, but 
a being that fails to do so may still be considered a person. 
On the other hand, a being exhibiting most of the factors named 
might still not be recognised as a person, as an advanced robot 
might. This is not to assert that no necessary or sufficient 
conditions can be given. Being alive is certainly a necessary 
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condition for being a person, but not a sufficient one. Being a 
supreme court judge is a sufficient condition, but not a 
necessary one. Engli ( 197 5: 250) maintains that the foetus 
lies a position in which it is not as simple to assert or 
deny personhood. 
What would the assertion of personhood of a foetus entail? 
English {1975: 251) explains that if the foetus is held to be an 
innocent person, and killing it is always wrong, then we need to 
elaborate this assertion with qualifications in order to give it 
credence. To attain such a conclusion, the proposition "killing 
of an . innocent person is always wrong" would need to be 
asserted. But this is not the case. Killing self-defence is 
justified. English elaborates her point by asking us to imagine 
a mad scientist who hypnotises people into hiding in bushes and 
attacking passers by with knives. If killing the attacker is 
the only way of avoiding being killed, or avoiding serious 
injury, then killing in s f-defence is fully justified. The 
fact that the attacker is not driven to his actions by his own 
free volitions seems to make no difference in this case. 
4.3 THOMSON'S DEFENCE OF ABORTION 
In her well-known article, "A Defence of Abortion" ( 1971a), 
2 Judith Jarvis Thomson, for the purpose of her investigation, 
accepts the conservative claim that a foetus is . a person. In 
doing so she wishes to show that even if the foetus is a person, 
it does not follow that abortion is always impermissible. She 
points out that most antiabortion arguments rely on the premise 
that the foetus is a person from the moment of conception. 
This, she believes, is a premise not well argued for. We are 
asked to notice, for instance, that the development from 
conception through birth into childhood is a continuous process. 
To draw a line at any point on this continuum is arbitrary, 
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having no sufficient reason to do so. The conclusion then drawn 
is that the foetus is a person from the moment of conception. 
Thomson ects this conclusion, pointing out that the 
development of an oak tree is also continuous, but acorns are 
not oaks. She concedes, however, that it is likely to be very 
difficult, if not impossible, to draw a iable cut-off point. 
Although she does not agree with the initial premise, she 
assumes its soundness r the purpose of her investigation. She 
therefore assumes that foetuses are persons, asking, however, 
how we get from this premise to the conclusion that abortion is 
morally. impermissible (Thomson 1971b: 188-189). If we again 
return to the standard argument against abortion: 
Premise 1: It is wrong to kill an innocent person. 
Premise 2: The foetus is an innocent person. 
Conclusion: Therefore, it is wrong to abort a foetus. 
She challenges the conclusion of this argument by challenging 
the validity of the first premise. 
Fundamental to Thomson's argument are two assumptions, 
namely that every person has a right to life, - therefore, if 
foetuses are persons, then they too have a ght to li and 
that every person has the right to determine what happens and 
to her body (Thomson 1971b: 189). 
Thomson employs a wel known analogy for the purposes of 
her argument. You are asked to imagine that you wake up one 
morning and find yourself in bed connected to a famous 
violinist, afflicted with a serious kidney ailment. The medical 
records show that you alone have the right blood-type to help. 
A society of mus lovers organised your kidnapping, and 1 
night the violinist was connected to you. If the violinist is 
unplugged from you, he will certainly die. But, you are assured 
that in nine months he will have recovered from his ailment and 
can then safely be unplugged. Are you morally required to 
accept .the situation? Of course you have a right to decide what 
happens in and to your body. But the violini also has a right 
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to life. If a person's right to life always exceeds another 
person's right to determine what happens to his body, then you 
do not morally have the right to unplug yourself. I am sure 
that you too will agree with Thomson that we would feel highly 
uncomfortable with such a decision. 
Granted, in this case you were kidnapped. Should we 
therefore by analogy permit abortions resulting from rape? 
Thomson states that opponents of abortion may here say that all 
persons have a right to life, but those coming into existence as 
a result of rape have less, if this argument is accepted. But 
why should your right to life depend on how you came into 
existence? Moreover, opponents of abortion do not make this 
distinction. Some opponents of abortion would not even make an 
exception if the continuation of the pregnancy would shorten the 
mother's life. This position is now rare; but Thomson deems it 
necessary to examine it (Thomson 1971b: 189-190). 
4.4 THE EXTREME ANTIABORTION VIEW 
Thomson asks us to imagine a pregnant woman with a serious 
cardiac condition who will die if she carries the baby to term. 
The foetus, being a person, has a right to life; but the mother, 
also being a person, also has such a right. Suppose again that 
you are hooked up to the violinist, and the director of the 
hospital says to you, your being connected to the violinist is a 
severe strain on your system, and that you will be dead within a 
month. Surely, it is not murder if you unplug yourself to save 
your life, even if the violinist has an equal ·right to life 
(Thomson 1971b: 190). 
Turning to the self-defence model again, English asks, how 
severe an injury inflicted in self-defence may be, pointing out 
that it would clearly be unacceptable to shoot someone merely to 
avoid having one's clothes torn. This does not mean, however, 
that the force applied in defence may only equal the force used 
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by the attacker. She maintains that it is generally accepted 
that one may inflict an injury slightly, but not much greater 
than the one intended. "To fend off an attack whose outcome 
would be as serious as rape, a severe beating, or the loss of a 
finger, you may shoot. To avoid having your clothes torn, you 
may blacken an eye" (English 1975: 251). Moreover, the injury 
inflicted in self-defence should be the minimum necessary to 
deter the attacker. Even if you know that he intends to kill 
you, you are not justified in killing him if you could equally 
well save yourself by running away. The intended purpose of 
self-defence ought to be to avoid, not equalise harms. In the 
case of abortion, parallels may sometimes be discovered. The 
foetus may pose a threat to the woman's well-being, physical or 
psychological health, or life prospects, although it may itself 
be innocent. The magnitude of the threat posed· by the foetus 
determines the nature and extent of the justifiable actions. If 
the threat is slight, then abortion is not justifiable according 
to self defence. If the threat is great, however, an abortion 
may be justifiable, even though the foetus is an innocent being. 
English argues that the woman has a right to be freed from the 
foetus, and not to demand the foetus's death. 
most cases, the two seem to be inextricably 
1975: 251-252). 
Unfortunately, in 
linked (English 
4.5 INTERVENTION ON BEHALF OF A THIRD PARTY 
But does a third party also have a right, or even a duty, to 
intervene? Again, Thomson asks you to imagine that you are in a 
very small house with a rapidly growing child. There will not 
be room for both of you, and you are already forced against the 
wall, and will be crushed if you do not do something soon. Of 
course you have the right to kill the child in self-defence, but 
is a third party allowed to intervene on your behalf? The house 
is yours, and if you do not do anything, then you will die and 
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the child will break out Surely a bystander saying, he 
cannot intervene because he cannot save one life by killing 
another is not being impartial. If Jones needs a coat to save 
him from zing, and Smith needs a coat too to save him from 
freezing, then Jones is tled to the coat if it belongs to 
him. Allocating the coat by the flip of a coin, or leaving the 
two to struggle over it, is not to be impartial (Thomson 1971b: 
191). Smith has a good reason for feeling quite indignant if I 
say to him, "Yes, it is your coat, but I cannot choose between 
you and Jones." 
Thomson understands that we are sometimes not willing to 
intervene, even if doing so would be right. Our reason for 
refraining to act is explained by our right to refuse to 
intervene, even when doing so would be right. She argues, 
however, that we have a right to refuse to intervene, but we do 
not have a right to hinder others from intervening. In 
addition, people in authority, whose duty it is to intervene in 
the interests of justice, do not have a right to re (Thomson 
1971b: 191}. 
English's self-defence model supports Thomson's position. 
Does a doctor have the right to choose between the li of the 
woman and the life of the foetus? Perhaps someone will contend 
that if you are a passer-by witnessing struggle between the 
hypnotised attacker and in innocent vi im, you do not have the 
right to kill either in defence of the other. Drawing parallels 
to abortion, it would mean that a doctor has no ght to assist 
a woman in having an abortion. English maintains that the case 
of the·third party is more complex. We generally inclined 
to intervene on behalf of the victim against the attac , other 
things being equal. She holds that if the attacker is a close 
relative, however, one would probably intervene on behalf of the 
relative, even if he is the attacker. The doctor's involvement 
may be justified as an agent hired to do a job, which one is not 
capable of performing successfully by oneself. An analogy is a 
person who hires a bodyguard for protection against attackers. 
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Should the person be attacked, the bodyguard has the right, 
indeed the duty, to intervene. 
Even most conservatives will consent to abortion if the 
life of the woman is endangered by the pregnancy, and the only 
way to save her would be to perform an abortion. This is the 
analogy that has heretofore been given with the self-defence 
model. 
4.6 SUBTLER CASES 
Not all attackers, however, intend to kill. Does the self-
defence model have explanatory value for subtler cases too? By 
"subtler" I mean cases in which one's life is not endangered, 
but one's general well-being. Imagine you are a philosopher who 
has invested a great deal of time and effort to study and 
contribute to the subject of your choice. You are abducted by 
the hypnotised person who has no intention of harming you, but 
merely to take you back to the mad scientist, ·who wishes to 
experiment on you. These :experiments would most likely bring 
about a mental block that will cause your forgetting all you 
have learned in the last ten years. In such a case, if killing 
the hypnotised person is the only way of avoiding this calamity, 
then doing so is perfectly justified. You would defend yourself 
against the possible loss of life-prospects. Pregnancies have 
similar consequences 1n some cases, for example, many unwanted 
teenage pregnancies have profound effects on the life-prospects 
of the pregnant woman. 
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WHAT IS ENTAILED IN HAVING A RIGHT TO 
LIFE? 
Thomson also asks, what is entailed in having a right to life. 
Is having a right to life, the right to be given the bare 
minimum in order to live? Let us suppose that the bare minimum 
here is something one has no right to be given. 
"If I am sick unto death, and the only thing that would 
save my life is the touch of Henry Fonder's cool hand on my 
fevered brow, then all the same, I have no right to be 
given the touch of Henry Fonder's cool hand on my fevered 
brow" (Thomson 1971b: 191-192). 
Returning to the example with the violinist, the fact that he 
needs continuous use of your kidneys to stay alive does not 
confer on him the right to use your kidneys. 
"He certainly has no right against you that you should give 
him continuous use of your kidneys. For nobody has any 
right to use your kidneys, unless you give him such a 
right. And nobody has the right against you that you shall 
give him this right" (Thomson 1971b: 192). 
Others claim that the right to life does not entail being 
given anything, but only that everyone refrains from actions 
that would kill one. If this definition of rights is applied, 
then in the case of the violinist, many people must refrain from 
many things: shooting the violinist, strangling him, and 
unplugging him from you, to mention only a few. Granting him 
this right amounts to granting him the continuous use of your 
kidneys. 
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4.8 THE RIGHT TO USE THE MOTHER'S BODY 
Thomson attempts to add clarity to the previous case with 
another approach. Basically, to deprive someone of something to 
which he has a right is to treat him unjustly. We are asked to 
imagine a boy and his brother who are given a box of chocolates 
for Christmas. If the older boy refuses to give his brother any 
of the chocolates, then he is unjust to him because the brother 
has been given a right to half of them. Unplugging yourself 
from the violinist, however, is not being unjust to him, since 
you gave him no right to use your kidneys. By unplugging 
yourself, however, you are killing him, and violinists, like all 
other persons, have a right to life. He has a right not to be 
killed, but by unplugging yourself you are killing him. But by 
doing so, you are not being unjust to him. From this then we 
may amend a person's right to life, saying that a person with a 
right to life has the right not to be killed unjustly. If you 
do not kill the violinist unjustly, then you do not violate his 
right to life. Once again turning to abortion, it is not enough 
to show that the foetus is a person, and to remind us that all 
persons have a right to life. We need also be. shown that to 
kill the foetus is to violate its right to life, showing that 
abortion is unjust killing (Thomson 197lb: 192). 
In the case of rape, we may safely assume that the woman 
has not given the unborn person a right to use her body. In 
which pregnancy, Thomson then asks, can it be clearly said that 
the woman has given the unborn person such a right. Thomson 
again requests us to imagine a woman voluntarily engaging in 
sexual intercourse, being fully aware that this may result in 
pregnancy, and then she does become pregnant. Surely in such a 
case she is at least partly responsible for the person's 
presence, even existence, within her. She did not invite it in. 
But, Thomson asks, doesn't her partial responsibility for its 
being there give it a right to the use of her body? Doing so 
would be depriving it of something to which it has a right, and 
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thereby doing it an injustice. Thomson then further asks, 
whether the mother has a right to kill it, even in self-defence, 
if she herself is responsible for calling it into existence 
(Thomson 1971b: 193). 
Thomson points out that opponents of abortion have been 
preoccupied with establishing the independent existence of the 
foetus in order to argue for its right to life. They have 
failed to see the advantage in arguing for a dependence of the 
foetus · on the mother, thereby arguing that she has a special 
responsibility for it. This responsibility gives it rights 
against her that are not possessed by any independent person, 
such as an ailing violinist who is a stranger to her. The 
argument would give the unborn person a right to the mother's 
body, only if the pregnancy is a result of a voluntary act, 
undertaken in full knowledge that a pregnancy might result. The 
argument in this form then would leave persons who come into 
existence as a result of rape with no right to life. Aborting 
them would not be depriving them of anything they have a right 
to, and therefore is not unjust killing (Thomson 1971b: 193). 
Thomson employs more analogies for her argument. If a 
burglar climbs through an open window of a house, it would be 
absurd to claim that the burglar has a right to stay, he has 
been given a right to the use of the house because the person 
who opened the window is partially responsible for his presence 
there, having voluntarily done what enabled him to get in, 
knowing that there are burglars, and that burglars burgle. This 
claim would even be more absurd if bars had been fitted to the 
windows in order to keep out burglars, and a burglar got in 
because of a defect in the bars. It would be equally absurd if 
not a burglar got in, but an innocent person falls in (Thomson 
1971b: 193). 
Now again, Thomson asks us to imagine that people seeds 
drift about in the air like pollen. If you open your windows, 
one may drift in and take root in your carpets or upholstery. 
Because you do not want any children, you install the best mesh 
screens to your windows. Very rarely, however, as in this case, 
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one of the screens is defective and a seed drifts in and takes 
root. Does the person plant that now develops have a right to 
the use of your house? You knowingly kept upholstered carpets 
and furniture, and you knew that screens are sometimes 
defective. Your opening the window allowed the seed to drift in 
and take root. Someone may argue that you are responsible for 
its rooting, and that it now does have a right to your house. 
You could have lived without upholstered furniture and carpets, 
and you could have kept the windows shut. Applying this analogy 
to the abortion issue, Thomson maintains that this is on a par 
to arguing that a person could have avoided pregnancy due to 
rape by having a hysterectomy (Thomson 1971b: 193). 
4.9 RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITS 
Thomson proceeds to illustrate that there are cases in which it 
would be morally indecent to detach a person from your body at 
the cost of his life. If the violinist would need to stay 
attached to your body for only one hour, and his being attached 
to you for that hour would have no adverse consequences towards 
your health, then you ought to let him use your kidneys for that 
hour, it would be morally indecent to refuse, even if you had 
been kidnapped. Thomson further adds that we should imagine 
that pregnancy lasts only · for an hour, and a woman becomes 
pregnant as a result of rape. The one hour of pregnancy would 
have no adverse consequences towards her health. Surely, 
Thomson concludes, it would be indecent to terminate the 
pregnancy (Thomson 1971b: 194). 
Terminating the pregnancy in such a case would be indecent, 
but not unjust. Again Thomson illustrates. If the box of 
chocolates had been given only to the older boy, and he was 
eating them alone, enviously watched by his younger brother, we 
may say that the older boy is indecent if he does not share with 
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his brother. 
1971b: 194). 
He may be indecent, but he is not unjust (Thomson 
Thomson claims that if a couple take no precautions against 
preventing a pregnancy, and the woman becomes pregnant, and they 
take the child home with them, then they have assumed 
responsibility for the child and have given it rights. If, 
however, a mother brings a child into the world, she is then in 
no way justified in wishing the life of the child to be 
terminated. The person who is detached from the violinist, for 
instance, once the violinist has recovered, also has no right to 
turn around and stab him. "You may detach yourself, even if 
this costs him his life. You have no right to be guaranteed his 
death by some other means, if unplugging yourself does not kill 
him" (Thomson 1971b: 195) Thomson therefore argues that a 
woman has the right to be separated from the foetus, but does 
not have the right to have it killed. Levin (1985: 121-126) 
points out that since foetuses can be kept alive at ever earlier 
stages of gestation, this argument entails that foetuses have an 
ever earlier right to life - if right to life is understood as 
being kept alive through medical technology. 
In contrast to Tooley's3 theory, the self-defence model also 
brings to the fore a significant difference between abortion and 
infanticide, even if a human is held to be a person from 
conception. Tooley merely looks at the characteristics of the 
developing human, not at the relationship between it and its 
mother. If after birth the presence of the infant poses a 
serious threat to the woman, for example, to her psychological 
balance, or her overall life-prospects, then she is not 
justified in killing the infant, since she could remove herself 
from the threat, (run away from the attacker), by, for example, 
putting the baby up for adoption, or into foster care. A 
solution that does not involve the death of the infant is 
available, unlike prior to birth, when the foetus is still 
biologically dependent on the mother. English therefore sees 
birth as the crucial point, not because the infant suddenly 
acquires certain characteristics, but because the relationship 
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between the child and its mother changes - the child no longer 
being absolutely dependent on its mother (English 197 5: 254) . 
The self-defence model, therefore, can only justify abortion, 
not infanticide. 
4.10 EVALUATION AND CRITICISM OF THE 
FOREGOING 
Let us begin with the self-defence model. It manages to clarify 
a number of points (such as that it is permissible to kill an 
innocent person in self-defence, or that the intervention of a 
third party is appropriate), but it fails to give clear 
guidelines on abortion. We are requested by English to imagine 
that the attackers operate only at night. The danger can 
therefore be avoided by refusing to go out at night. A possible 
criticism is that if you do go out at night, you have no right 
to kill your attacker, since you chose to leave the house in 
spite of having prior knowledge of the danger. An analogy would 
be that the only justified and certain way to avoid pregnancy is 
to abstain from sexual intercourse. It may be argued, however, 
that you ought to take along some protection that would deter 
the attacker. If this defence fails, however, you are obliged 
to accept the resulting injury, regardless of its severity. 
This parallels the view that contraception is always acceptable, 
but abortion is always wrong, even if the contraception fails. 
A third objection may be that you are entitled to kill the 
attacker only if he intends killing, not just injuring 
This parallels the conservative view on abortion, namely, 
you. 
that 
abortion is only morally justifiable in cases where the 
pregnancy threatens the life of the mother. Finally, we have 
the view that killing the attacker is justified, even if only to 
avoid a slight inconvenience, and even if one knowingly walked 
down the street in which all the attacks were taking place 
without · taking any protection or precaution. If the foetus is 
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held to be a person, then this analogy serves to justify the 
liberal position of abortion on demand (English 1975: 253). 
English gives an example in which your abduction would 
seriously threaten your life-prospects. In such a case, I agree 
with her, killing the attacker would be justified, even if he is 
actually innocent. But is this analogous to an abortion? As 
should be clear from my arguments, the answer is in the 
negative. A woman engaging in sexual intercourse is not morally 
justified in having an abortion, even if her pregnancy would be 
a serious disruption in her life. Surely, the woman knew this 
before having sexual intercourse. If she nevertheless took the 
chance, believing the likelihood of becoming pregnant to be 
sufficiently small, because she practices contraception, for 
instance, then she is still morally responsible for the 
pregnancy, because it was a voluntary act. A person may take 
all precautions not to have an accident on the roads, but 
despite taking care of one's vehicle, having it serviced 
regularly, one may still have an accident for which one is 
responsible. If a person is thereby injured, the driver has a 
moral responsibility to care for the injured. In this regard, I 
cannot agree with English that an abortion is justified on the 
grounds that a pregnancy would seriously disrupt one's life 
prospects. This is not to say that I have no understanding of 
the reasons for an abortion that is performed in such a case. 
In some situations, such as when a girl is too young to have a 
child, or a pregnancy will seriously threaten a student's 
successful completion of her studies, there may well be 
significant reasons to abort a pregnancy, but by doing so, one 
should . always keep in mind that a virtuous act is not being 
performed. One's original choice, engaging in sexual 
intercourse, got one into the difficulties in the first place, 
and dealing with the problem may often leave one in a situation 
described by psychologists as a "double avoidance conflict," 
i.e. whichever solution is chosen, one is faced with an 
undesirable state of affairs. If abortion should turn out to be 
the psychologically less undesirable of the possible choices, 
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then it would still not mean that abortion in such circumstances 
is the morally correct choice to make. In such cases, however, 
mitigating circumstances can certainly be identified, and should 
be taken into account. 
Thomson's arguments have also received much criticism. For 
instance, Don Marquis (1989: 129-133) considers Thomson's 
assumption that foetuses have the same moral status as adult 
human beings. From this he claims that the presumption that any 
abortion is immoral is extremely strong. He wishes to defend 
the extreme conservative position, namely that foetuses enjoy 
the same moral status as adult humans. He argues that what 
makes killing adults wrong is that it deprives them of all the 
experiences, activities, projects, plans, and pleasures that 
would otherwise have constituted their future. Because abortion 
also deprives a normal foetus of a future like ours, the moral 
presumption against abortion is equally as strong as the 
presumption against killing adults. 
Marquis's arguments, however, also pose two clear problems. 
Firstly, his argument seems to suggest that killing an older 
person is less wrong than killing a younger one, and that it may 
hardly be wrong to kill a person who only has a short time left 
to live, such as a few months. Secondly, he tries to 
distinguish abortion from contraception by claiming that only 
abortion deprives something of a future like ours. But it is 
not clear, why, if both abortion and contraception deprive an X 
of a future like ours, why only abortion is to. be prohibited 
(Sterba 1997: 118). 
Thomson argues from very imaginative hypothetical examples 
- being connected to a violinist for nine months, for example -, 
claiming that these are analogous to being pregnant. Is this 
really the case? Can we not contend that Thomson is guilty of 
using false analogies? To be connected to a strange violinist is 
not analogous to being pregnant. A pregnancy is a relationship 
between a mother and her child, perhaps potentially the most 
intimate relationship possible. 
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"Clearly, the violinist has a right to life; but Thomson 
thinks that we should agree, in this case, that your right 
to do as you please with your body outweighs the 
violinist's right to life. So one would not do the wrong 
thing, everything being considered, by unplugging you from 
the violinist if you so wished it. 
One can agree with her conclusion in this case but 
still reject her suggestion that the case is analogous to 
that of a pregnant woman's decision to have an abortion. 
A more fitting analogy is one in which you are partly 
responsible for an accident in which an innocent bystander 
is seriously hurt and will die unless you, with your rare 
blood type, agree to give him a series of blood 
transfusions over the next nine months and also agree to a 
special diet and program of exercise to insure that both 
you and the victim remain healthy. It seems to me that in 
this case you do owe the accident victim the use of your 
body and blood, because you are partly responsible for the 
fix that he is in, and only you can get him out of it. Is 
not this case morally similar to the normal case of 
pregnancy, and do we not think that a prospective mother 
should show moral concern for the continued existence of 
the conscious life, which she is partly responsible for 
creating? If this is an analogous case, it shows that far 
more weighty considerations than liberty and privacy must 
be adduced in order to sanction the abortion of an 
individual who has come to possess the right to life" 
(Carrier 1975: 398-399). 
Carrier's example is more analogous than Thomson's. If one 
is partially responsible for an accident, one is under a moral 
obligation to take care of those harmed. If I am kidnapped and 
connected to a violinist, I am not partially responsible for 
being in that situation. If I use the roads, however, it is a 
different matter. I use the roads voluntarily, and if I injure 
someone, I am morally obliged to assist appropriately. 
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With respect to a pregnancy where the mother's life is 
endangered, Thomson argues, an abortion is morally justified 
because a prohibition in such an instance would be equivalent to 
one's being connected to a violinist, knowing that this 
connection will kill one, but nevertheless denying that one has 
the right to disconnect oneself, because the violinist also has 
a right to life. Baruch Brody, 4 for one, argues that it is not 
morally permissible to kill another person in self-defence, if 
the pursuer does not intentionally harm the victim. An 
abortion, he argues, is not morally justified if the mother's 
life is endangered, because the foetus does not willingly attack 
the mother. According to Brody, a person A is only justified in 
killing an attacker B, if B intentionally attacks A. He 
identifies three conditions in a paradigm case of pursuit: 
(1) The continued existence of B poses a threat to the 
life of A, a threat that can only be met by the taking of 
B'.s life (condition of danger). 
(2)B is unjustly attempting to take A's life 
(condition of attempt). 
(3) B is responsible for his attempt to take A's life 
(condition of guilt) (Brody 1975b: 199). 
Brody maintains that at least the first two conditions must be 
satisfied. He believes that abortion is justified only if it is 
evident that if an abortion were not performed, mother and child 
would both die. Is Brody correct? Has he not perhaps 
oversimplified the matter? 
Brody denies that one is justified in aborting a foetus to 
save the life of the mother because only the "condition of 
danger," neither the "condition of attempt" nor the "condition 
of guilt" is satisfied. What would it be like here for the 
"condition of attempt" to be satisfied? The foetus does not yet 
have an autonomous will, cannot will an action or state of 
affairs outside itself in any psychological sense. 
Psychologically speaking, the foetus can intend neither 
78 
something posit nor negative, and therefore an attempt cannot 
be identified in psychological terms. Behaviourally or 
biologically speaking, however, a foetus's development may be 
described in pos i ve or negative terms positive when its 
development proceeds normally and brings about no complications, 
and negative when its development is hostile towards its normal 
development, or to the well-being of its mother. If its 
development causes s mother's suffering, then biologically 
speaking, we may say that is the cause of mother's 
suffering. If removing cause is the only way of eliminating 
the hostility, then doing so is surely morally justified, even 
if the foetus cannot have any psychological intent, either 
posi or negative, and an attempt cannot be described in 
psychological terms. 
Thomson5 also provides a useful analogy to indicate that a 
condition of danger may be suf ent to jus fy one's killing 
of the innocent. She asks us to imagine that a violent 
aggressor nation has threatened us with death unless we allow 
ourselves to be enslaved by it. It has developed a monster 
missile launcher, which it will use on us unless we surrender. 
For technical reasons the missiles have to be triggered by a 
human hand, and the tunnels leading to the launcher had for 
technical reasons to be built very narrowly, enabling only small 
children to get through. Unfortunately, by bombing the missile 
launcher, we kill the children. Some people may say that we may 
not bomb the missile launcher, because by doing so we kill the 
innocent children. Others will say, as does Thomson, that we 
may bomb the launcher, since was the violent aggressor nation 
that imposed the risk on the children. Thomson maintains that 
the most likely response is, "those children are not really 
innocent in the sense intended in the principle "Direct killing 
of the· innocent is always impermissible"" (Thomson 1973: 154). 
Here "innocent" does not mean "free of guilt," but has a 
technical sense, such as "not currently doing harm," or "about 
to do harm in the immediate future," perhaps "not part of the 
threat directed at others." The children on the launching team 
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are free of guilt, meaning no one any harm, but they are part of 
the threat to us, because they are the ones who will launch the 
missiles against us (Thomson 1973: 154) 
To return to Thomson's violinist example, suppose you too 
were a member of the society of music-lovers. Your violinist, a 
friend and admired musician, develops this ·severe kidney 
ailment. You are not kidnapped, but volunteer being connected 
after no other sui table person could be found. Would you 
volunteer without stipulating any condition under which you were 
to be permitted to be disconnected? Suppose that the responsible 
physicians inform you prior to your consenting that if you are 
connected, a slight chance of complications arising will exist 
that may endanger your life, or severely threaten to compromise 
your long-term health. Would you still agree unconditionally? 
Would not almost all persons agree to being connected only if 
they have a right to be disconnected, should such threatening 
complications arise? I believe so. Even if one has voluntarily 
agreed to being connected to the violinist, one does so with the 
presumption that the procedure will occur normally, i.e. the 
procedure will not encompass adverse consequences for one's 
health. In effect, one is making a contract with the violinist, 
if one voluntarily concedes to being connected to him, a 
contract stipulating that a "normal" course of developments is 
present throughout the duration of the procedure. 
As argued in the previous chapter, by voluntarily engaging 
in sexual intercourse, a couple either explicitly or implicitly 
consent to procreation, consent to becoming parents. They 
moreover consent, however, to a normal pregnancy. A normal 
pregnancy commences once the fertilised egg implants in the 
uterus. A pregnancy following a "normal course of developments" 
is one in which the genetic code steers the development of the 
zygote from being a potential person towards becoming an actual 
person. 6 If the development of the potential person becomes 
hostile towards the mother, thereby endangering her life, or 
threatening to seriously compromise her long-term health, the 
mother is fully justified in terminating the pregnancy, since 
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the pregnancy no longer proceeds along a "normal course of 
developments," no longer proceeds according to the conditions 
under which the woman consented to becoming pregnant. Surely it 
must be agreed that no woman would willingly consent to a 
pregnancy, if prior to her becoming pregnant she already has 
absolute certainty that the pregnancy will endanger her life, or 
seriously harm her long-term health. Of course the question may 
be posed, how far from normal a pregnancy must be in order to 
justify an abortion. If the mother's life is threatened, it is 
clearly no longer normal. A case in which her long-term health 
is threatened is more difficult to decide, but a general guide 
might be, if the pregnancy would bring about a serious medical 
condition, such as the loss of her kidney functions, from which 
a recovery is not expected, based on scientific judgement, then 
that is also clearly abnormal. If the pregnancy only brings 
about a temporary depression, an abortion is 
since the woman is expected to recover from 
within a not too lengthy duration. 
not justified, 
this condition 
Thomson claims that if the woman's life is not at stake, 
the foetus still has no right to use her body. Even if one's 
right to life entails being given a bare minimum, one does not 
have a right to this minimum, if the satisfying of one's right 
infringes on the rights of another. Again she uses an 
imaginative example. If you are sick in bed, and the only thing 
that will save you is the touch of a specific film star, then 
you do not by virtue of this fact have a right to be touched by 
him. Again, I must accuse Thomson of employing a false analogy. 
As I have already stated, by voluntarily engaging in sexual 
intercourse, a couple is explicitly or implicitly consenting to 
parenthood, the woman consents to pregnancy, and they do so even 
if they practice contraception. Every informed adult knows that 
contraception does still very occasionally fail, and if such 
failure should occur, then under normal circumstances they are 
morally obliged to accept responsibility for the pregnancy and 
the developing foetus. 
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Thomson is correct in arguing that it is not sufficient to 
show that the foetus has a right to life, but that it needs to 
be shown that killing it would be unjust killing. Again, an 
analogy is employed. The elder brother is not being unjust if 
he does not share his chocolates with his younger brother, if 
they were given only to the elder one. He may be unkind, 
spiteful, or something of the sort, but he is not unjust. The 
younger brother has no "right" to the chocolates. In the case 
of the violinist, too, where you were kidnapped, you are not 
being unjust, if you detach yourself, even if this does bring 
about certain death for him. The violinist does not have a 
right to be provided with the bare minimum required for his 
survival, if this would be an infringement on your rights, and 
you have not consented to this being done in this case. Thomson 
argues, however, that an unwanted pregnancy is an analogous 
case. If a woman engages in sexual intercourse, and carefully 
practices contraception, then, Thomson believes, the woman has 
not given the foetus a right to use her body. As should already 
be expected from the foregoing, I differ from Thomson in this 
regard. By practising contraception, every informed person 
knows that she is not totally eliminating the possibility of 
becoming pregnant. The possibility still exists, even if it is 
already very slight. A couple is always morally required to 
take responsibility for its actions. If they willingly engage 
in sexual intercourse, they are morally required to accept the 
responsibility of procreation, if contraception should fail. By 
accidental conception, a couple has given implicit consent to 
procreation, by virtue of their sexual intercourse. The reader 
will recall that I have argued that a couple gives implicit 
consent to a pregnancy when they engage in sexual intercourse. 
Unlike Thomson, therefore, I argue that an unplanned pregnancy 
is still the moral responsibility of the couple. I here wish to 
stress . "of the couple," since most articles on abortion focus 
only on the role of the woman. Her partner is equally 
responsible, it is equally his responsibility, whether they 
practice contraception or not, and in the case of an unplanned 
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pregnancy, he is equally morally obliged to support his partner, 
and take responsibility for her pregnancy. 
Both Thomson and English fail to distinguish between 
possible, potential, and actual persons. As I established in 
the previous chapter, the foetus is a potential person, giving 
it a right to life, in virtue of its potential. I argued that 
an abortion is not justifiable, under normal circumstances, once 
implantation has taken place. Subsequent to implantation, the 
genetic code becomes activated towards developing into a new 
person~ If, however, the pregnancy is not the result of 
voluntary sexual intercourse (if it is as a result of rape), 
then the foetus has not been given permission to use the woman's 
body (it has not been invited in) . It has a right to life, but 
this right cannot override the right of the woman to determine 
whether or not to permit a pregnancy to go ahead. The abortion 
of such a being is then also not the termination of a person's 
life, but only of a potential person's. In this regard, Thomson 
clearly understands the issue. Her analogy of a burglar 
climbing through an open window aptly serves the purpose of 
pointing out that an intruder has no right to be there. If the 
person is not a burglar, but someone who accidentally falls in, 
Thomson points out, the same conclusion holds, he still has no 
right to use the house. Anti-abortion advocates, however, such 
as Brody, argue that although the pregnancy came about through a 
terrible crime, one has no right to abort the foetus because it 
is not responsible for the crime, it is not the cause of the 
misery. Let us return to the house described by Thomson. 
Imagine that a burglar does not climb in, nor does an innocent 
person accidentally fall in, but someone (a homeless person) is 
thrown in by another. Does he now have a right to stay in your 
house? He is not responsible for being there. Surely, you will 
not give him a right to stay? The important point here is, it 
makes no difference to the intruder's rights, whether he is or 
is not responsible for his intrusion, i.e. in either case he 
has no right to be there. He has a right to be there only if he 
has been invited in. 
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Regarding abortion when the pregnancy poses a threat to the 
woman's li or long-term health, I am also in agreement with 
Thomson. By voluntarily engaging in sexual intercourse, the 
woman explic ly or impl i tly consents taking responsibility 
for a normal pregnancy. It is important to s ss "normal 
pregnancy." A foetus that becomes hostile towards the mother, 
threatening her life or long-term health, may be expelled, even 
if it was ini ally invited in. When inviting someone into your 
house, you expect him to behave in a fairly ci vili manner. 
As long as he does so, you may grant him the right to stay. If, 
however, he becomes hos le to you, you may retract s right to 
stay and throw him out. In such a case the use of the house 
does not occur according to the conditions explicitly or 
implicitly stated. Similarly, a hostile pregnancy does not 
follow a "normal course of developments," does not occur 
according to the condi ons one explicitly or implicitly 
consented to. 
It is necessary to tinguish between the taking of X' s 
life, and the saving of X's life. We generally have a duty not 
to do the former, and a duty to do the latter. The latter duty 
is usually perceived as a much weaker duty than the former one. 
I may, for instance, be relieved from the duty of saving X' s 
life, if my saving X has serious disrupt consequences for my 
life. At such a cost, may be "decent" (to use the term 
Thomson employed) to save X' s life, but I have no duty to do 
that. This because X has no right to be saved by me. 
Thomson's argument runs as follows: 
(l)Let us assume that the foetus's right to life 
includes the right not to be killed by the woman carrying 
it. 
(2)But to re from killing it is allow it 
continued use of the woman's body. 
(3)0ur first assumption entails that the foetus's 
right to life includes its right to the continued use of 
the woman's body. 
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( 4} But we all grant that the foetus's right does not 
include the continued right to the use of the woman's body. 
(5}Therefore, foetus's ght to li cannot 
include the right not to be killed by the woman in 
question. 
Thomson has failed to distinguish between the duty not to 
kill and the duty to save a· life. Point 4 is correct if we see 
it in terms of the duty to save someone from dying, but not in 
terms of the duty not to 11 someone. In the example of the 
violinist, point 4 has relevance, i.e. we do not have the duty 
to save his li In the case of abortion, however, is a 
different matter. The mother has the duty not to kill the child 
if she has implicitly given it a right to life by voluntarily 
engaging in sexual intercourse, and therefore point 4 is invalid 
in the. case of abortion. If a woman becomes pregnant through 
voluntary sexual intercourse, and the pregnancy proceeds 
normally, i.e. does not threaten her li or long-term health, 
she has a mo obligation to continue with the pregnancy. 
Thomson maintains that a couple is only responsible for a 
resulting pregnancy if they engaged in sexual intercourse 
without taking any precautions (such as using contraceptions} . 
She also maintains that only if they t the child home with 
them do they accept responsibility for it and give it rights. 
As was ready contended, voluntary sexual intercourse is 
at least an implicit willingness to accept responsibility for an 
unplanned pregnancy. In the case of rape, where abortion is 
morally jus able, Thomson is correct in arguing that the 
mother has no right to be assured of the foetus's death. If the 
foetus should survive prematurely, she has no right to kill it, 
or demand i death. The kidnapped person, who detaches herself 
from the violinist, also has no right to demand the violinist's 
death, if were miraculously to survive the premature 
detachment. 
It is important to point out again that Thomson fails to 
make an important distinction, namely between taking of X' s 
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life, and the saving of X's life. We generally have a duty not 
to do the former, and a duty to do the latter. The latter duty 
is usually perceived as a much weaker duty than the former one 
{Gensler 1986: 98). 
Perhaps the reader might wish to object (as Thomson almost 
certainly would), how one can defend the position that by 
voluntarily engaging in sexual intercourse with contraception, 
one is still responsible for an unwanted pregnancy. Thomson 
argues: 
Premise 1: One who has not voluntarily assumed any 
special obligation towards another person has no obligat 
to do anything requiring great personal cost to preserve 
the li of the other. 
Premise 2: Often a pregnant woman has assumed no 
special obligation towards the foetus, and to preserve s 
life by continuing to bear the unborn child would require 
great personal cost. 
Conclusion: Therefore, a pregnant woman often has no 
obligation to continue to bear the unborn child. 
The first premise seems prima facie to be acceptable; normally 
you do· not have an obligation to save a stranger. If you sk 
your life in doing so, you do more than duty obliges you to do. 
It is different, however, if you have assumed an obligation. If 
you are a volunteer lifeguard, you have an obligation to save a 
drowning stranger, even at the sk of losing your life. 
Thomson believes that a woman getting pregnant is 
voluntarily accepting an obligation towards the child. However, 
if the pregnancy is not voluntary, such as through contraceptive 
failure or rape, then the woman does not accept an obligation 
towards the foetus. If a continuation of the pregnancy would 
require great personal cost, then the woman has no obligation to 
continue with the pregnancy, and is entitled to an abortion. If 
she continues with the pregnancy, despite great personal cost, 
then she is doing something beyond what duty requires, something 
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heroic. Thomson's first premise is, however, not sound. A 
motorist involved in an accident is under an obligation to help 
the injured, even though he did not voluntarily cause the 
accident. The fact that he voluntarily used the roads puts him 
under an obligation to help anyone he injures. Not all special 
obligations towards others are voluntarily assumed (Gensler 
198 6: 98) . Similarly, a couple voluntarily engaging in sexual 
intercourse is obliged to accept a pregnancy, even if the 
pregnancy was unplanned or unintended. 
4.11 THE RIGHTS OF NONPERSONS 
At the end of her article, Thomson once again reminds us that 
she has only assumed the personhood status of foetuses from the 
moment of conception for the purpose of her investigation. She 
believes that a very early abortion is not the killing of a 
person, and therefore is not affected by anything she has 
argued. For Thomson, 
pregnancy is always 
therefore, abortion in the early stages of 
morally acceptable, since it is not the 
killing of a person. Let us assume for the moment that Thomson 
is correct. Let us assume that foetuses are not persons, nor 
potential persons (as I maintain). Does it then unquestioningly 
follow that an abortion is, by virtue of this fact, always 
morally unobjectionable? Do nonpersons never have a right to 
life? Is it never morally objectionable to kill nonpersons? 
Jane English (1975: 253-254) answers with an emphatic "no." 
Nonpersons do receive attention in our moral code, although 
their rights are not as extensive as those of persons. 
Nonpersons do not have moral responsibilities, and their 
interests may be overridden by the interests of persons, but one 
is not morally justified in treating them any way at all. To 
torture chimpanzees for fun, or the killing of dogs without any 
significant reason is wrong. It is wrong, even though 
chimpanzees and dogs are not persons. To use chimpanzees, or 
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any of the other higher primates for experimental purposes, even 
though these experiments may cause them much discomfort, pain 
and harm, is usually regarded as acceptable if the benefits 
gained from the experiments are substantial for people. 
People's rights are different to those of animals. It is not 
morally acceptable to experiment on persons, even if substantial 
benefits would thereby be gained. Of course, people may 
volunteer to serve as experimental subjects, but no person 
should be forced into experiment against his or her will. She 
expresses a perceived difficulty in deciding how to treat 
nonpersons in order not to violate their rights. Torturing 
animals can simply not be judged to be right, simply because the 
sum of the consequences of the torturing is positive for 
persons, i.e. a simple utili tar ian decision is not defensible. 
If this were the case, she points out, it would be right for a 
person to torture a dog if he were to gain pleasure from doing 
so, and his actions were to have no bearing on anyone else. 
English (1975: 254) maintains that an ethical theory must 
operate by evoking a set of sympathies towards others, and 
thereby reinforce the principles of the. system. We feel strong 
compassion towards others, but we also have compassion towards 
personlike nonpersons. Many theories of psychology have offered 
adequate explanations for this, behaviourism being just one 
example. Behaviourism has found that organisms are capable of, 
an indeed do, generalising among similar stimuli. An organism 
may, therefore, produce a response to a stimulus that is 
different, yet relevantly similar to a different stimulus, to 
which the response was usually evoked. In a similar sense 
people ·may feel compassion, sympathy, and feelings of warmth 
towards a nonperson that has a similarity to persons. It is 
beyond doubt that psychological factors play a significant role 
in our attitudes towards others. English maintains, if a set of 
principles were to permit the treatment of any nonperson, 
resembling persons to a significant degree, in any way we wish, 
the sympathies and compassion necessary for the adequate 
functioning of our ethical system would be undermined. For this 
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reason the mistreatment of animals would be wrong, regardless of 
the util ian value. English accordingly maintains that it 
makes sense that those animals that have greatest similarity 
to people enjoy the highest consideration in our moral 
deliberations. She applies this argument to the issue of 
abortion (English 1975: 255). 
The similarity between an almost mature foetus and a new-
born baby is so great that hardly any difference in the amount 
of sympathy and compassion for the two beings is worth 
mentioning. These beings are so alike that no justification can 
be given treating them differently. In the early weeks of a 
human being's development, by contrast, the being hardly 
exhibits any similarity a new-born. Indeed, in the rst 
weeks of its development, ·the human being is visually not 
distinguishable from other mammals, such as pigs. 
Psychologically, an early abortion can hardly be equated to 
murder on the basis of s larity, whi a late abortion can 
hardly be distinguished from it. Bodily continuity of the 
developing human also has explanatory value for our respect 
towards etuses. English (1975: 255) mentions that even after 
death, when a human body is no longer held to be a person, we 
still pay respects towards Similarly, she claims, even 
though a foetus may not yet be a person, it is bound to develop 
into one, and thereby deserves our respect. 
The conclusions English draws from her arguments are: 
~rn early months of pregnancy, when the foetus hardly 
resembles a baby at 1, abortion is ssible whenever 
it is in the interests of the pregnant woman or her family. 
The reasons would only have to outweigh the pain and 
inconvenience of the abortion itself. In the middle 
months, when the foetus comes to resemble a person, 
abort would only acceptable if the continuation of 
the pregnancy, or the rth of the child, would cause harm 
(physical, psychological, economic, or social) to the 
woman. In the late months of pregnancy, even in our 
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present assumption that the foetus is not a person, 
abortion seems to be wrong, except to save a woman from 
significant injury or death" (English 1975: 256). 
English is not correct in claiming that animals having a 
high degree of similarity to humans enjoy most sympathy from us. 
Dolphins and whales, for instance, have a lower overall degree 
of similarity to people than do mice, for example, yet most 
people are more sympathetic towards the former than towards the 
latter. Her claim that a late abortion is hardly 
distinguishable from murder, due to the similarity between an 
almost mature foetus and an infant, while an early abortion is 
psychologically justifiable because there is hardly any 
similarity between an early foetus and a person is dangerous to 
say the least. If visual similarity is to be the criterion by 
which a being is to be accorded personhood status, or the right 
to life, then where are we to draw the line. The evils of 
racial prejudice and discrimination are based almost entirely on 
the differences in appearance between different peoples. It is 
correct to say, however, that infants are usually accorded 
personhood status, they are given a right to life. If an infant 
is killed in our society, the agent is accused of homicide. 
Why? Even though an infant may not yet exhibit rationality, its 
resemblance to a grown person is exceptionally large. A more 
important factor, however, is that from birth it has become part 
of our· social community. We are able to interact with it from 
birth in an infinite variety of ways. In many respects an 
almost mature foetus has a similar degree of resemblance to 
adults, but its social interaction with others is still lacking. 
For this reason one does not mourn over a late miscarriage to 
the same degree as over the death of a neonate. This is true 
even if comparing the death of a neonate born two months 
prematurely and a fatal miscarriage occurring in the eighth 
month. Resemblance alone does not account for our difference in 
emotional response, but the capacity for social interaction 
does. 
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4.12 SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE 
In this chapter, I examined and defended the right to an 
abortion when the pregnancy is hostile, i.e. when it came about 
due to rape, or when it threatens the life or long-term health 
of the mother. In the case of rape, it was argued that although 
the foetus does have a right to life in virtue of its being a 
potential person, the mother neither explicitly nor implicitly 
consented to the pregnancy, and thus has a right to refuse the 
foetus the use of her body. She did not invite it in. In cases 
where the woman voluntarily engaged in sexual intercourse, and 
perhaps even willed the pregnancy, but the pregnancy then 
threatens her life or long-term health, she is not morally 
compelled to continue with the pregnancy. She then has a right 
to an abortion. She willed a pregnancy, but she willed a normal 
pregnancy. If the pregnancy does not proceed under conditions 
she implicitly agreed to, she has a right to terminate it. 
In cases of mere contraceptive failure, however, abortion 
is not morally justifiable, even though the pregnancy was not 
explicitly consented to. 
Let me briefly explain what I mean by "implicit" and 
"explicit" consent. A couple engaging in sexual intercourse 
with the desire to conceive are explicitly consenting to a 
pregnancy. Pregnancy is the intended outcome of their sexual 
intercourse. A couple engaging in sexual intercourse, without 
the present desire to concel ve a child, are consenting 
implicitly. They are not primarily engaging in sexual 
intercourse to conceive, but they know that their actions could 
lead to pregnancy, even if precautions, such as using 
contraception, are used. A raped woman did not consent to the 
act in any way, and therefore neither implicitly nor explicitly 
consented to a pregnancy. 
By virtue of voluntarily engaging in sexual intercourse, 
one has implicitly accepted responsibility for a resulting 
pregnancy, one is morally obliged to carry the foetus to term. 
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Mere contraceptive failure 
person's right to life. 
cannot override the potential 
Having argued that pregnancy due to rape is a sufficient 
reason to procure an abortion, I shall argue in the next chapter 
that abortion in such an instance is not morally justifiable 
throughout pregnancy, but only during the initial stages when 
the foetus is still pre-sentient. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ABORTIONS OF RAPE PREGNANCIES 
ARE NOT MORALLY DEFENSIBLE 
THROUGHOUT PREGNANCY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter I argued that a woman becoming pregnant 
as a result of rape is morally justified in procuring an 
abortion. In this chapter I shall argue that the woman is not 
morally entitled, in such an instance, to obtain an abortion at 
any stage of the pregnancy. I shall argue that only during the 
initial stages, only prior to the foetus becoming sentient, is 
an abortion in such an instance morally justifiable. 
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1 I shall turn to the arguments of L.W. Sumner (1985), who 
argues for sentience as the appropriate criterion determining a 
being's right to life. I shall point out the advantages of 
adopting sentience, but shall also criticise the limitations of 
an approach adopting sentience as the sole criterion determining 
a being's right to life. It will become evident that Sumner 
argues for sentience as both a criterion of inclusion, as well 
as comparison. I shall reject this approach, arguing that by 
doing so, a theory deviates from our commonly held beliefs and 
sentiments, and its simplicity is purchased at the price of 
accuracy. I shall argue that "being alive" ought to be the 
inclusion criterion, i.e. all living beings have some right to 
life. Potential is to be the comparison criterion when 
comparing beings of different species, i.e. the being with the 
greater potential has a greater right to life, even if it is 
still less developed than the other. Sentience is to be the 
comparison criterion when comparing beings of the same species, 
because potential cannot explain why, for instance, we believe a 
late-term abortion to be considerably more serious than an 
early-term one. Beings with roughly the same potential are 
differentiated by their degrees of sentience. 
In sections 5.2 to 5.8 I give a detailed account of 
Sumner's arguments. He examines the criteria of intrinsic value 
(5.3), and being alive (5.4). In 5.5 he examines when moral 
questions are pertinent, before proceeding to the criterion of 
rationality and the moral community in 5.6, and the criterion of 
sentience in 5.7. 
elucidated, and 
follows in 5.9. 
In 5.8 the implications of Sumner's views are 
an evaluation and criticism of his arguments 
In 5.10 I argue for a multi-criterion approach. 
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5.2 SUMNER'S DEFENCE OF SENTIENCE 
L.W. Sumner has developed a set of arguments that attempts to 
defend a position between the extreme conservative one of 
2 3 
Noonan's, and Tooley's extreme liberal one. I shall briefly 
outline Sumner's arguments in the following. 
Sumner identifies the moral standing of the foetus as the 
central question pertaining to abortion. For the purposes of 
his discussion, Sumner stipulates that the term "moral standing" 
refers to a being regarded to be in its own right in the process 
of moral decision making. To count for nothing is to have no 
moral standing. To count for as much as possible is to have 
full moral standing. For the purposes of his discussion, he 
further assumes that to have some moral standing is to have some 
right to life, therefore equating the terms "moral standing" and 
"a right to life." A being with moral standing has a right to 
life. The strength of the claim on a right to life stands in 
direct proportion to that being's moral standing. This means 
that a being with full moral standing has the greatest right to 
life. The question that is then relevant for the issue of 
abortion is whether foetuses have some moral standing, and hence 
have some right to life. A being with moral standing imposes 
duties on moral agents. Such duties may be positive or negative 
- not to deprive, or to support (Sumner 1985: 232). 
On which creatures should we bestow some degree of moral 
standing, and thereby acknowledge their right to life? Which 
criteria should we employ in order to reach such a decision? The 
paradigm case of a being with moral standing is an adult human 
being with normal capacities of intellect, emotion, perception, 
sensation, decision, action, etc. Selecting a specific 
property, or set of properties, is to define the class of beings 
with moral standing, i.e. all and only those that exhibit that 
property, or those properties. Sumner points out at the outset 
that a criterion that is found to be too narrow will exclude 
beings with moral standing, and hence would not be a necessary 
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condition for moral standing; a too broad criterion, on the 
other hand, would include beings not having moral standing, and 
hence would not be a sufficient condition for moral standing. 
Four criteria, he maintains, need to be seriously investigated 
in respect to moral standing namely, beings that are (1) 
intrinsically valuable; (2) alive; (3) sentient; or (4) 
rational. 
5.3 THE CRITERION OF INTRINSIC VALUE 
The scope of the 
poses a problem. 
to have a right 
included in this 
first criterion, Sumner maintains, already 
If everything that has an intrinsic value were 
to life, then almost everything could be 
category, even inanimate objects, such as 
rocks, landscapes, the moon, or even entire galaxies. Of course 
nonliving things cannot have a right to life, but in such cases 
one might speak of a right to continued existence, where such a 
right entails a right not to be destroyed, and a right to 
receive treatment upholding its existence. Thus a landscape may 
be ascribed a right not to be destroyed, as well as a right to 
receive treatment upholding its present beauty. The criterion 
of intrinsic value also differs from the remaining three in one 
important respect, namely, the criterion itself is not 
empirically verifiable. Without being told which things have 
intrinsic value, we could not, if this criterion were to be 
determinate, establish the right to life of a being without 
first being told which beings have intrinsic value. 
A criterion of intrinsic value must be objectively verifiable, 
being capable of being confirmed or denied on· the basis of 
certain properties being present or absent. The criterion of 
intrinsic value cannot be applied without a theory of intrinsic 
value. Such a theory would point out the natural properties a 
being would need in order to have such a value. Sumner points 
out that if a being has moral standing in virtue of having 
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intrinsic value, but this intrinsic value is dependent on 
certain specified natural properties, then moral standing is 
reducible to the specified properties without having to mention 
intrinsic value. The theory of intrinsic value may, therefore, 
entail moral standing, but intrinsic value cannot itself serve 
as that criterion (Sumner 1985: 234). 
The remaining three criteria all fulfil the demand of being 
verifiable, since they all rest on empirical properties of 
things. Sumner sees rationality as a subset of sentience, which 
in turn is a subset of being alive. The class of rational 
beings~ therefore, is the strongest criterion, marking the 
narrowest sphere, while living beings is the weakest, and 
defines the broadest sphere. He concedes, however, that it is 
imaginable to create artificial intelligence before creating 
artificial sentience, or artificial life. 
5.4 THE CRITERION OF BEING ALIVE 
Sumner (1985: 234) mentions that K.E. Goodpaster has proposed 
that on all living beings be conferred moral standing simply 
because they are alive. Let us assume that all forms of life, 
no matter how primitive, can be clearly distinguished from all 
inanimate things. All living beings share the properties of 
being teleological systems, having functions, ends, needs, etc. 
In order for their needs to be met, all living beings require 
certain conditions to be fulfilled. Since they all have needs, 
they can all be benefited and harmed. It thus makes sense to 
say that such entities have a "good," i.e. conditions that 
benefit them are good, conditions to the contrary are bad. If 
morality is to apply to all beings that have a good, then moral 
standing must be conferred on all living creatures. Sumner 
(1985: 235) claims that we are usually not comfortable with 
conferring moral standing on beings such as plants and micro-
organisms. How ought we to live if we ought to confer moral 
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standing on every living being? Sumner continues, however, that 
Goodpaster makes a distinction between a criterion of inclusion 
and a criterion of comparison (Sumner 1985: 235-236). The 
former criterion determines the boundary of the criterion of 
moral standing in question, while the latter is concerned with 
distinguishing between the differences in degree of moral 
standing within the inclusion criterion. Thus the comparison 
criterion allows for variations in amount of moral standing a 
being may have. All beings are presumably equally alive, 
therefore, being alive cannot serve as a comparison criterion. 
This allows for the stance that all living creatures have moral 
standing, but not to an equal degree. We are then left with the 
problem, however, how much moral standing to confer on different 
species. Even if we do agree on some standard of comparison 
(for example, sentience), Sumner maintains, we may then ask why 
this standard should not also serve as the inclusion criterion. 
Adopting sentience as the comparison criterion and being alive 
as the inclusion criterion leaves us with two different criteria 
operating simultaneously. This is not necessarily a problem, as 
Sumner correctly realises. For Mill, for instance, every value 
has some value merely in virtue of being a pleasure (inclusion), 
but its relative value is. determined by its quality or kind 
(comparison). However, Sumner asks whether a plausible 
situation could be conceived in which sentience might serve as 
the comparison criterion, but not simultaneously also adequately 
serve as the inclusion criterion. A problem arises, however, if 
the inclusion and the comparison criteria are not of equal 
scope. This is the case if being alive is the inclusion 
criterion, and being sentient the comparison criterion, since 
not all living beings are sentient. Another objection to 
conferring moral standing on all beings that are alive (because 
they have needs, function teleologically, and can be harmed or 
benefited) is that some nonliving entities also exhibit such 
characteristics in order to function effectively. Computers, 
for instance, can be harmed if not treated appropriately, and 
require proper maintenance to function efficiently. Life is 
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thus an inadequate indicator for indicating teleology, and the 
capacity for being benefited and harmed. Therefore, being alive 
cannot be consistently employed as a criterion by which to 
confer moral standing (Sumner 1985: 236-237). 
5.5 WHEN ARE MORAL QUESTIONS PERTINENT? 
When are moral questions pertinent? Sumner replies that they are 
pertinent whenever the actions of an agent threaten to harm a 
being with moral standing. Duties and rights are closely 
connected to benefits and harms. If we take the paradigm case 
of moral standing and ask what counts as a benefit or harm 
towards a human being, Sumner maintains, the usual answers take 
one of two forms. The desire model maintains that human beings 
are benefited if their desires are satisfied, and harmed if they 
are frustrated. The experience model holds that human beings 
are benefited if they are brought to have experiences that they 
like or find agreeable, and harmed if brought to have 
experiences that they dislike or find disagreeable. Both models 
interpret benefits and harms in terms of psychological states of 
the beings in question, i.e. in terms of their interests or 
welfare. Such models have reference only to beings that are 
conscious or sentient. Therefore, Sumner (1985: 237-238) 
concludes, if morality is concerned only with the promotion of 
interests and welfare, then it 1s concerned only with beings 
that are conscious or sentient. Goodpaster, ·however, also 
ascribes interests to nonsentient beings, maintaining that they 
also may have needs, a good, and the capacity to be benefited 
and harmed. Sumner finds it odd to ascribe interests and 
welfare to beings such as plants. He maintains that morality 
does not have to do with benefits and harms as such, but only 
with a specific category of benefits and harms: 
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"Leaving my lawn mower out in the rain is bad for the 
mower, pulling weeds is bad for the weeds, and swatting 
mosquitoes is bad for the mosquitoes, but there are no 
moral dimensions to any of these acts, unless the interests 
or welfare of some sentient creature is at stake" (Sumner 
1985: 238). 
5. 6 THE CRITERION OF RATIONALITY AND THE 
MORAL COMMUNITY 
Sumner continues by investigating the criterion of rationality 
for moral standing before proceeding to sentience. A being is 
rational if it is able to communicate, has foresight, has 
memory, etc. Moreover, the fact that such a capacity is not 
presently exhibited does not mean that the being in question 
does not possess such faculties. A person capable of speaking 
still has the capacity to communicate, though he may now be 
silent. A person able to do calculations still has this 
ability, even though he may now be asleep. "The capacity 
remains as long as the appropriate response could be elicited by 
the appropriate stimuli" (Sumner 1985: 238) . It is lost only 
when an appropriate stimulus no longer is able to evoke an 
appropriate response. It is not essential for an individual to 
possess all faculties in order to be classified as rational. A 
person· not able to speak may still possess all or most other 
faculties and hence be labelled rational. Seeing rationality as 
a sufficient condition for having moral standing poses no 
difficulty, but if it is to serve as a necessary condition, then 
most nonhuman creatures, and even a significant number of human 
beings ·would fail to have moral standing, such as infants, the 
mentally deranged, and comatose patients. Why then should 
rationality serve as the criterion of moral standing? Sumner 
contends that it is not a matter of controversy for rationality 
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to be a sufficient condition for moral standing, disregarding 
cases of artificial intelligence. However, if rationality is to 
be the necessary condition for moral standing, then many 
sentient creatures would fall outside this sphere, which 
precisely would depend on the stringency of the rationality 
criterion employed. This would not mean that non-rational 
beings lack all rights. As Tooley has already argued, to deny a 
being the right to life is not necessarily also to deny it other 
rights. A kitten may lack the right to life, but has a right 
not to be tortured (Tooley 1972a: 223) If rationality is 
adopted to serve as the criterion by which moral standing is 
established, another criterion, such as sentience, may be 
adopted to determine other rights, such as the right not to be 
tortured. The question Sumner poses in response is, if 
sentience is adopted to serve that function, why can it not also 
be adopted to serve as the criterion measuring the right to 
life? We often kill nonhuman animals, but the reason given is 
usually that the benefits gained from their killing outweighs 
the negative weight of the action itself. It is nevertheless 
clear that the killing of animals usually calls for 
justification, and therefore they do have a right to life, 
although this right may be fairly restricted. If rationality 
were to be the determining criterion (necessary condition) for 
moral standing, then the killing of animals would only call for 
justification if their killing impinges on the rights of some or 
other rational being. If· we deny rationality of horses and 
cats, for instance, and if the rationality criterion is to be 
determinate for ascribing moral standing, then the killing of a 
horse or a cat would be no more morally objectionable than 
swatting a mosquito or weeding a garden. Furthermore, if the 
criterion of rationality were stringently enforced, many members 
of our own species, such as infants, the senile, the mentally 
retarded, psychotics, to name just a few, would have no right to 
life. . Killing them would then entail doing no moral injustice 
to them. I presume, this is a position most people would be 
uncomfortable with. Needless to say, such members are sentient, 
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and most are capable of leading pleasurable and comfortable, 
though often simple lives. To kill them would be to deprive 
them of lives that would be of value to them (Sumner 1985: 239-
240) • 
Whether only beings that are capable of moral agency ought 
to have moral standing is also a relevant question when dealing 
with rationality. Should only beings that have the capacity of 
moral agency be retained within the category of beings having 
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moral standing? A.I. Melden defends such a position in his book 
"Rights and persons." Only beings participating in a moral 
community, acknowledging moral rules, and recognising one 
another's integrity are held to have moral agency. Rights can 
therefore only be attributed to members that have moral 
intercourse, that care for one another, and that regulate their 
behaviours in accordance with the behaviours of others. It 
should be obvious that a prerequisite for being a moral agent is 
to be rational. The class of moral agency will therefore not 
extend beyond the sphere of rational beings. Rationality is a 
necessary condition for moral agency, but not a sufficient 
condition. Sumner also contends that not only humans are 
capable of moral agency. Depending on how the term is defined, 
many higher primates, birds, dolphins, and other higher mammals 
exhibit· behaviours that may be labelled altruistic. Sumner, 
however, correctly points out that the criterion of moral agency 
may be. applied in two ways to a moral community. It may be a 
community of moral agents, i.e. the bearers of moral duty. To 
be a member of such a community one would need to be capable of 
moral agency. Alternatively, a moral community may be thought 
of as a community of beings to whom all beings owe duties, i.e. 
the bearers of moral rights. The class of members having moral 
duties need not necessarily be coextensive with the class of 
members having moral rights. Some members, such as infants, 
animals, and the mentally deranged, may have .moral rights, 
without having moral duties because they lack . moral agency. 
Sumner argues that a higher standard may be employed for 
adjudicating moral duties than for mo rights. Rationality 
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appears to be appropriate when determining moral agency, but a 
criterion less demanding, such as sentience, is more appropriate 
for determining moral rights (Sumner 1985: 240-241). 
5.7 THE CRITERION OF SENTIENCE 
Sumner contends that the criterion of being alive is too weak, 
as has already been made evident, admitting teleological classes 
of beings, both animate and inanimate, that are not suitable for 
moral rights. Being alive necessary, but not sufficient, for 
having moral standing. The criterion of rationality is too 
strong, excluding beings, both human and nonhuman, that are 
suitable loci for moral standing. Being rational is sufficient, 
but not necessary, for having moral standing. Sumner ( 1985: 
241) proposes sentience as· a suitable criterion, lying between 
the two extremes of being alive and being rational. Sentience 
is basically the capacity to have feelings or affect, the 
capacity to experience pleasure and pain, the capacity to suffer 
and enjoy. At a more developed level sentience includes the 
ability to have wants and desires (and therefore the ability to 
be satis ed and frustrated"), have attitudes and values, moods, 
sentiments, emotions and passions. Consciousness, at least to 
some degree, is a prerequis for sentience. It is, however, 
not a sufficient condition for sentience. It is not 
inconceivable that a conscious being, even a rational being, 
lacks all feelings and affects, and is incapable of suffering 
and experiencing joy. Such a being would not be sentient. It 
is the qual y of being sentient that determines a being's 
desires or preferences, moulded by what the being has 
experienced as enjoyable or agreeable. If morality is concerned 
with the protection and promotion Of interests, then it should 
be concerned with all beings that are capable of having 
interests. This includes all sentient creatures. It makes 
sense to see sentience as being present in varying degrees. 
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More developed creatures, usually the more rational ones, have a 
higher degree of consciousness, and a higher degree of 
experiencing the world, and there re more ways of being 
affected by it. Higher, more developed creatures, are therefore 
also capable of having a more ful lling existence. Sentience 
can therefore serve both as a terion of inclusion as well as 
of comparison (Sumner 1985:. 241). Nonsentient beings have no 
moral standing, and among sentient beings, the more developed 
have greater moral standing. A fully functioning adult human 
being is currently the paradigm of the upper limit. In Sumner's 
own words: 
" In our moral reasoning paramecia and horse ies count 
for nothing, dogs and cats count for something, chimpanzees 
and dolphins count for more, and human beings count for 
most of all, the most sentient also being most rational" 
(Sumner 1985: 242). 
5. 8 IMPLICATIONS FOR ABORTION OF SUMNER'S 
VIEWS 
The foregoing has made evident that Sumner differentiates 
between degrees of sentience and therefore also degrees of moral 
standing. Since the most developed are most sentient, the least 
developed least sentient, we may argue that the development of 
sentience is a gradual development, just as the development of 
an organism, or the development of a species is a gradual 
process. Sumner ghtly maintains that one cannot precisely 
identify a specific point in the development of any organism as 
the threshold between sentience and nonsentience (Sumner 198 5: 
243) . 
The implication this carries for abortion is that in the 
development of a human being we too cannot point to a 
precise point at which sentience is attained. Zygotes and 
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embryos are clearly 
functioning central 
being sentient. A 
not sentient, not yet possessing a 
a prerequisite for 
third trimester of 
nervous 
foetus 
system, 
in its 
gestation, however, has a well functioning central nervous 
system, and is most certainly already sentient to some 
degree. The transition from nonsentience to sentience 
hence lies somewhere in the second trimester of an unborn 
child's development. Performing abortions during the first 
trimester of pregnancy does not raise a moral issue, since 
the foetus does at that stage not yet have any moral 
standing, according to the sentience criterion. (In 
section 5.10 I shall argue that it does raise a moral issue 
in virtue of being alive.) Abortions performed during the 
third trimester of pregnancy, however, warrant moral 
justification, since foetuses at that stage are already 
quite sentient, and therefore have moral standing. The 
threshold between sentience and nonsentience in the 
development of a human being, therefore, is located 
somewhere in the second trimester of pregnancy. Sumner 
(1985: 246) defines an early abortion as one carried out 
during the first, or early in the second trimester. Its 
moral significance is held to be on a par with 
contraception, i.e. it prevents the emergence of a new 
being with moral standing. A late abortion is defined as 
one carried out in the third, or late in the second 
trimester. Such an abortion is held to be on a par with 
infanticide, i.e. terminating the life of a human being 
with moral standing. The only relevant difference between 
late abortions and infanticide is that the foetus in late 
pregnancy is still dependent on the mother, while the 
infant is not. Sumner therefore permits abortions in the 
third trimester, but a case by case analysis is necessary, 
and ought only to be carried out in exceptional cases, such 
as when the life of the mother is endangered, and 
especially when that risk becomes evident only in the third 
trimester. Sumner also defends abortions carried out 
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during the third trimester after a severe defect has been 
detected in the infant, especially if the defect has become 
evident only during the third trimester (Sumner 1985: 247). 
5. 9 EVALUATION AND CRITICISM OF THE 
FOREGOING 
Sumner is correct in maintaining that the criterion of intrinsic 
value depends on a theory of intrinsic value to indicate which 
objects or beings have intrinsic value. In themselves, it may 
be added, such inanimate beings cannot have value. Why might we 
assert the value of a Rembrandt painting, for instance? Because 
we enjoy beholding it, because it gives us positive experiences. 
Destroying such a painting may be held to be immoral because it 
would deprive many people of the experiencing pleasure. Of 
course, we may say, it ought not to be destroyed because it 
causes the dishonouring of its creator by such an action. Such 
reasons may be given for other inanimate objects too. Many of 
us believe that we ought to take special care of many natural 
sights, such as landscapes, glaciers, or the Antarctic, to 
mention only a few. We believe it would be immoral to destroy 
them, not only because they might have some instrumental value 
for humanity, or other living beings, either now or in the 
future, but because we would deprive future generations from 
pleasurably experiencing them. Of course, the argument may be 
posed, such natural sights· could only have been created by a 
marvellous creator, and destroying them would be dishonourable. 
One may thereby be referring to a deity, a creator, or 
teleologically functioning nature. Nature produces environments 
that man might never be able to create. 
Sumner correctly realises that it need not be a problem if 
two criteria are employed, one as the inclusion, the other as 
the comparison criterion. ·He believes, however, that it is a 
problem if the two criteria are not coextensive. This need not 
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necessarily be the case. If we assert that all living beings 
have some moral standing, but that sentient beings have more, 
then this problem does not arise. It would mean that 
nonsentient beings have moral standing with a value greater than 
zero, and sentient beings have a value greater by their degree 
of sentience. This would make it understandable why some 
people,. of which I am one, believe it immoral to needlessly cut 
down a magnificent tree such as an oak. Our be ef is neither 
grounded in its value to others nor is a tree ·sentient. Of 
course, nonsentient living beings have a moral standing less 
than sentient beings the rights of the former often being 
overridden by those of the latter. Sumner finds it odd to 
ascribe moral standing to nonsentient beings such as plants. 
Why? He states that swatting mosquitoes is bad for the 
mosquitoes, but there is no moral dimension to this action. 
This would mean that no matter what I do to a mosquito, it can 
never be immoral. If I deliberately torture a mosquito for fun, 
pulling off one wing, or slowly burning a bee with a magnifying 
glass, are my actions then morally neutral? I believe not. Of 
course we are justified in swatting a mosquito if it is near us 
and might bite us, but this is not because the mosquito has no 
moral standing, but only because our rights by far override its 
rights. Sumner is therefore not correct in asserting that moral 
standing depends only on sentience. Nonsentient beings have a 
value of moral standing greater than zero, they cannot be 
equated to nonliving things. Indeed, I believe Sumner's 
position is one that is in opposition our general attitudes 
and sentiments. I fully agree, however, that a sentient being 
has more moral standing than a being without. Ranked on a 
continuum, therefore, I argue that we should not place the least 
sentient at one end and most sentient at the other, but rather 
nonsentient living beings at one end, passing through the least 
sentient to the most sentient the other end. I agree with 
Sumner that it is desirable to keep the number of criteria as 
low as possible, i.e. if it is possible adequately to employ a 
criterion as both one of inclusion and of comparison, then one 
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should do so. When theorising, simpl ty should always be an 
objective, but simplicity should not be purchased at the price 
of accuracy. In this case, therefore, I maintain, a criterion 
establishing moral standing of a being cannot comprehensively 
function as both an inclusion as well as a comparison terion. 
5.10 DEFENDING A MULTI-CRITERION APPROACH 
The position I shall defend is briefly following: 
( 1) All living beings have some right to li That 
is, all living beings have some degree of moral standing. 
"Being ive" is therefore to be the inclusion criterion. 
( 2) "Sentience" is to be the comparison criterion when 
comparing beings of the same species. 
( 3) "Potential" is to be the comparison criterion when 
comparing beings of fferent species. 
I shall now explain why I find it necessary to employ three 
dimensions of criteria. 
I assume that most people will agree that all living beings 
have some right to life, have some moral standing. Cutting down 
a three-hundred-year-old tree just a bit of fun, for no 
significant reason, is morally not acceptable. Why not? It is 
because the tree has a ght to life. It has a ght to life 
even though it is not sentient. Sumner maintains that swatting 
a mosquito may be bad for the mosquito, but by doing so, I am 
not acting immorally. As previously mentioned, my burning a bee 
with a magnif , or pulling off one wing of a mosquito cannot 
be morally neutral acts. These creatures have a right to life, 
even though they are nonsentient. Nonliving beings, on the 
other hand, cannot be directly wronged morally. By destroying a 
painting, or a landscape, I might be acting immorally because I 
am depriving future generations of their existence, or am 
dishonouring someone by their destruction. Intrinsically, 
however, nonliving things have no moral value. For this reason, 
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I argue that "being alive" ought to be the criterion of 
inclusion in our moral system. Sumner is therefore not correct 
in asserting that an abortion in the pre-sentient period is 
always unobjectionable because it does not yet have any right to 
li It does have a right to li in vi of its being 
alive, and it is ready a potential person. 
Being alive, however, cannot also serve as a criterion of 
comparison, since presumably all living beings are equally 
alive. For this reason I argue that "sentience" ought to be the 
comparison criterion when comparing beings of the same species. 
5 
Most of us would agree with Langerak in asserting that a late-
term abortion is morally more problematic than an early-term 
one. Why? The explanation lies in the 1 term foetus's 
attainment of sentience. During the first trimester of 
pregnancy the foetus is not yet sentient, since it does not yet 
have an intact central nervous system (a prerequisite for being 
sentient). Beings that can feel, experience, suffer, enjoy, 
etc., are more developed than those that cannot. The foetus's 
potential (the probability that it will develop into an actual 
person) does not change dramatically during its prenatal 
development. Certainly it has a greater probability of 
developing further during the later stages, since most 
miscarriages occur during the ini al stages of pregnancy (Louw 
1991: 101-102). The shift in probability is, however, gradual, 
and drawing the line during the prenatal period based on 
potential is arbitrary. In addition, measuring the potential of 
a fie be at any given time is not possible. We may base 
the calcul on on a statistical average, but a individual 
may devi substantially from the norm. Employing sentience as 
a sui table comparison rion when comparing beings of the 
same species is meaningful, since the more sentient have greater 
moral standing (have a greater right to life) than the less 
sentient. If we assume that abortion in the early stages of 
pregnancy is less problematic than in the later stages, our 
assumption is explained by the being's degree of sentience. 
Both an early foetus and an almost mature etus are not 
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rational, therefore rationality cannot explain the difference. 
Both the early and the almost mature foetus are potential 
persons, and their potentials are not signi cantly different. 
Therefore, potential can also not serve as an explanation. The 
early foetus is, however, not yet able to feel and suffer, while 
the late foetus is. Sentience explains the difference. 
Sentience is a suitable criterion for comparing beings 
within a given species, but not for comparing beings of 
different species. How are we to compare, for instance, the 
moral standing of a new-born chimpanzee with that of a human 
foetus in the fourth month of s development? Does the 
chimpanzee have greater moral standing and thereby also a 
greater right to life because it is much more sentient? The 
answer is clearly "no." Answering yes to the question would be 
answering against our general sentiments. A new-born chimpanzee 
has a high probability of developing into an adult chimpanzee, 
but no probability of attaining an equal measure .of rationality 
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and sentience as an adult human being. A developing foetus, in 
contrast, has the potential of developing into ·a human adult 
with a high degree of sentience and ionality. For this 
reason potential should be the overriding criterion when 
comparing beings of different species, but sentience should be 
the comparison criterion when comparing beings of the same 
species. This conclusion also serves as an explanation why we 
might find it morally acceptable to implant an organ, such as a 
heart, from a new-born chimpanzee in to a seven-month-old 
foetus, but not to destroy a young foetus to save an adult 
chimpanzee, even if this were to be the only poss lity of 
7 
saving the chimpanzee. This hypothetical example clearly 
indicates that potential is to serve as the comparison criterion 
when comparing different species. 
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5.11 SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE 
In s chapter the difference in moral seriousness between an 
early-term and a late-term abortion was discussed. The 
arguments of L.W. Sumner were elucidated, evaluated, and 
criticised. He argued for sentience as the criterion by which a 
being has a ght to li , arguing that sentience can serve both 
as an inclusion and comparison criterion. I argued that Sumner 
is guilty of oversimplification, and that nonsentient living 
beings . also have a right to life. They have a right to life, 
but less than sentient ones. I argued for "being alive" as the 
inclusion criterion (all living beings having at least some 
ght to life}, sentience as the comparison criterion within a 
given species, and potent as the comparison criterion when 
comparing beings of different species. 
In the previous chapter I defended a woman's right to an 
abortion if the pregnancy is the result of rape. The reasons 
concisely stated are that the woman did not voluntarily engage 
in sexual intercourse, i.e. neither explicitly nor implicitly 
consented to pregnancy. The foetus is an intruder, was not 
invited in, and therefore she may refuse it the use of her body, 
even if it means the death.of the foetus. We have established 
that aborting a late-term foetus is more serious than aborting 
an early-term one. Therefore, I here argue that a woman is only 
morally justified in procuring an abortion of a pregnancy 
resulting from rape while the foetus is still pre-sentient. 
Sumner clearly points out that the foetus in the third trimester 
is already clearly sentient; while in the first it is not. The 
attainment of sentience, therefore, occurs somewhere in the 
second trimester. In order to be safe on s matter, it is 
appropriate to permit abortions due to rape up to the end of the 
rst trimester. This is not unreasonable, since it leaves the 
woman ·sufficient time to deliberate over and procure an 
abortion, after having discovered that she is pregnant as a 
result of the crime. A woman who does not abort a rape 
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pregnancy during the first trimester has implicitly accepted the 
pregnancy and is then morally compelled to bring the child to 
term. 
In the previous chapter a defence of the abortion of 
hostile pregnancies was given {rape pregnancies and pregnancies 
threatening the life or long-term health of the mother). It was 
also argued that abortion is not acceptable when sexual 
intercourse was voluntary, even if contraceptive failure 
occurred, as long as the pregnancy is not hostile. In this 
chapter I argued that an early abortion is less objectionable 
than a late abortion, and thus rape pregnancies ought only to be 
aborted during the first trimester. The position I must now 
still defend is that abortion is also defensible· {in relatively 
rare cases), when the foetus is retarded to such a degree as to 
have no potential of acquiring any personhood characteristics 
other than the biological. This position will be defended in 
the next chapter. To do so, it will be necessary to examine the 
issue of life's value. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ABORTIONS OF SEVERELY 
RETARDED INDIVIDUALS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I shall defend the belief that it is morally 
acceptable to abort a etus even in late pregnancy, if 
i tests indicate that the individual will be severely 
retarded (retarded to such an extent that no personhood 
characteristics, other than the biological, will ever 
attained}. In order defend this belief, I shall f 
examine life's value in general before proceeding to 1 
abortions. I shall argue that if a human being does not have 
the potential to develop into an actual person, i.e. is not a 
potential person, then it cannot enjoy the same moral status as 
potential persons. Such beings are morally more on a par with 
animals, and hence have ghts similar to animals. This does 
not mean that they do not have any rights, but only that their 
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rights can more easily be overridden by actual persons (as 
discussed in 4.11). 
In 6.2 I begin the discussion by examining the re on ship 
between li death and suffering. this question warrants 
examination, since it is sometimes ld that it is better to 
suf than to die. Following this in 6.3, the question, 
whether suffering can have value, is posed, and in 6.4, whether 
life always has meaning. An important distinction between life 
in general, and individual lives is made. In 6.5 it is then 
asked, · whether it is only rational to consider . things from a 
cosmic perspective. It will be pointed out that the cosmic 
perspective may sometimes be irrational and a personal 
perspective rational. In 6.6 I turn the abort of severely 
retarded foetuses. I argue that even though all .human foetuses 
are endowed with the human genetic code, not all human beings 
have the potential of developing into actual persons. Only 
beings that have the potential of developing into.actual persons 
may be regarded as potential persons, and hence enjoy the moral 
status · of potential persons. Aborting foetuses that lack the 
potential to become actual persons is morally justified, 
especially if their abortion would spare them from continuous 
pain and suffering. 
6.2 LIFE, DEATH AND SUFFERING 
If a given life does not have meaning, and all indications are 
that it will never be capable of attaining any meaning or 
purpose, is it justifiable to terminate it? Jean de la Fontaine 
remarked in the seventeenth century that it is better to suffer 
than to die (Donnelly 1978: 163). 1 Donnelly believes that many 
philosophers of the late twentieth century would reverse this 
statement to assert that it is better to die than to suffer. He 
believes that many philosophers have adopted the prevention of 
suffering as a higher value claim than the preservation of life. 
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If a life is nothing but meaningless and filled with 
suffering, would it not perhaps be moral to terminate it? Might 
we not be accused of being callous striving with 
extraordinary means to sustain a life that perhaps has no value? 
Donnelly argues (1978: 164) that the propos ion "suffering is 
evil" is not necessarily true. He believes it not even to be 
contingently true in all instances. An infant suffering from 
some currently incurable physiological ailment as well has his 
guardians, may be thankful for his or her hardship, which 
facilitates their developing certain character traits and mental 
sets not as readily mani sted in a healthy body or less 
stressful situation. It is a fact that we all suffer at some 
point in life, if by "suffer" we mean having some form of pain, 
displeasure, or mental anguish. 
The quality of life of an infant with a birth-defect is 
established long before conception. Society's attitude towards 
diseased, disabled or malformed indi victuals reflects its 
attitude towards life and death. The psychosocial aspects 
regarding the birth of an infant with a rth-defect are 
directly related to the issue of life and death. The events of 
birth and death directly confront us with the meaning of human 
life. A malformed or handicapped individual reminds us of 
life's vulnerability, of which death is the ultimate 
realisation. Many perceive the birth of a defective infant as a 
biological mistake, one they wish to negate. Such a desire is 
o en present, although there exists a reasonable probability 
that the defective infant will develop intellectually. Death 
becomes desirable as a means for escaping suffering of the 
2 
infant (Metzler 1978: 172). 
Our society, which idealises strong, healthy, well-formed 
individuals, feels threatened by members not capable of living 
up to this ideal. The handicapped are often seen as unable to 
attain ·success and a good li an attitude readily reinforced 
by prejudice and discrimination. Usually those who are most 
emotionally insecure are most ready to practice discrimination 
and prejudice towards those they find inferior in any respect. 
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But even the most secure individuals often react annoyingly by 
feeling nothing but the degrading feelings of pity, rather than 
empathy or a compassionate understanding. When confronted by a 
handicapped individual, it is natural for one to 1 that one 
hopes neither one nor any of one's loved ones will ever be 1 
the same fate. Disability is, however, always a possibility. 
There is no guarantee that a given individual will be born 
without any disease, disability or disfigurement, nor any 
assurance that one will not suffer such a fate during one's 
li Road accidents, or time activities (such as working 
with power tools, horse riding, or diving) may result in sudden 
accidents that may leave the vi im disfigured or paralysed. 
The question we are faced with, however, is whether we 
ought to abort a foetus that is developing abnormally to a gh 
degree. If the resulting child will only suffer, will 
experience nothing but agony, would it not be better to abort 
it? Or should suffering sometimes be accepted, can suffering 
sometimes be pos ive? If suffering is sometimes positive, and a 
developing child will almost certainly have a life filled with 
suffering, the call for such a foetus's abortion is not an 
obvious course to take. 
6.3 CAN SUFFERING HAVE VALUE? 
Donnelly questions whether the proposition "suffering is evil" 
necessarily or contingently true. If we mean "instrumentally 
evil," then our answer is clearly in the negative. If we mean 
"contingently evil," then some philosophers, such as 
Kierkegaard, would also reply in the negative. Kierkegaard 
believes that suffering is blessed. Donnelly correctly 
questions, whether Kierkegaard held suffering to be 
intrinsically good, because by denying that it is intrinsically 
evil, he does not necess ly assert its intrinsic goodness. He 
did believe, however, that some forms of suffering were 
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instrumentally good, and finds value therein: "there truly is a 
fellowship of suffering with God, a pact of tears, which is 
intrinsically very beautiful" (Donnelly 1978: 166). He also 
believed that people ought to value such fering, even without 
any igious motivation. Poets, ists, and religious 
individuals are examples of great values facilitated in their 
coming about by suffering and pain. Without these sufferings, 
they would not have become great. Kierkegaard believes, if one 
were to take away their sufferings, give them an easy life, and 
grant them what they desire, it would be all over with greatness 
(Donnelly 1978: 166). Kierkegaard adds that one ought to 
rejoice in suffering, but that these individuals are beyond 
suffering, and wonders whether an individual in such a situation 
could really understand this {Donnelly 1978: 166). What he is 
really · suggesting is that the suffering leads to something 
great, as though something great could only be achieved through 
anguish and dismay. It is though he were using .the analogy of 
water flowing upwards, in order to do so, there must be 
pressure. 
Kierkegaard maintained that if one were free of suffering 
and anguish, one would readily yield to one's passions and 
pride, accordingly, although suffering may be a burden, it is a 
bene cial one. He denies that it would be possible anyone 
physically and mentally complet y healthy, free from any 
distress, to live a truly spiritual li (Donnelly 197 8: 167) . 
He is saying that a spiritual life, or one of moral integrity, 
entails a love for, and commitment to the virtues. The pursuit 
of virtues in our hostile world necessarily strains the physical 
and mental well-being of even healthy individuals. He goes so 
far as to maintain that the virtuous person actively seek 
suffering. If one does not have such strength within oneself, 
then one should hope that God will help one to suffer (Donnelly 
1978: 167). This is truly a radical outlook. A child afflicted 
with severe Down's Syndrome, for instance, does not actively 
will its illness, but those who care for him or her might freely 
choose .to accept it. Kierkegaard does not believe suffering to 
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be an end itself, but rather as a means 
compassionate and humble dispositions of the 
achieving the 
spirit. In the 
moral order suffering is tolerated primarily for 
instrumental worth, while in the religious order is relished 
as a necessary condition of i thful witness. From a religious 
perspective, he saying that the meaning of life is contained 
in suffering (Donnelly 1978: 167). Seen from a Christian 
perspective, Kierkegaard writes that if one does not suf 
then one has nothing to do with God, and that those who are not 
willing to suffer will have alienated themselves from God's 
love. Donnelly points out that it is questionable whether it is 
true that the closer to God, the greater the extent of 
suffering. He does not doubt, however, that closeness to God is 
necessarily accompanied with suf ring in our hos le and 
vicious world (Donnelly 1978: 169). 
6.4 IS LIFE ALWAYS WORTH LIVING? 
3 
Joseph Margolis (1978: 180-191) examines the question, when life 
is no longer worthwhile, no longer worth living. Considering 
capital punishment, it is not the case that the sentenced 
person's life be no longer worthwhile, be no longer worth living 
for the punishment to be carried out. A surgeon who terminates 
the li of a severely malformed, almost viable foetus in the 
late stages of development, employs a principle of some sort 
that assigns to that life a counterfactual rationality. He 
might think that if that being were allowed to· come into the 
world, . it would like any ional person choose rather to die 
than to live. The question that needs to be answered is, at 
what pdint are we, as fully rational beings, willing to end our 
own lives, or honour the explicit wishes of others in this 
regard (Margolis 1978: 181)? 
To hold that God or nature has given us our lives, and 
therefore hold it to be impermissible to deliberately end them, 
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is not capable of being independently verified. Let us assume 
that we were created by God, and were given a set of values by 
Him. This would still not mean that I have to accept these 
values. I may still be free to question them and choose my own. 
It is a given fact that though we are interested in when and how 
we shall die, there is no way of discovering the appropriate 
moment, either for the species, or for individual persons. To 
favour ending one's or another's life is not to assert that the 
life in question utterly lacks value. If all medical estimates 
indicate that to a high degree of scientific certainty, an 
infant will die, and that s li will be filled with nothing 
but pain and suffering until s death, would not be more 
humane to expedite its dying? 
What is the value of life? How do we assess life's value? 
Is its value intrinsic, that every life is valuable, or is s 
value conditional, that in some rcumstances a life may have no 
value at all? These questions are inevitably thrust upon us when 
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faced with making life and death decisions. Steven Nathanson 
(1978: 192-205) examines the view that life itself has no value 
at all, in the hope to establish life's value. 
The following argument is often put forward: 
Premise 1: The real nature of things is that 
which is seen from a cosmic or ultimate perspective. 
Premise 2: To view things rationally is to view 
them from the cosmic point of view. 
Premise 3: When things are viewed rationally, 
that is from a cosmic point of view, they seem to be 
lacking in value. 
Conclusion: Therefore, to attribute value to 
something is irrational (Nathanson 1978: 193). 
This nihilistic argument has nothing in particular to do with 
life, it is completely general. Life is simply one of the many 
things that seems to be lacking value. Nathanson correctly 
mentions that the argument seems to be more forceful if we are 
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considering life, rather than some other matter. We seldom feel 
inclined to adopt a cosmic point of view when considering the 
value of free speech, or the right to own private property. 
Many people assume, however, that the value of life needs to be 
established from a cosmic point of view. Therefore, many people 
believe that life is without value if, for instance, our souls 
do not have eternal existence or our achievements are forgotten 
(Nathanson 1978: 194). 
It is important to distinguish between "li " and 
"individual lives." "Life" in its abstract singular form refers 
to the totality of life that now exists, has existed, and will 
exist, and is to be differentiated from particular lives of 
particular individuals. A second distinction needs to be made 
between two kinds of value or purpose. Something has value if 
it ts into some overall cosmic scheme or design that applies 
to the totality of reality; something may also be said have 
value if it is useful in achieving the aims of particular 
agents. Having made these distinctions, the nihilist claims can 
be clearly stated as follows: 
(1) Because life. has no cosmic purpose, individual 
lives have no purpose, and therefore no value. 
{2) The value of individual lives depends on life 
having a cosmic purpose. 
If life has no purpose because there is no overall scheme or 
design for it to serve, then individual lives will lack cosmic 
purpose because they will serve no overall scheme. It does not 
follow, however, that individuals cannot follow their own goals 
that give their own lives meaning, purpose, and value. Nor does 
it follow that if life has an overall purpose or value, then 
individual lives too have value or purpose. If life were to 
have the overall purpose of entertaining a demonic being, 
individual lives would thereby diminish in value or purpose. 
Nathanson asserts that the basic criterion for evaluating life 
has to be a worldly one (Nathanson 1978: 195}. A cosmic purpose 
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can only give meaning to individual lives if indi victuals are 
aware of the cosmic scheme, and are capable of participating in 
it. In this respect, cosmic purpose seems to be irrelevant for 
worldly life, or at least subsidiary to it. 
6.5 THE RATIONAL PERSPECTIVE AND LIFE'S 
VALUE 
Why then, Nathanson asks, is the attraction of the cosmic 
perspective so great? He proceeds by examining whether to view 
things rationally is to view things from a cosmic point of view. 
What ate we doing if we request someone to consider something 
rationally? One answer is that we are asking him or her to 
consider the given matter unemotionally. We are urging the 
person to overcome one of the subjective factors that may 
influence one, i.e. to lay aside one's attitudes, emotions or 
belie We are asking him to be objective. Contingencies of 
background and upbringing also often stand in the way of 
rational deliberation. By urging someone to be objective, we 
are urging him or her not . to be influenced by the contingent 
aspects of his character, personality, emotions, moods, 
feelings, or situations. We recognise a description as 
conforming to reality, if it is verifiable by a number of 
observers with different natures (Nathanson 1978: 195-196). To 
refer to the "cosmic point of view" is to refer to the view any 
rational being could arrive at, a position one may consider as 
objective reality. 
In making decisions we sometimes are irrational, i.e. when 
we give precedence to our present desires, desires that override 
our awareness of long-term interests or future desires. 
Prudence requires that we do not give priority to the present, 
but rather overcome the irrational influences of presently felt 
desires in order to survey longer portions of our lives, and 
rationally compare the values of presently desired objects with 
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those we may desire or require in the future. However, if we 
view all of our needs and desires from a long-term perspective, 
we may well 1 victim to Jacob Horner's "malady cosmopsis" 
(Nathanson 1978: 197). This entails that the prudential view may 
help us to realise that currently strongly felt desires may not 
be important in the long-run - no matter what we choose, the end 
result will be the same, death. If we do ,put ourselves into a 
position in which only cognitive powers play a role, where 
desires, goals, and preferences are left aside, if we register 
the properties and characteristics of the world, but are 
indifferent to them, it seems that we will find no value 
properties that constitute objective reality. On this basis we 
may be lead to the conclusion that there is no ultimate reason 
for valuing anything (Nathanson 1978: 197). It is sometimes 
argued, however, that this· need not be the case, since God 
perceives the world benevolently from a cosmic viewpoint. 
Nathanson asks, whether it is possible to reject this 
nihilistic view of cosmic reality without rejecting rationality. 
It must first be noted that the cosmic point of view is 
irrelevant to the practical· decisions confronting us daily. To 
elucidate this, 1 us imagine that I am faced with having lemon 
or milk in my tea. If the cosmic point of view requires that I 
ignore . my tastes and preferences, then it can provide no 
assistance. On the contrary, would be irrational to adopt 
this point of view because the factors requires me to leave 
out are precisely those that are relevant for making a decision 
in this instance. To demand that one choose involving taste by 
ignoring the taste factor is to be arbitrary and irrational. 
This example is indicative of the fact that the rational point 
of view and the cosmic point of view do not coincide (Nathanson 
1978: 197-198}. 
When I choose lemon instead of milk, my choice is guided 
not only by taste and felt desires, but also by adherence to the 
following rational principle: 
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Given a choice between A and B, where X prefers A to B, it 
is rational l things being equal) for X to choose A 
(Nathanson 1978: 198). 
This is a principle of rational choice that could be 
acknowledged by an indifferent being to both A and B. 
Therefore, to recognise this principle is not to express one's 
5 
own irrational preferences. Kohl (1978: 206-207) denies the 
cosmic perspective's validity for determining the value of li 
claiming that it confuses the issues of finding meaning in one's 
li with finding a meaning or purpose of the ·universe. He 
maintains that purposes can only be assigned to sentient beings, 
and consequently, if one does not believe that there is 
sufficient evidence for maintaining that the universe is 
governed by a sentient being, then one can only recognise the 
separate purposes of men and animals. Furthermore, he denies 
that it follows from the proposition that nothing has intrinsic 
value, that nothing is of value. We are free . to choose the 
values .in our lives. 
Nathanson states, to adopt the cosmic point of view as a 
test for values is to overlook the difference between the 
following two questions: 
(1) Would a purely rational being, one possessing only 
cognitive powers, necessarily choose A over B? 
(2)Would a rational being, with such traits as 
particular goals, preferences, needs, or desires, 
necessarily choose A over B? (Nathanson 1978: 198). 
The former question yields the nihilistic answer because it is 
indifferent to A and B, and has no ground for choosing between 
them. The latter question, on the other hand, refers to the 
contingent features of the being making the choice, thereby 
allowing for judgements of rationality. To ignore one's own 
preferences, leave one's own needs unmet, and thwart one's own 
goals, is under normal circumstances regarded as irrational. 
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Seen from this perspective it becomes clear that rationality is 
linked to prudent satisfaction of desires and preferences. 
We usually describe something as "good," rather than "good 
for X," only when particular interests or circumstances are 
shared to a large degree, such as when they are aspects of human 
nature. What can we assert about the value of life? Seen in 
this light, the value of life is not unconditional. 
properties rational for a · person to want in his 
certain aims, desires, preferences, and so on} will 
life. A life lacking such properties will have· no 
have no value. In this respect it is even possible 
A life 
life 
be a 
good, 
for a 
with 
(with 
good 
will 
li 
to be positively bad, and Nathanson believes that it may be 
appropriate for a person to end his or her life in such 
circumstances. Even if one believes that suicide is immoral, 
one may nevertheless also believe that it would not be 
irrational for a person to commit suicide if the future held 
nothing but torture and suffering. An alternative view may 
insist that such a life s 11 had value. One would thereby be 
distinguishing between the life of the person in itself, and the 
conditions under which the person would live. The latter would 
be seen as evil, while the former would still be seen as having 
value (Nathanson 1978: 200}. 
Nathanson does not conclude that li has value only if 
value is attributed to it. His conclusion is that the value of 
life is relative because it. is conditional on what other things 
and persons happen to value, and on their evaluation of life 
itself. It is not irrational to value what one prefers, and 
given that something is preferred, it is rational for one to 
value it. To return to my previous preferences, my lemon 
preference may be an irrational preference, but it is not 
irrational for me to act in accordance with this preference. 
The value of life is objective in a further respect, namely that 
one can be mistaken about one's evaluations of one's li A 
person may, for instance, be dejected because he led in 
achieving a particular goal, and therefore judge his life to be 
meaningless, while many other aims he values are ill available 
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to him. Therefore, his overall negative evaluation of life 
may be mistaken, and ceasing to attribute value to it would be 
irrational. This indicates that attributing value to life is 
not totally subjective (Nathanson 1978: 202-203). 
Those who bel that one has the ght to terminate one's 
life, believe that to expedite one's death is essentially an 
exercise and expression of one's freedom. They may argue that 
since a person's life belongs to himself, he does not only have 
the right to terminate his present li , but need not even have 
an extraordinary reason for doing so. Seneca6 maintained, for 
instance, as long as one departed from one's life nobly, one's 
li as a whole was positive; and that often one must leave 
bravely, and one's reasons for doing so need not be substantial, 
since our reasons for remaining al are also not substantial. 
He also believed that living long is not a good, but living 
well; and that the wise person will therefore not cling onto 
life, but only live as long as he ought. The quality, and not 
the quantity of one's life determines its value. He maintained, 
when one is plagued by misfortune, one has the right to free 
oneself from this life (Kohl 1978: 207-208). Thinkers such as 
Seneca recognise that there are differing degrees of quality of 
life, and that some reasons for dying are better than others. 
Ultimately, however, any reason is sufficient as long as it is 
not the result of external coercion. 
Countering this, one may say that this view fails to 
distinguish between relevant and irrelevant reasons. To end 
one's life as soon as one encounters grave misfortune may not be 
a sufficient reason to do so, and may be irrational. Certainly, 
one may often risk losing one's life to achieve a signi cant 
good, such as to save others, but thereby one is not performing 
the action for the primary purpose of ending one's life. This 
position carries with it the dif culty, however, that no matter 
how benevolently motivated one's intentions may be, one is never 
morally justified in deliberately terminating a person's life. 
Another difficulty is, why are we sometimes justified in 
sacrificing one's life to assist others, but are never justified 
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terminating one's life to help oneself? The right not to be 
killed, the right to subsistence, the right to health care, and 
the right to self-defence are instances of a person's 
fundamental human rights. The right to die is usually the other 
side of the coin. It entails the right to choose how, when, and 
where to die, or how we would choose if capable of doing so. 
The question here is no longer whether we want voluntary death, 
but how much, and under what circumstances it ought to be 
allowed. This position is usually advocated by those who 
believe that there are cases in which one ought to terminate a 
life if that li would be utterly meaningless and filled with 
irremediable suffering, for example, patients who can no longer 
live a meaningful existence due to terminal illness filled with 
suffering, or humans in the initial stages of life, born 
retarded to such an extent as never to have the capacity to find 
any meaning in life. 
I am sure most people will agree that to live a meaningless 
life is an intrinsically undesirable state of af rs. I 
therefore argue that to end a life that is irrevocably 
meaningless is a morally correct action. The critic may object 
with the question, whether it ought then not to be accepted that 
all meaningless lives be ended. Let us imagine a person who 
develops the inability to derive satisfaction from anything. 
His lethargy may lead to his giving up all life-plans or system 
of aims. Even though such a person might not be suffering, we 
may describe his life as having no value. Having nothing to 
live for, such a person may well be indifferent to the decision 
between life and death, and given even only a slight motivation 
to end life, his action would not appear irrational. If we know 
that his condition is permanent, then he has no life-plan that 
allows him to establish that life is better than death. His or 
her life may be described as devoid of value because he or she 
wants to do nothing with it. This is not to assert that death 
would be the rational decision, since given a state of 
indifference, the decision to continue living is just as 
rational. Such a state· may be attributed to beings in 
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irreversible comas, or the case primarily under discussion in 
this chapter an infant born with such extreme mental 
retardation as never to be capable of developing any life-plan. 
A person with consciousness, perceiving his li to be 
meaningless is not one we could ever classify as having an 
irremediable meaningless condition. He may suddenly experience 
something wonderful, develop an interest, or fall in love. His 
life would thereby suddenly become meaningful. 
6.6 ABORTING SEVERELY RETARDED FOETUSES 
At the centre of this discussion are beings that lack 
consciousness, or that are incapable of meaningfully 
classifying, storing, and retrieving sensory information, and 
thereby incapable of integrating experiences to give meaning to 
them, or develop any life-plan. Nathanson suggests that the 
correct question to ask is whether a rational person would 
choose· life or death given such circumstances (Nathanson 1978: 
201). With this view I strongly disagree. Many healthy persons 
could riot imagine being blind or deaf, believing that they would 
rather be dead. Yet many blind and deaf persons live very 
ful lling lives. Helen Keller (1880-1968) lived a fulfilling 
life despite being both deaf and blind. Many people often 
express that they would rather die than live a life in a 
wheelchair. Steven Hawking, one of the world's leading 
scientists in the fields of physics and cosmology, is paralysed 
and unable to speak. Yet his contribution to science is 
invaluable. Christopher Reeve, known for his acting roles as 
Superman, was paralysed from the neck down subsequent to falling 
off his horse. His injuries were of such a nature that even his 
respiratory system no longer functioned autonomously, 
necessitating his constant connection to a respirator. Is this 
a li many would still consider as minimally decent? Judging 
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from the utterances, many people would probably rather choose 
death. Perhaps, prior to Christopher Reeve's accident, he also 
believed that he would rather die than be in such a state. In a 
televised interview, however, he expli tly stated that death 
was only a possibility in his mind for a few minutes 
waking from coma. Seeing his wife and children made him realise 
that there is still so much to live for. Despite his physical 
disability, he again lives a very active life, and by his own 
account, a meaningful one. Strongly disagreeing with Nathanson, 
I argue that a life's quality cannot be determined by asking 
whether we would choose life or death in a given situation, 
since such a belief may change from one time to another, and 
from prior to being in that situation to being in , i.e. the 
decision depends entirely on subjective preferences that may 
vary. 
When arguing for the significance of potential, I argued 
that the value of a potent person is proportionate to, and 
derivative from the value he or she will have as an actual 
person. A being that through some serious defect will never 
attain personhood status cannot be considered a potential 
person. A potential person is a being that will in the normal 
course ·of its development develop into a person. If a being's 
development is retarded to such a severe degree that it will 
never attain any significant personhood characterist then 
abortion even in the late stages of pregnancy, and even 
infanticide in very severe cases, is morally defensible. Which 
beings would we so de ? . An anencephalic infant for tance 
(one whose brain and spinal column did not form) who will never 
attain any properties other than a few biological ones usually 
attributed to persons. .Mary Anne Warren7 (1996: 204-211) 
mentions a number of characteri ics usually attributed to 
persons: consciousness (especially the capacity to feel pain), a 
developed capacity to reason, self-motivated activity 
(relatively independent from genetic or external control), the 
capacity to communicate complex messages, and self awareness 
(the presence of a self-concept) . A severely retarded 
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individual may develop at most the ability to feel pain, and has 
no potential for developing the rest. In arguing for abortion 
in cases of severe mental retardation, I am stressing "mental 
retardation." I have frequently used the term "normal course of 
developments" to refer to a pregnancy, or to the development of 
an infant. If the foetus's development is abnormal to such a 
degree that it will never attain even the most rudimentary level 
of personhood, then its development cannot be described as a 
"normal course of development." For many heal thy parents the 
prospect of having a blind or deaf child is one too dreadful to 
imagine. Under no circumstance, however, can I morally defend 
the aborting of a foetus because it is physically handicapped or 
deformed. People with physical handicaps are often able to 
compensate their shortcomings, are often able to transcend their 
handicaps, and can certainly live meaningful and fulfilling 
lives, as the examples of· Helen Keller, Steven Hawking and 
Christopher Reeve have attested. 
"In creating one's own life, a person can establish new 
standards of value, can go beyond his own limitations and 
even a little beyond the previous limitations of mankind as 
a whole. For this reason we all thrill to examples of 
human greatness, for those who have been great inspire us 
with hope that we may yet not only do what they did, but 
also do what they did not - that as they became what man 
before them had not been, so we too may become what man 
before us has not been. Our heroes inspire us not to 
relive their lives but to live our lives with a touch of 
their heroism" {Grisez 1972: 295). 
I am also not arguing for the moral permissibility of abortion 
in all. cases of mental retardation. Many people with Down's 
Syndrome {a congenital disorder involving moderate to severe 
mental retardation), for instance, are capable of living 
comfortable though simple lives. As many parents of such 
children testify, being a parent to such a child can also be 
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rewarding and fulfilling. When deliberating whether to abort, 
the severity of the mental disorder must primarily be carefully 
considered, and the potential of the child's development be 
evaluated. If the findings show that the child will, to a 
reasonable degree of scientific certainty, never develop much 
beyond a vegetative level, then abortion is surely morally 
justifiable. But if the child has a chance . of attaining 
cognitive abilities (even if these might be very slight), an 
abortion is not morally defensible. Aborting severely retarded 
indi victuals is morally less objectionable in virtue of their 
potential. They lack the potential to become "actual persons." 
It must be kept in mind that the value of a potential person is 
proportionate to and derivative from the value it will have as 
an actual person. If a human being {a being endowed with the 
human genetic code) does not have the potential of developing 
into an actual person, then it cannot assume the status of a 
potential person, and hence aborting such a being is morally 
less objectionable. The aborting of such a being may morally be 
equated to the killing of an animal, keeping in mind that 
animals· have rights too, but that their rights can be more 
easily overridden than of potential or actual persons. 
6.7 SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE 
In this chapter, I endeavoured to argue for the moral 
permissibility of abortion if it becomes evident that the 
developing child will be mentally retarded to such a degree as 
to never attain any significant characteristic of personhood. 
Aborting such a foetus often means performing an abortion in the 
advanced stages of pregnancy because the anomaly can seldom be 
detected earlier. Since the foetus is already clearly sentient, 
performing such an abortion requires very significant reasons. 
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It was, therefore, imperative to take a look at the value of 
life in general, as well as at its relation to suffering. 
Donnelly argued that suffering is not always evil. In some 
cases it helps one, or those around one, to develop as a person. 
Nevertheless, many people wish to abrogate the handicapped, even 
if this would mean letting them die. 
threatened by the handicapped. 
Society generally feels 
Kierkegaard believed that suffering had great instrumental 
value, enabling us to develop desirable traits that could 
otherwise not be attained. Suffering should therefore be seen 
as a virtue. He held suffering to be a beneficial burden. For 
him spirituality without suffering is inconceivable. 
In determining life's value, it had to be determined 
whether its value is intrinsic, or conditional. Steven 
Nathanson argued that if one beholds life from a universal 
viewpoint, one incapable of attributing value to Its 
value has to be attributed to it from a worldly standpoint, i.e. 
we have to give individual lives their meaning. The universal 
viewpoint is also not always the rational viewpoint, nor is the 
worldly viewpoint necessarily irrational. Sometimes the 
opposite is the case. Nathanson does not conclude that life has 
value only if value is attributed to it. His conclusion that 
the value of life is relative because it is conditional on what 
other things and persons happen to value, and on their 
evaluation of life itself. It was also argued that if one 
presently believes a life to be meaningless, it is not 
necessarily appropriate to end the li in question, since a 
turn in events could bring a significant change and give that 
li meaning. 
Turning to the abortion of severely retarded indi victuals, 
Nathanson suggested that the correct question to ask is whether 
a rational person would choose life or death given such 
circumstances. I rejected this suggestion, 
sometimes believe a situation to be meaningless, 
since people 
but once they 
themselves are actually 
meaning. 
that situation, they too find 
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Regarding abortion of severely retarded individuals, I 
argued that such abortions are only morally justifiable when the 
foetus does not have the potent of acquiring significant 
personhood characteristics. If a foetus will be retarded, but 
will still have the potential of attaining bas cognitive 
abilities, then an abortion is not morally defensible. 
In this and the foregoing chapters, I have defended all 
positions I initially set out to defend regarding abortion. To 
do so, I adopted a rights oriented perspective. In recent 
decades, numerous philosophers have argued for a return to a 
virtue-oriented approach in ethics, claiming that it avoids the 
shortcomings of a ghts-oriented perspective. In the next 
chapter, I shall examine virtue ethics, and explain why I have 
chosen a rights-oriented perspective. 
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CHAPTER 7 
VIRTUE ETHICS AND ABORTION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In dealing with the issue of abortion, I was primarily concerned 
with the rightness or wrongness of performing an abortion. I 
thereby concentrated on a being's rights. A number of 
philosophers have in recent decades, however, expressed their 
concerns about the limitations of a rights-oriented perspective 
and argued for a return to a virtue-oriented perspective. In 
this chapter I shall examine virtue ethics, pointing out the 
advantages and disadvantages of the approach. I shall then turn 
to a virtue philosopher, Rosalind Hursthouse, who concerned 
herself · with the issue of abortion. In the final section of 
this chapter, I shall point out that my approach led me to 
conclusions that ought to be acceptable to many virtue 
philosophers and shall also explain why I chose and prefer a 
rights-oriented perspective to a virtue-oriented one. 
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In 7.2, virtue ethics is briefly introduced and its origin 
and development discussed. This whole ethical approach focuses 
on virtues. In 7.3 it is, therefore, imperative to ask what a 
virtue is, followed by why virtues are important (7.4). 
Advantages and shortcomings of virtue ethics are discussed in 
7.5 and 7.6 respectively. In 7.7 I turn to a virtue philosopher 
who dealt with the issue of abortion, and in 7.8 an evaluation 
of virtue ethics regarding abortion is made. It will become 
clear that the normative conclusions of virtue oriented and 
rights oriented approaches need not necessarily differ, but that 
at a metaethical level the justifications of the conclusions 
will differ radically. Finally, in 7.9, I defend the choice of 
a rights-oriented perspective. 
7.2 BACKGROUND TO VIRTUE ETHICS 
In dealing with any subject, the question we begin with is 
1 determinative for the answers we give. Aristotle 1 s ethics is 
about a person 1 s character. He asks, what it is to be a good 
person, 
life. 
and answers, to be a good person is to live a virtuous 
To understand ethics, we must therefore understand what 
makes a person virtuous. For Aristotle, the good person is the 
one with a virtuous character, therefore, for him, the virtuous 
are the central focus of ethics (Rachels 198 6: 34 5) . Male 
points out that the classical philosophers did not lay down 
principles of moral behaviour, but rather concentrated on the 
character of the moral person. He contends that classical moral 
theory is superior to an ethics of duty. The fundamental moral 
question for Aristotle is not "What shall I do?" but "What shall 
I be?" The morality of doing is relatively simple - we decide 
what we ought to do by determining which actions- will maximise 
utility, or are universalisable. The morality of being entails 
another. kind of simplicity, which Male calls "unity of 
character." Persons of character do not only provide us with 
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principles, but more importantly, examples to follow. Male 
contends that an ethics of character is more flexible than an 
ethics of rules, since we can find more than one way of 
llowing a good example. For Aristotle, telling the truth was 
not as for Kant, fulfilling an obligation, but rather a quality 
of character, or a range of qualities of character. Aristotle's 
ethics · does not deal with principles though he must have 
adopted some principles, such as that one ought not to commit 
adultery), but rather focuses on character traits of virtuous 
individuals. 
Aristotle li s numerous virtuous means between extremes, 
of which a few are mentioned. Courage is the mean between 
cowardice and foolhardiness, liberality between prodigality and 
illiberality, magnificence between vulgarity and meanness, pride 
between vanity and humility, friendliness between obsequiousness 
and sulkiness, and justice between the two extremes of injustice 
(Sommers & Sommers 1997: 194). 
Although virtue centred ethics is often attributed to 
Aristotle, other ancient thinkers such as Socrates and Plato are 
also identified with They all approach the subject of 
ethics by posing the question, what characteristics, what traits 
of character make one a good person. Plato speaks of virtues 
and vices, and of certain types of human character, but says 
nothing about principles, rules or laws, except when dealing 
with politics. The central issue in ancient moral philosophy is 
not duty, but virtue (Male 1997: 310) . For Christian 
philosophers, being a good person means obeying God's 
commandments. Augustine sees happiness as the enjoyment of 
the highest good. This good cannot be lo by accident or 
misfortune, since then we would not be able. to enjoy it 
confidently. Therefore, it must be of the soul. The highest 
good must be something greater than the soul itself, otherwise 
the soul would become worse by pursuing it. St Augustine 
concludes that the highest good is the possession of virtue. 
The virtuous Christian follows God, avoids sin, and obeys His 
will (Augustine 1997: 305-309). Reason was the source of 
135 
practical wisdom for the Greeks, i.e. the virtuous li for 
them was inseparable from the li of reason. St Augustine 
mistrusted reason, and defended the subordination of reason to 
the will of God. Medieval philosophers, therefore, discussed 
the virtues in the context of divine law, of which faith, hope, 
charity, and obedience were the central focus ·(Rachels 198 6: 
345-346) . 
Although philosophy again became secularised after the 
Renaissance, there was no return to the Greek way of thinking. 
The divine law was replaced by the moral law. The moral law was 
a system of rules drawn up through reason, determining right or 
moral action. Instead of asking, "What character traits 
designate a moral person?" the focus shifted to "What is to 
perform a moral action?" or "What is it to act morally?" This 
new approach led them no longer to develop theories of virtue, 
but rather of right action and obligation. The theories that 
dominated moral philosophy since the seventeenth century, were 
ethical egoism maintaining that one ought to do whatever will 
promote one's own interests; utilitarianism, that one ought to 
act as to maximise overall happiness or well-being; Kantianism, 
that we follow rules that we could will to become universal 
principles; and social contract theory, maintaining that we 
ought to follow rules that rational, self-interested people can 
follow ·and agree to establish in the interest of mutual benefit 
(Rachels 1986: 346). 
Recently, several philosophers have maintained that the 
approaches of modern moral philosophy are inadequate and that we 
should return to Aristotle's way of philosophising. This stance 
was first put forward by Elizabeth Anscombe in 1958. She 
suggested that modern moral philosophy is incoherent, resting on 
the assumption of a law without a law giver. The notions of 
obligation, duty and rightness, she maintained, are inextricably 
linked to this idea. She suggested that we give up focusing on 
these notions and again let the concept of "virtue" be the focal 
notion. Since 1958, some philosophers have followed Anscombe 
rejecting the approaches of modern moral philosophy. 
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Nevertheless, virtue ethics is still in a relatively undeveloped 
state, although philosophers such as Philippa Foot, Ros ind 
Hursthouse, John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, Michael Stocker, and 
Michael Slate are agreed that a radical reorientation of the 
subject is needed (Rachels 1986: 346-347). 
Rachels 2 
should have: 
lists five components that a theory of virtues 
(1) there should be an explanation of what a virtue 
is, (2) there should be a list specifying which character traits 
are virtues, (3) it should be explained what these virtues 
consist in, (4) there should be an explanation why these 
qual ies are good ones for a person to have, and (5) the theory 
should clarify whether these virtues are the same for all 
people, or whether they differ from person to person, or from 
culture to culture (Rachels 1986: 347). 
7.3 WHAT IS A VIRTUE? 
Several acorns fall from a tree. One is eaten by a squirrel, 
another decays on the ground, a third grows into an oak tree. 
We maintain that the third acorn's fate is appropriate to it, 
that it succeeds where the other two fail. We believe that the 
appropriate purpose of an acorn is to develop into an oak tree. 
By doing so it reaches goal. To speak of a "goal" here, 
however, is anthropomorphic. An acorn is not a conscious being, 
pursuing a happy outcome of its development. Moreover, the 
happy outcome is hardly more natural than the unhappy outcomes -
more acorns decay on the ground, or are eaten by squirrels, than 
develop into oaks. Nevertheless, our contention that the 
appropriate goal of an acorn is to develop into an oak is 
justified. Any organic matter can decay on the ground, any nut 
can serve a squirrel fodder, but only an acorn can develop into 
an oak tree (Sommers & Sommers 1997: 290). 
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The Greeks defined the function or natural purpose of a 
thing as an activity that is speci to it, one that only it 
performs, or one that it is capable of best performing. In this 
sense the acorn's development into an oak tree is the "happy" or 
"proper" one. The Greeks employed the term "eudaimonia" to 
refer to a s f-functioning, sel fulfilling activity. The 
characterist that enable a being to fulfil its function or 
functions the Greeks termed "virtues." A virtue may be 
described as any trait or capacity that enables a being to 
fulfil· its appropriate function. Virtues also refer to a 
special kind of excellence that only humans possess or lack. In 
this latter sense the virtues are moral excellences that 
contribute to a life of human fulfilment, and in. this sense we 
refer to them in contrast to "vices" (Sommers & Sommers 1997: 
290) . 
The question that now needs to be answered is, "What goal 
or purpose is appropriate for human beings?" The Greeks 
audaciously confronted this.question. Aristotle maintained that 
human beings are rational and social animals. They naturally 
fulfil themselves as rational and social beings. He maintained 
that a· virtue is a character trait manifested in habitual 
actions. A person who only occasionally tells the truth does 
not possess the virtue of honesty. The honest person is 
habitually truthful, telling the truth not only when so doing is 
convenient to him. Rachels rightly points out, however, that 
this is not enough. Vices are also character its manifested 
in habitual behaviour. Rachels redefines a virtue as "a trait 
manifested in habitual action that is good for a person to have" 
(Rachels 1986: 348). 
The question that immediately arises is, what the virtues 
then really are. Which character traits could be fostered in 
human beings that we would agree to be labelled as virtues? 
Rachels suggests a list, cautioning, however, that this list 
need in no way be complete. He mentions benevolence, civility, 
compassion, conscientiousness, cooperativeness, courage, 
courteousness, dependability, fairness, friendliness, 
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generosity, honesty, industriousness, justice, loyalty, 
moderation, reasonableness, f-confidence, self-control, self-
discipline, self-reliance, tactfulness, thoughtfulness, and 
tolerance (Rachels 1986: 348}. But what do these character 
traits consist in? It is one thing to say that we ought to be 
conscientious, courteous, dependable and thoughtful, but what 
are these virtues? Each virtue has its own features and raises 
its own problems. Rachels (1986: 349) examines four of these 
more closely, namely courage, generosity, honesty, and loyalty 
to family and friends. 
Aristotle held courage to be the mean between the two 
excesses of cowardice and foolhardiness - it is cowardly to flee 
from all dangers, but is foolhardy to risk too much. Courage 
is needed by anyone facing danger, this includes all of us at 
different times. We all need courage because we all face 
situations in which we are vulnerable. If we consider only the 
normal rcumstances of life, then the virtue of courage poses 
no extraordinary problem, but when we examine more unusual 
circumstances, the matter is no longer as clear. Does a soldier 
possess the virtue of courage when courageously fighting for an 
evil cause? Some may hold that he does not, that courage in an 
unworthy cause is not a virtue. Calling such a soldier 
courageous seems to praise his conduct, but we do not wish to 
praise it. However, it does not seem right to say that he is 
not courageous. 
Foot3 (1978: 340} believes that most people do not find any 
dif culty in believing that virtues are sometimes displayed in 
immoral actions. Industriousness and courage may, for instance, 
assist an immoral person in his immoral actions. The UNA4 
bomber, for instance, used his industriousness to construct 
parcel bombs that killed three people and injured twenty-nine, 
over a period of more than seventeen years in the United States. 
Foot maintains that it seems wrong to connect a characteri ic 
such as industriousness equally to good and bad· actions. She 
proposes that one way of evaluating usually virtuous actions, 
when employed for the attainment of bad ends, is to deny that 
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these characteristics serve as virtues in those people. 
Firstly, she cautions that we should not draw this conclusion 
from seeing a person employ a usually virtuous property towards 
an unworthy end on one occasion. For instance, if a person is 
generally courageous, using his or her courage in laudable 
situations, but is courageous on one occasion in pursuit of an 
unworthy end, we cannot conclude that courage is not a virtue 
that person. Just as "poison," "solvent," and "corrosive" are 
properties of physical things, virtue words re to the power 
to produce good actions ·and good desires. But poisons, 
solvents, and corrosives also do not always act 
characterist lly; similarly, properties usually regarded as 
virtues do not always function characteristically~ If arsenic 
is a poison, does not follow that it acts as a poison 
wherever it is present. Sometimes it is acceptable to state 
that arsenic is a poison, but does not act as a poison in this 
case. Similarly, Foot concludes, virtues such as courage are 
not virtues in some instances, although in general they are 
(Foot 1978: 341-342). Rachels is correct in suggesting that we 
should avoid this problem by asserting that he exhibits two 
qualities of 
danger), and 
cause) . On 
employed in 
350) 
character 
one that 
the whole, 
despicable 
- one that is admirable (bravely facing 
is not (willing to fight for an evil 
courage is admirable, but when it is 
causes, it is not (Rachels 1986: 349-
Generosity is the willingness to use one's resources to 
assist others. It is also a mean between two extremes, 
somewhere between stinginess and extravagance 
person. gives too little, the latter too much. 
the former 
How much is 
enough? The answer to this question depends on the ethical view 
we accept. Jesus said that we must give all we have to save the 
poor. Many regarded, and still regard this as a hard teaching, 
and even many considering themselves His followers are unwilling 
to accept it. Mother Teresa of Calcutta was perhaps one of the 
few who completely did so. The modern utilitarians closely 
follow this teaching. They maintain that one ought always to 
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act in such a manner as to increase the overall happiness of all 
concerned. This means that one ought to support the poor until 
further giving would diminish rather than increase the general 
level of preference satisfaction. Why do people generally 
reject s idea? Part of the answer may be selfishness, but 
adopting such a policy would also prevent us from living normal 
lives (we would not only have to provide financial support, but 
also give much of our time, which would drastically change many 
of our lives). Rachels therefore suggests an amendment to the 
definition of generosity to state that ~we should be as generous 
with our resources, as is consistent with conducting our 
ordinary lives in a minimally satisfying way" (Rachels 1986: 
350) . But some rich persons would consider an ordinary li as 
one others would evaluate as extravagant. 
An honest person is one who does not lie. But there are 
many ways of misleading people, other than by lying. Should we 
maintain that an honest person is one who never lies, or one 
that only lies in exceptional circumstances when is 
considered the appropriate thing do? Most people would adopt 
the latter view. Why? Our abil y to live together in societies 
depends on our ability to communicate. We talk to one another, 
read one another's writings, exchange information and opinions, 
express our desires, beliefs, wants, needs and preferences, make 
promises, ask and answer questions, debate and discuss issues, 
and much more. Without communication, social living would be 
impossible. In order for communicative interactions to be 
successful, certain rules of communication must exist. We must 
be able to rely upon one another to be honest. By accepting 
someone's words, we make ourselves vulnerable by modifying our 
beliefs in accordance with what we are told by others, we place 
our welfare in their hands. If they lie, we may acquire false 
bel fs, and if we act on those beliefs, we may do foolish 
things. We trusted them, and they deceived us. For this reason 
lying is offensive; it is a violation of trust. This does not 
mean, however, that we ought to be honest with everyone. If we 
know that we are living under a despicable regime, and know that 
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the authorities are unjustly arresting, detaining and torturing 
citizens, we need not tell them the truth when asked the 
location of a certain person of whose hideout we are aware. 
Justice is considered a virtue, therefore, if people wish to use 
our information against the interests of justice, we are not 
obliged to be honest. People for their right to the truth 
from us if they wish to employ our information for the 
attainment of some unjust end (Rachels 1986: 351-352). 
In Plato's "Euthyphro," Socrates learns that Euthyphro is 
prosecuting his father for murder. Socrates questions whether 
it is proper for a son to bring charges against his father. For 
Euthyphro, murder is murder, seeing no wrongdoing in his 
prosecution. Normally, however, we do not treat family and 
friends as we would strangers. We would do things for them that 
we would not do for strangers, and are bound to them by love and 
affection. An explanation for the difference in treatment is 
not based merely on the fact that we treat those people we like 
differently from those we do not. Our duties and 
responsibilit s are different to them. The essence of 
friendship is that we have· special duties and responsibilities 
towards friends. Friends help one another, but the benefits of 
friendship by far exceed the benefits of mutual assistance. 
Without a friend, life would be empty. Even Aristotle 
maintained that no one would wish to be without friends, even if 
he could have everything else. "By returning our affection they 
confirm our worthiness as human beings" (Rachels 1986: 353). To 
have friends, we must also have the qualities of character that 
enable us to be a friend, of which loyalty is very important. 
Friends are reliable, they will stand by one even when times are 
hard, and even when, objectively speaking, the person would 
deserve to be abandoned. They make allowances for each other, 
forgive offences, and refrain from making harsh judgements. 
Sometimes it is necessary for a friend to tell his or her friend 
an unpleasant truth about himself, but in doing so he or she 
will not embarrass the friend in front of others. This does not 
entail that we do not have duties to strangers, but these duties 
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are different. Beneficence is a virtue, but it does not require 
the same treatment for strangers and ends. Justice also 
requires impartiality, but because ends are loyal, the 
demands of justice apply less stringently between them. This is 
why Socrates is surprised at Euthyphro' s prosecution of his 
father. The relationship between loved ones is even closer than 
between friends, a reason why in many countries a person cannot 
be compelled to testify in court against his or her spouse 
(Rachels 1986: 352-354). 
It seems clear that virtues are beneficial, but it is 
appropriate to ask, whether they are beneficial to the person 
having . the virtues, or to those dealing with him or her. The 
answer depends on the virtue in question. Courage, temperance, 
and wisdom benefit both the possessor of these virtues and 
others. Charity and justice, on the other hand, are primarily 
concerned with the welfare of others, and with what is owed to 
them. If we define virtues as character traits a person needs 
to live well, being both beneficial to her and others, many 
properties immediately come to mind that are not virtues, but 
are beneficial to oneself or others. Health, physical strength, 
concentration and intelligence are examples. To distinguish 
between virtues and other beneficial characteristics, Foot 
suggests that virtues are traits connected to a person's will. 
Our moral dispositions are usually judged with reference to our 
intentions. A person doing something unintentionally is usually 
not thereby judged on his virtues. There is an exception to 
this, however, when the lack of an intention is held to be a 
malady of character, such as when a person does harm to others 
through his unintentional or inconsiderate neglect. A rtuous 
person does not only do good where it is in his power to do so, 
but also intends to do good, and finds pleasure in the well-
being of others. Foot is . using "will" in its wider sense to 
stand not only for what is sought, but also what is wished for 
(Foot 1978: 330-331). 
The virtue of wisdom, 
initial definition by Foot. 
however, does not fit in with this 
It also seems to be a property of 
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the intellect, such as concentration and intelligence, rather 
than the will. Wisdom is associated with knowledge, but 
knowledge is not associated with intention or will. What do we 
mean by "wisdom?" Foot maintains that wisdom has two parts, the 
first being knowledge of means towards certain ends, and the 
second is knowledge of a particular end's worth. Wisdom may 
thus be distinguished from cleverness, as Aristotle and Thomas 
Aquinas insisted. Cleverness is the ability to take the right 
steps to any end, while wisdom is the ability to take the ght 
steps only to good ends, and pertaining to human life in 
general, rather than to. the ends of particular arts. 
Furthermore, Foot states that wisdom is associated only with 
knowledge attainable by any ordinary adult human being, i.e. it 
does not require training or special intelligence. Knowledge 
that is attained only by training or requires special 
intelligence would not be considered as wisdom, even if it had 
the same ends. 
well informed. 
Some people are wise without being clever or 
Wisdom is connected to the will in that the wise 
person ·knows how to achieve a good end, and wants to attain it. 
Wisdom is also the capacity to distinguish between the values of 
different ends. A wise person will not s ive incessantly 
towards unworthy ends (Foot 197 8: 331-332) . On· this point we 
may question Foot's contention. Does a wise person have 
knowledge of worthy ends and the means towards them, or is a 
wise person also one who is capable of pursuing those ends he 
chooses as worthy? 
A·further important distinction between virtues on the one 
hand, and skills and arts on the other, is that voluntary 
mistakes are usually preferred to involuntary ones in the 
latter, while the opposite is the case with the former. 
Therefore too, rtue is more than just a mere capacity, it is 
imperative that it engages the will. Saying, "I did it 
deliberately," is not seen as an excuse when a virtue is in 
question. With a skill or ability, such as spelling, however, 
such an excuse is acceptable (Foot 1978: 333-334). 
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Another characteristic of the virtues identified by Foot is 
their corrective capacity. By this she means that each virtue 
has some temptation to be resisted, or deficiency in motivation 
to overcome. It may be asserted that only because temptations 
of fear and intemperance exist, the virtues of courage and 
temperance exist at 1. We often experience fear and wish to 
flee, even when doing so is inappropriate behaviour, or we 
desire ·pleasures when attaining them may be unseemly. If fear 
and pleasure were not sometimes inappropriate, virtues of 
courage and temperance 
corrective function is 
well, cooperativeness, 
tolerance, because 
would not 
applicable 
exist as correctives. The 
for many other virtues as 
industriousness, reasonableness, and 
uncooperative behaviour, idleness, 
unreasonableness, and intolerance are encountered temptations. 
Justice, unfriendliness, and benevolence are slightly different 
because. they are not corre·ctives to unwanted temptations, but 
rather to a lack in motivation. If people were as concerned 
with the well-being of others as they are with themselves, there 
would be no need for a virtue of benevolence (Foot 1978: 334-
336) . 
If we accept the thesis that virtues are correctives, a 
related question arises: Is it the case that the more effort a 
person must exert to act virtuously, the more virtue is needed 
to act ·virtuously? Or is difficulty in acting virtuously an 
indication that the agent is lacking in virtue? Aristotle 
believed the person finding pleasure in virtue superior to one 
experiencing difficulty in being virtuous. Who is more 
courageous, the one who wants to flee but does not, or the one 
who does not even want to flee? Who shows more justice, the one 
who finds it easy act for what is right and proper, or the 
one who does not? Who shows more benevolence, the one 
experiencing difficulties in working for the well-being of 
others, or the one who does not? Foot argues that virtues are 
correctives to dispositions or tendencies in human nature in 
general. This does not mean that if a virtue is not a 
corrective for a speci c person, then he or she is not 
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virtuous. A person overcoming great fear is regarded as 
courageous, but a person in a similar situation also facing the 
danger without experiencing any fear is similarly judged. Foot 
provides an example regarding honesty. A person tempted to 
steal is regarded less virtuous than one who never even 
considered such an action (Foot 1978: 33 338). 
7.4 WHY ARE VIRTUES IMPORTANT? 
Why are virtues desirable? Why is it good for a person to be 
courageous, generous, honest, or loyal? The answer may depend on 
the virtue in question. Courage is good because life is filled 
with dangers, and without we would not be able to function 
optimally. Generosity is desirable because there will always be 
disadvantaged people needing help. Without honesty the 
relations between people could not function adequately and 
reliably. Loyalty is essential for friendship, and friendship 
is needed to find esteem as a human being. From these answers 
it appears that the answer is different from virtue to virtue. 
Aristotle maintained that we can give a general answer to 
the question, stating that the virtuous person fairs better in 
life, i.e. the virtues are needed to live a good life. We are 
rational and social beings, desiring and requiring the company 
and affection of others. We therefore live in communities with 
friends, families, and fellow citizens. In social interactions, 
characteri ics of benevolence, civility, compassion, 
conscientiousness, cooperativeness, courteousness, 
dependability, fairness, friendliness, generosity, honesty, 
industriousness, justice, loyalty, etc. are needed to interact 
successfully with other people. A person lacking these 
qualities is incapable of functioning adequately, and depending 
on the degree of his inability, may be regarded as an antisocial 
personality. 
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"Antisocial personality, is a personality disorder in 
which the outstanding characteristics are a marked lack of 
ethical or moral development and an apparent inability of 
the individual to follow approved models of behavior. 
Basically, these individuals are unsocialized and seemingly 
incapable of significant loyalty to other persons, groups, 
or· social values. These characteris cs often bring them 
into repeated confl with society ... 
Typically intelligent, spontaneous, and usually very 
likeable on first acquaintance, antisocial personalities 
are deceitful and manipulative, callously using others to 
achieve their own ends. Often they seem to live in a 
series of present moments, without consideration for the 
past or future" (Carson, Butcher & Coleman 1988: 237-238). 
On a more individual level, characteristics of courage, 
industriousness, loyalty, self-confidence, self-control, self-
discipline, and self-reliance are needed to successfully atta 
the goals one strives towards and fulfil the social roles we 
occupy. Despite their differences, it is contended, the virtues 
have the same general sort of value. They are qualities needed 
for successful human living in all societies and in all ages 
(Rachels 1986: 354-355). 
Other virtue philosophers, however, maintain that virtues 
are society or culture specific. Societies provide values, 
institutions, and ways of li that determine individual ways of 
life. The traits needed to occupy these roles will differ, 
therefore the character traits needed to live successfully will 
differ; hence the virtues will be different. It is therefore 
contended that which traits are considered as virtues will 
di ·from society to society, depending on which traits are 
conducive to successful living in a given society. Macintyre5 
maintains, to adequately understand a person's actions, it is 
imperative that the context in which the action is performed is 
understood. For an action to be indicative of a person's 
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possessing 
observable 
a specific virtue, 
in different roles, 
the type of behaviour must be 
unlike many skills, which are 
specific to certain roles. For a person to possess the virtue 
of honesty, for tance, it is not sufficient him or her to 
be honest at work, while not being completely honest at home. 
The behavioural response must be observable all roles. 
Therefore, Macintyre argues for the importance of taking a 
person's life as a who into account (Macintyre 1984c: 318). 
deems it important to understand the context in which an 
action is performed, because by only focusing on the action, no 
insight is obtainable about the motivation of the person 
performing the action. A person's jogging, for instance, may be 
explained in different ways. If his motivation is to get 
exercise, then we have one explanation. This may have positive 
secondary consequences, such as to bene his health, and 
relieve tension. If his motive for jogging is relieve 
tension, we have a different explanation. The behaviour may 
thus take place in a setting that is primarily a health oriented 
one, or in a recreational one, to name only two. To fully 
understand his behaviour, we need to understand the whole 
context in which the behaviour arises. Macintyre therefore 
argues, we cannot characterise behaviour independently from the 
intention leading to it, and cannot understand an intention 
independently from the setting in which is situated. He uses 
the term "settings" re ively inconclusively. A social setting 
may be an institution, a practice, or a milieu of another human 
kind (Macintyre 1984c: 319) . To understand a behaviour we need 
to identify the primary intention behind it. Thus, if we know 
that Jones is jogging because he believes it to be good 
exercise, relieves tension, ·and his wife admires his commitment, 
we have not yet identified the primary intention. Would Jones 
still jog if his wife were indifferent to it? ·If it did not 
relieve. tension? If neither ieved his tension nor 
benefitted his health. Only once these questions are answered 
can an .adequate explanation of his behaviour be attained. A 
situation's setting, Macintyre maintains, is inextricably linked 
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to its historical and cultural backgrounds. Therefore, to 
understand a person's behaviour a specific setting, to 
understand his role, it is imperative that the historical and 
cultural values of his role be understood. Macintyre so 
believes that the virtues enable us to attain the good life. 
Since settings are different, since life roles vary, virtues 
will be different too. "What the good life is for a fifth 
century Athenian general will not be the same as what it was for 
a medieval nun, or a seventeenth century farmer" (Macintyre 
1984c: 324). Th.is is not merely because we live in different 
social settings, but because we approach our circumstances with 
different social identities. According to Macintyre, therefore, 
virtues vary from culture to culture, from setting to ing, 
and can only be understood from the setting's perspective. 
This view may be challenged, maintaining that there are 
virtues that will be needed in all soci ies and in all eras. 
Aristotle maintained that the basic values, such as friendship, 
loyalty, honesty, benevolence, etc., are universal, since all 
people . need friends, no society can function without adequate 
communication, in every society there will be people worse off 
than others, and so on. Rachels rightly states that it may be a 
fact that the virtues are given different interpretations in 
different societies, and because individuals live particular 
sorts of lives in particular circumstances, they will value 
certain traits more than others, but cannot be correct to 
maintain that whether any particular character trait is a virtue 
is never anything more than social convention. "The basic 
virtues are mandated not by social convention, but by basic 
facts about our human condition" (Rachels 1986: 355-356). 
7.5 ADVANTAGES OF VIRTUE ETHICS 
Three main 
appealing: 
points 
(1) it 
are identifiable why 
provides a natural 
virtue 
account 
ethics is 
of moral 
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motivation, {2) it is capable of dealing with the problem of 
impartiality, and (3) it evades many objections of modern moral 
philosophy made by feminist philosophers. Virtue ethics seems 
to have a clear advantage over the other theories of ethics in 
regard to human motivation. Certainly, there are connections 
between being and doing - a man can only be what he is, by doing 
what he does {Male 1997: 312). His moral qualities are ascribed 
to him.because of his actions, which are described as exhibiting 
those qualities. An ethics of being must entail doing, while an 
ethics of doing often looks no further than doing. A morality 
of principles is concerned solely with what people do or fail to 
do, since that is what rules are for. Male states that 
according to such an ethics; people need possess no character at 
all, only moral principles and a will to live according to them. 
The philosophy of duty takes no account of what people are, but 
only how they should conduct their actions. Justice for Plato 
does not mean "acting according to law," is a quality of 
character, and a just action is one a just character would 
perform (Male 1997: 311). Kantians and utilitarians, according 
to Male, have difficulties in accounting for motives because 
they only focus on actions, not on the person behind the 
actions. Male contends that a utili tar ian, for instance, is 
only able to commend a courageous character by stating that his 
or her action is one a courageous person is likely to perform, 
which in turn is an indication of a courageous character. For 
Aristotelians, on the other hand, a courageous action is one 
that manifests a courageous character and springs therefrom. 
Male {1997: 313) rejects a morality based on rules, since we may 
not yet have rules to guide all behaviour. When I am faced with 
a situation in which I am. to make a moral decision, such as 
whether to permit an abortion, I first have to adopt a moral 
principle. Suppose now that I adopt a principle permitting 
abortion due to rape, then this principle may be opposing 
another of my principles, namely, not to kill an innocent human 
being. What is required, Male maintains, is not a new 
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principle, but a whole set of rules, one mani sted in a 
virtuous character. 
The shortcomings of two modern ethical theo are 
illustrated in the following. Donaldson (1990: 1-15) asks us to 
consider a fictional society 
people have for one another 
which the degree of affection 
is homogeneous. It is not that 
these people are not fond of one another, or show a lack of 
interest for interpersonal relationships. On the contrary, 
these people value them, but they are equally fond of everyone. 
No one is preferred to another - strangers are appreciated to 
the same degree as spouses or children. In such a society, 
every person counts as one and no more than one - a utilitarian 
ideal. Would we feel inclined to immigrate to that society? 
Most of us would probably decline the offer. We would probably 
still be very hesitant even if the overall amount of friendship, 
love and interpersonal commitment were higher than in our 
present society. A society with absolute equals would not 
contain friends, lovers, or family relationships as we know 
them, since all would have equal status. People of that society 
would rather save two strangers than an own child, and even when 
faced with saving either a child or a stranger, the decision 
would be randomly decided, since none is to enjoy preferential 
treatment. Although utilitarianism would prefer the imagined 
society to our own, why are most people not inclined to agree? 
Sommers offers insight to this question. 
According to Sommers ( 1988: 439-456), .universal and 
impartial theories of morality are based on the assumption of 
equal pull {EP) among all members. She argues that an 
investigation into personal relationships yields no evidence 
that EP actually exists. We are differentially attracted to 
different members of society; Sommers calls this "differential 
pull" {DP) . There are certain institutions and relationships 
that we are unwilling to give up. She argues that whether we 
would be willing to give up an institution depends on the nature 
of that institution - whether it has a predominantly intrinsic 
or extrinsic value. We would be willing to give up institutions 
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such as the nation state that have predominantly extrins 
value, i.e. their main functions, such as patriotism and 
security, could also be achieved within another social 
establishment. We would, however, not readily give up 
institutions and relationships of intrinsic value, such as 
friendship and the family, since the companionship, love, 
intimacy, mutual commitment and comfort could not be substituted 
by other institutions or relationships to a greater or equal 
degree. A society or . social community in which all 
rel ionships are equal, in which all people are valued equally, 
is not.appealing to us. Not only is it not appealing, we would 
not admire a person who conducted all his behaviours according 
to a principle of equality. If he were to give a stranger just 
as much interest as a friend, lover, child, or spouse, when 
faced with a situation in which he could only help one (their 
situations 
only fail 
being otherwise relevantly similar), · he would not 
to attract admiration from everyone besides 
utilitarians, he would also receive a great deal of criticism, 
and perhaps even scorn. 
Kant's theory of morality, with its insistence that to act 
morally· is to act out of duty is no more appealing. Stocker 
(1976: 462) illustrates a situation in which a person receives a 
loyal visitor in a hospital. The patient appreciates the 
visitor's engagement under di cult conditions. He comes to 
realise that his visitor has not done this out of love or 
friendship, but merely out of duty - believing it to be his duty 
to visit a sick acquaintance, not doing this out of love, 
friendship, or other similar commitment. How would the patient 
feel? Surely the visit would be of greater value if it were done 
out of love or friendship, rather than mere duty. Another 
example will strengthen argument. Suppose a person rescues 
his child from drowning. Would we not assume the action to have 
sprung out of love? If we are then honestly told by the rescuer 
that his only consideration was duty, how would we react? Even 
if the drowning person were a stranger, we would assume the 
rescuer to act out of care for others, to be motivated by 
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affection towards beings in distress. An action out of mere 
duty is similar to seeing it as a job to ful 1. Surely, moral 
actions cannot spring out of duty, but should be done out of 
love, care for other beings, or similar motivations. 
The insensi t ty of Kant's ethics becomes visible in his 
reaction to Maria von Herbert. Von Herbert was an Austrian who 
admired Kant's philosophy. She contemplated suicide a 
having told her lover about a previous relationship. She wrote 
to Kant for advice. He replied that she did the right thing by 
telling the truth, that she need never regret having done her 
moral duty, and that she should live with the consequences with 
composure. Unable to come to terms with her situation, she 
again wrote to Kant, who believed her to be mentally deranged. 
Von Herbert finally committed suicide. Kant's response to 
Herbert is indicative of his unwillingness, or inability to 
sympathise with von Herbert (Langton 1992: 175-192). 
We want our relationships to be based on mutual regard. 
Acting from a utilitarian motive (the desire to do the right 
thing), or from a Kantian duty (from an abstract sense of duty), 
is not to act from such a mot We do not wish to live a 
community acting only from such motives, nor would we like to be 
such persons. Therefore, it is argued that theories of ethics 
focusing only on morally right action will fail to give a 
comprehens account of the moral life. A theory emphasising 
loyalty, personal personal qualities (such as friendship, 
commitment} is needed to give an adequate 
theory of the virtues. 
Both Kantian and utilitarian 
It is emphasised that we ought 
equals,. being tot ly impartial. 
account, i.e. a 
ethics stress impartiality. 
to consider all persons as 
Of the modern theories, only 
ethical egoism disregards imparti ity. 
Feminist philosophers argue that modern ethical theories 
contain a subtle male bias. The bias is more than that the vast 
majority of philosophers have been men, and that their comments 
about women have often been degrading. Traditionally, soc 
life has been divided into private and social segments, with men 
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dominating soci affairs, and women being repressed to private 
affairs to a large degree. Men have dominated politics and 
economics, while women have been confined to the home and 
family. The concerns of the public and private realms are 
naturally different. In politics and business, ations are 
generally impersonal and contractual, very often affecting 
people · one does not even know. In such a realm it may be 
appropriate to make one's decisions, and conduct one's 
behaviour, according to which decisions and measures will cause 
the highest level of benefit for 1. In the private realm, 
however, this impartiality does not apply. Here we are dealing 
mainly· with family and friends, with intimate relationships. 
Bargaining and calculating play a minor ro whi love and 
care are preponderant. If we keep this distinction in mind, it 
is not di cult to understand why the modern theories drawn up 
by men (Kantianism, utilitarianism, and social contract theory), 
place emphasis on abstract impartiality and universalisability, 
characteristics traditionally required in the male realm. These 
incomplete theo s are therefore incapable of giving 
explanations and guidance for our private, familial 
relationships. Virtue ethics is capable of undoing the 
imbalance. Virtues such as friendship, personal commitment, and 
compassion, to mention only a few, may be of paramount 
importance in the private domain, while virtues of benevolence, 
cooperation, and tolerance may be predominant in the social 
realm (Rachels 1986: 357-358). 
7.6 SHORTCOMINGS OF VIRTUE ETHICS 
Some virtue theorists have suggested that the modern approaches 
of ethics should be rejected altogether, replacing them with a 
theory entirely committed to virtue ethics. Virtue ethics is 
not to be seen as a supplement to the other theories, but as a 
preferable alternative. Is such an approach plausible? 
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As shown in the previous section, traditional theories of 
right action are incomplete, failing to consider the agent's 
character. Virtue ethics makes the issue of character its 
central concern, but thereby runs the sk of being incomplete 
the opposite direction. Moral problems are frequently 
problems of how we ought to act, how we ought to behave, what we 
ought to do, and not what we ought to be. Virtue ethics fails 
to provide answers to such questions. If a virtue ethical 
theory .is to be complete in itself, it will have to provide some 
explanation of right action. Some virtue philosophers, such as 
Anscombe, have suggested that we refrain from using moral terms 
such as "right" altogether, describing human conduct only in 
terms of character traits. A morally ght action would then be 
described as just, honourable, considerate, 
wrong action as unjust, dishonourable, or 
1986: 360}. 
or the like, and a 
malevolent (Rachels 
Rachels suggests that is not necessary, however, for 
terms such as "right" and "wrong" to be dispelled, they could be 
given .a new interpretation within a virtue ethical theory. 
Actions could be described as right or wrong in the fami ar 
manner, with references that can be given for or against them. 
The reasons cited will, however, all be connected to the virtue 
or virtues in question. The reason for performing an action 
will be that it is honest, just, or benevolent, while the 
reasons against it will be that it is dishonest, unjust, 
malevolent, and the like. In summary we could then say that the 
right thing to do is what a virtuous person would do (Rachels 
1986: 360}. 
Would an exclusively rtue ethical theory be capable of 
giving us an adequate explanation of moral conduct? Rachels 
(1986: 360) asks us to imagine what this would mean in terms of 
a typical virtue such as honesty. The reason a person should 
not lie, according to the exclusive virtue approach, is merely 
that by doing so one would be dishonest. The question "What 
does it mean to be honest?" is justified. Surely an honest 
person is one that follows the rule "do not lie!" It is 
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difficult to provide an explanation of what honesty consists in 
without referring to the disposition to follow such rules. It 
is important to ask, however, why such rules are important. Why 
should one not lie, especially when an advantage is to be 
attained by doing so? Merely commending or censuring conduct by 
referring to certain character traits is insufficient. We need 
to explain why certain character traits are desirable 
(considered as virtues), and not their opposites (considered as 
vices). A possible answer may be that a policy of truth-telling 
is advantageous the long-term (an egoist's explanation), or 
that it promotes the general welfare (utilitarianism}, or that 
people living together, relying on one another, need it (a 
version of social contract theory) . Such explanations take us 
beyond exclusive virtue theory. Virtue theory ·also gives no 
explanation of how to resolve moral confl s. If you have to 
choose . between two actions, the first being honest but unkind, 
the second kind but dishonest, which are you to choose? An 
example is telling someone a painful truth about himself. Both 
honesty and kindness are virtues, but you cannot do both in this 
instance. In such cases we are in need of guidance that must be 
obtained beyond the domain of exclusive virtue ethics. 
According to virtue ethics, ·the reasons for performing an action 
must always be located one or more virtues. This means that 
for every good reason there is for performing an action, there 
must be a corresponding virtue to accept and act on that reason. 
This, however, does not seem to be the case. A slator 
deliberating over which research to fund from limited resources 
may choose the project that may help the most people. May we 
say that he has a virtue that matches the disposition to do so? 
Perhaps it would be called "acting like a utilitarian?" Perhaps 
the ability to choose between virtues in conflict situations is 
matched by the virtue called "wisdom?" Surely, we cannot 
allocate virtues to cover all kinds of behaviour merely save 
the theory (Rachels 1986: 361-362}. 
This section has shown that virtue ethics on its own is 
also incapable of comprehensively explaining and guiding all 
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aspects of moral li Virtue ethics should therefore not be 
seen as a complete theory itself, but rather a theory within 
the overall theory of ethical conduct. 
7.7 VIRTUE ETHICS AND ABORTION 
Virtue cs is concerned with "human flourishing," or "living 
well" (Hursthouse 1991: 204) . Rosalind Hursthouse6 defines a 
virtue as: 
"a character a human being needs to flourish, or 1 
well" (Hursthouse 1991: 204). 
A virtuous agent is a person who "has and exercises virtues" and 
defines a right action as "what a virtuous agent would do in the 
circumstances" (Hursthouse 1991: 204). 
Hursthouse examines several situations in which a woman 
might consider having an abortion. In each case she questions 
whether a virtuous woman would decide to undertake an abortion. 
Fundamental to her answers are two points: aborting a foetus is 
a serious matter that must be taken seriously, and being a 
parent constitutes in part a flourishing human life. 
She examines women's rights. It is important to point out, 
as Hursthouse does, that she is not concerned with the laws 
tting or prohibiting abortion, but merely with the morality 
thereof. She maintains, if one assumes women have the 
right to determine what will happen with their own bodies, or 
the right to terminate the life of a foetus, then no conclusion 
can be drawn from this fact. According to virtue theory, by 
exercising a moral right, one can do something "cruel, or 
callous, or sel sh, light-minded, sel righteous, stupid, 
inconsiderate, disloyal, dishonest, that is act viciously" 
(Hursthouse 1991: 205}. She maintains that love and friendship 
can neither survive, nor can people live well, when the main 
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concern of people is the assertion of their own ghts. 
Hursthouse therefore declares that whether women have a right to 
an abortion is irrelevant to virtue theory, because it is 
irrelevant to the question, whether an agent would be acting 
virtuously, viciously, 
(Hursthouse 1991: 205). 
or neither, in having an abortion 
Regarding the moral status of the foetus, Hursthouse claims 
that this is an issue falling outside any .moral theory, 
declaring it to be a very difficult metaphysical question. If 
the status of the foetus is relevant to the issue of abortion, 
then its status must be known to the wise and virtuous person. 
This is so because virtue is said to invo knowledge, and part 
of this knowledge involves having the right attitude to things. 
"Right" here not used the sense of "morally right," or 
"proper," but rather means· "accurate truth." One cannot have 
the right attitude to something if one's attitude is based on 
inaccurate or false beliefs; Hursthouse declares; however, that 
the status of the foetus is not evant to the rightness or 
wrongness of abortion. The only sense in which it is relevant 
is insofar as the familiar· biological facts are relevant. By 
familiar biological facts 
is the result of sexual 
approximately nine months, 
meant no more than that pregnancy 
intercourse, pregnancy· usually lasts 
that a baby is born at the end of a 
rm of pregnancy, and that this is how every human being comes 
into this world (Hursthouse 1991: 205). If we go beyond these 
"familiar biological facts," deriving some sort of conclusion 
from them (such as that the foetus has rights, or is or is not a 
person), we go beyond what is relevant to virtue theory. The 
central ,question to virtue theory is not what the familiar 
biological facts show, and what can be derived from them about 
the status of the foetus, but rather, how these facts influence 
practical reasoning, actions, thoughts and reactions of the 
virtuous and the non-virtuous. What is having the right 
attitude towards these s, and what is the wrong attitude? 
This orientation not only accentuates the relevance of the 
familiar biological facts, but so our psychologi facts, and 
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our emotions, such as that both males and females tend to care 
passionately for their offspring, and that family relationships 
are among the deepest and strongest in our lives (Hursthouse 
1991: 206). She rightly claims that these facts make it evident 
that pregnancy is not just a thing among others, or an event 
comparable to others; those who declare an abortion to be on a 
par with a hair cut or appendectomy are mistaken. Abortion is a 
serious matter because the premature termination of a pregnancy 
in a sense the cutting off of a new human li , and connects 
with all our thoughts about a new human life and death, 
parenthood and family relationships. To see abortion as the 
killing of something that does not matter, or the mere 
exercising of some right one has, "is to do something callous 
and light-minded, the sort of thing no virtuous person would do" 
(Hursthouse 1991: 206). It is not only to have the wrong 
attitude to foetuses, but also to life and family relationships 
in general. She poignantly illustrates this by pointing out 
that even the most ardent supporters of abortion, believing that 
abortion is no different in status to an appendectomy or a hair 
cut, seldom maintain this in the case of a miscarriage. Is it 
not unusual for one to remark over the grief of someone's 
miscarriage, "what a fuss about nothing," whi to laugh at an 
appendectomy scar or a failed hair cut would not be? The 
assertion that every termination of a human life is a serious 
matter, as virtue ethics does, does not overlook the fact that 
the termination of life at different stages has differing 
degrees· of moral significance, nor that no precise line can be 
drawn between the different stages. Our emotions and attitudes 
towards the foetus change as it develops, and this is why 
abortion in the late stages, Hursthouse maintains, is more 
problematic than in the early stages of pregnancy. Therefore, 
also, deep grief over a miscarriage in a late stage is more 
appropriate than a similar degree of grief over one during early 
pregnancy, under normal 
that the application of 
rcumstances. Hursthouse maintains 
"tragic" to describe a miscarriage 
becomes more appropriate as the foetus grows, because one has 
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lived with it for longer, and was conscious of its existence for 
longer (Hursthouse 1991: 207}. 
Hursthouse argues, however, that although pregnancy is not 
merely a physical condition among others, this does not entail 
that one can never regard it as such without manifesting a vice. 
If women seek abortions to avoid the physical conditions because 
they are compelled to do strenuous physical work, are worn out 
from childbearing, or are in poor physical health, then they 
cannot be described as light-minded, lous, or irresponsible. 
To bear children under such circumstances may be described as 
heroic, and people who are not heroic are not necessarily 
vicious. That such women can regard pregnancy only as months of 
misery, ending sometimes in days of agony, is not an indication 
of any serious disrespect for human life, or a shallow attitude 
to motherhood. What it does show, Hursthouse insi s, is that 
something is terribly wrong in their lives, which makes it so 
difficult for them to recognise pregnancy and childbearing as 
the good which they can be (Hursthouse 1991: 207}. 
Hursthouse attacks moral theories of abortion that focus on 
the rights of women to determine what happens in and to their 
bodies. A theory that focuses on rights, she maintains, ls 
to deal with pregnancy itself, and that the woman will have the 
child if the pregnancy is not terminated, i.e. a theory of 
rights does not deal with the familiar phys logical and 
psychological facts, and their connection to having the right 
attitude to family relationships and parenthood. Responding to 
the claim that the woman too has a right to determine what 
happens in and to her body, the virtue theorist replies that 
this is not the place to stop. Virtue theory is ·concerned with 
more than merely what rights a person 
what the good, virtuous life really is. 
has, is concerned with 
The question the virtue 
theorist therefore is compelled to ask is "Does she have a good 
life? Is she living well?" To give an answer in the context of 
abortion, the virtue theorist brings in love and the value of 
family .life. Hursthouse asserts that it is a familiar fact that 
family . relationships and motherhood in particular are 
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intrinsically valuable, and constitute in part components of a 
good or virtuous life (Hursthouse 1991: 208). If this is 
correct, then a woman who chooses not being a mother, or decides 
to have an abortion, may have a distorted view of what a good 
life is about. Hursthouse stresses, however, that this need not 
necessarily be so. A woman who already has several children, 
and fears that having another will severely compromise her 
capacity for being a good mother to those she already has, does 
not, Hursthouse maintains, show a diminished respect for human 
li by deciding to have an abortion; nor does a woman who is 
advanced in age and looking forward to being a grandmother; nor 
does a woman who learns that another pregnancy may kill her. 
But nor does a woman who finds that motherhood would compete 
with another intrinsically valuable role. Many of us are 
fortunate to have more intrinsically valuable things to do than 
can possibly t into one lifetime, some of which may compete 
with parenthood. Parenthood, and motherhood in particular, take 
up a lot of time in one's life, resulting in one's not having 
time for many other desired intrinsically valuable things to do. 
Unfortunately, however, many women who choose abortion to avoid 
having · their first child, and many men who encourage their 
partners to do so, are not avoiding parenthood in order to 
pursue other intrinsically valuable roles. 
However, Hursthouse maintains, in circumstances in which an 
abortion would be the "right" decision, one a virtuous person 
could agree to or recommend, the decision or action is not void 
of any wrong. Because a human life has deliberately been 
prematurely terminated, some 1 has probably come about. 
Guilt is almost inevitable if the decision to bring about this 
" 1" is a result of rcumstances for which one is 
responsible. What gets one into such circumstances, except in 
the case of rape, is one's sexual behaviour, and one's choice of 
contraception. The virtuous woman has such character traits as 
"strength, independence, resoluteness, decisiveness, self-
confidence, responsibility, serious-mindedness and 
determination" (Hursthouse 1991: 209). Hursthouse believes it 
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indubitable that anyone can deny that most women have unwanted 
pregnancies because they lack one or more of these character 
traits. Therefore, even in cases where abortion is judged to be 
the "right" decision, it can still be seen as a moral failing in 
another sense. This is so because the lack of one or more 
virtuous character traits initially landed one in the unwanted 
situation. 
Although the abortion decision, in the final instance, is 
the woman's, the man involved is equally responsible. Just as 
women, men can exhibit light-mindedness, egocentricity, and 
callousness about life and . parenthood in relation to abortion. 
They need to take responsibility for their own actions, and life 
in relation to fatherhood. Hursthouse concludes by stating that 
just as motherhood is intrinsically valuable to women, 
fatherhood is equally intrinsically valuable to men, and 
therefore those who pretend that they have many more important 
things to do are being immature and irresponsible (Hursthouse 
1991: 209). 
7. 8 EVALUATION OF VIRTUE ETHICS REGARDING 
ABORTION 
In addition to the shortcomings regarding virtue ethics already 
discussed previously, Hursthouse's approach deserves further 
crit sm. She maintains, by asserting one's rights, one does 
not necessarily act virtuously, one can also be vicious. 
Although I have taken a rights-oriented approach to abortion, I 
deny that a virtue theorist has any ground for accusing me of 
being vicious in any way. If a woman's li is threatened, or 
her long-term health is seriously compromised by her pregnancy, 
denying her the right to an abortion may be described as callous 
or inconsiderate, i.e. certainly not as responding virtuously. 
In this case, therefore, it would be sa to assume that 
Hursthouse would agree with me in that having an abortion in 
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such a case is the best possible alternative, the only truly 
virtuous one, in virtue-ethi terms. 
Would Hursthouse agree with my conclusions regarding a 
pregnancy resulting from rape? I believe so. Forcing a woman to 
continue with a pregnancy she neither impl tly nor explicitly 
consented to could again be described as callous or 
inconsiderate, but certainly not compassionate. Those pointing 
to the right of the unwanted foetus may be accused of being 
callous, inconsiderate, disloyal, certainly vicious; since 
though we may assert an unborn being's right to life, we cannot 
seriously hold that its rights override the woman's in 
circumstances where she has no responsibility for bringing it 
about. Certainly, if such a woman does choose by her own 
volition to go ahead with the pregnancy, she may be admired, and 
praised for doing so. In virtue ethical terms, continuing with 
the pregnancy would be evidence of a virtuous character, but 
deciding to do the opposite; deciding to terminate the pregnancy 
cannot be described as evidence of a vicious one. We may here 
have found an instance where the oppos of a virtuous action 
may not be a vicious one. Furthermore, I am certain the virtue 
theorist will agree that should the raped woman decide to have 
an abortion, she should do so before the foetus has developed 
beyond a certain stage. Virtue theory, however, is incapable of 
drawing a line beyond which an abortion would be non-virtuous, 
because establishing criteria, other than character traits, 
falls outside the domain of rtue ethics. 
Regarding late-term abortions, I argued, such abortions are 
only morally defensible if the individual, to a high degree of 
scienti c certainty, has no potential of attaining any degree 
of personhood besides the basic biological. On this point, 
Hursthouse might disagree with my precise stipulation. Perhaps 
she would be willing to defend abortions if the foetus is 
moderately mentally retarded, or its additional care would 
severely strain the family's financial and human resources. 
According to her philosophy, having such a child may not be part 
of what one considers as having a good life. 
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Hursthouse argues that the biologi facts of the foetus 
are relevant only insofar as these facts influence practical 
reasoning, as well as actions, thoughts, and reactions of the 
virtuous and the non-virtuous. What is having the right 
attitude towards these facts, and what is the wrong attitude? 
Hursthouse' s approach is deficient because it focuses only on 
the person having the abortion. How is she fected by her 
being pregnant? How is the family affected thereby? She ls to 
consider the other party to the problem, the foetus. Does it 
not have ghts too, even a right to life? Hursthouse's 
preoccupation with the agent neglects the object of the 
behaviour. 
Hursthouse maintains that if women seek abortions to avoid 
the physical conditions of pregnancy because they are compelled 
to do strenuous physi work, are worn out from childbearing, 
or are in poor physical health, they cannot be described as 
light-minded, 
described? Is 
lous, or 
a woman 
irresponsible. 
voluntarily 
Can they not be so 
engaging in sexual 
intercourse, becoming pregnant, and then seeking an abortion not 
irresponsible, callous, or light-minded? I agree with Hursthouse 
that bearing children under such circumstances may be described 
as heroic, and that people who are not heroic are not 
necessarily vicious. Nevertheless, she is at least partially 
responsible for becoming pregnant, a fact that obliges her to 
accept the responsibilities for her actions. I do not wish to 
create the impression that I do not understand such women's 
motivations for having an abortion, or have no compassion for 
their difficult situation, but regardless thereof, such an 
action is still not morally defensible. Certainly, abortions 
performed under such difficult circumstances receive a degree of 
understanding, that abortions undertaken without significant 
reasons do not. A woman in such difficult circumstances also 
elicits compassion, even though she may decide to perform an 
abortion (a morally indefensible act) . I agree with Hursthouse 
in asserting that something is terribly wrong in their lives, 
which makes it so difficult for them to recognise pregnancy and 
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childbearing as the good they can be, yet this does still not 
make the abortion right. 
Hursthouse maintains that a woman who already has several 
children, and fears that having another will severely compromise 
her capacity for being a good mother to those she already has, 
does not show a diminished respect for human life by deciding to 
have an abortion; nor does a woman who is advanced in age and 
looking· forward to being a grandmother; nor does a woman who 
learns that another pregnancy may kill her. But nor does a 
woman who finds that motherhood would compete with another 
intrinsically valuable role. Again, I must respond to 
Hursthouse that reasons may be given why a pregnancy is 
undesirable, and why a woman might opt to have an abortion, but 
unl Hursthouse, I cannot agree that one is thereby acting 
virtuously. If we take another virtue, honesty, for instance, a 
person who lies (even if he has a good reason for doing so) 
cannot . be described as being honest, although his honesty may 
have been laid aside to achieve another virtue, perhaps self-
preservation. Similarly, a person opting for an abortion lays 
the virtue of having respect for human life ide least 
temporarily), though only few virtues can be said to be able to 
have precedence, self-preservation, for instance. Hursthouse is 
aware of this, however, although she only brie y mentions it 
towards the end of her article. She mentions that even if an 
abortion would be the "right" decision, one which a virtuous 
person could agree to or recommend, it does not mean, however, 
that the decision or action is void of any wrong. Because a 
human life has deliberately been prematurely terminated, some 
evil has probably come about. Guilt is almost inevitable if the 
decision to bring about this "evil" is a result of circumstances 
which one is responsible. What gets one into such 
rcumstances, except in the case of rape, is one's sexual 
behaviour, and one's choice of contraception. The virtuous 
woman has such charact~r .traits as "strength, independence, 
resoluteness, decisiveness, s f-confidence, responsibility, 
serious-mindedness and determination" (Hursthouse 1991: 209). 
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With this I can readily agree. Hursthouse is correct in 
asserting that most women having unwanted pregnancies lack one 
or more of these character traits. Therefore, even in cases 
where an abortion is judged to be the "right" decision, it can 
still be seen as a moral failing in another sense. This is so 
because the lack of one or more virtuous character traits 
initially landed one in the unwanted situation. 
7. 9 DEFENDING THE CHOICE OF A RIGHTS-
ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 
Normative conclusions of rights based and virtue based 
approaches may coincide, but at a metaethical level the 
justifications for normative conclusions may differ radically. 
My reason for adopting a rights-oriented approach is not because 
I believe virtue ethics to be incapable of providing any 
insights on this issue. As should now be clear, the conclusions 
arrived at need not be in opposition to those one would attain 
when employing a virtue ethical approach. The main advantage of 
a rights-oriented approach, however, is its clarity, due to the 
precise nature of approaching an issue. If we examine any 
rights oriented approach on abortion, the permissibility or 
impermissibility of the practice is beyond dispute. Tooley 
argues that only beings having consciousness, possessing the 
concept of a continuous self have a right to life. Therefore, 
he concludes that abortion is always permissible. Noonan 
employs potentiality. If there exists a high probability that a 
being will develop into a person, then destroying it is 
irresponsible. He concludes that abortions are under normal 
circumstances morally indefensible. Warren argues that a foetus 
possesses none of the characteristics usually ascribed to 
persons, therefore, it is not a person and abortion is always 
permissible. Thomson argues that even if the foetus is a 
person, abortion is permissible in most instances, since the 
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rights of the foetus do not override the rights of the mother to 
determine what happens in and to her body. Sumner argues for 
sentience as the criterion by which moral standing is conferred. 
He argues that abortion is permissible if the foetus is still 
pre-sentient, and not when it is already sentient, unless 
weighty reasons are present. Many more could· be mentioned. 
None of these theories leave any doubt about whether an abortion 
is or is not permissible in a given situation. The same is true 
r my. treatment of abortion. I have also elucidated clear 
principles determining the moral permissibility or 
impermissibility of abortion, depending on the means by which 
the pregnancy came about, the stage of the pregnancy, and the 
development of the foetus. Virtue ethics is useful for testing 
one's principles. I can always ask, whether the conclusions 
drawn from my princip s are in accordance with what is 
considered as a compassionate, understanding, and sensitive 
conclusion, i.e. are the principles arrived at. evidence of a 
virtuous approach to the subject. I believe, and hope, that my 
theory .does this. An exclusive virtue ethical approach, such as 
Hursthouse's, however, lacks this clarity. Is the woman 
entitled to an abortion because the career she pursues is a more 
worthwhile pursuit? How are we to determine whether it is more 
worthwhile, if no principles are employed? 
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CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY 
In this dissertation I began the investigation by examining 
rationality as a sui table cri rion for conferring personhood. 
Michael Tooley argued that a being can only have a right to 
something if it is capable of desiring that something, i.e. A 
has a right to X only if A is capable of desiring X. A being 
only has a right to life if it is capable of desiring a 
continued existence. Foetuses lack the concepts involved in 
desiring a continued existence. Therefore, Tooley concludes, 
foetuses do not have a right to life. In order to avoid 
cri cism regarding persons that temporarily lose ability to 
desire a right to life, Tooley added quali cations to his 
premise, namely that only beings capable of desiring a right to 
life have such a right. The problem of Tooley's argument is 
that his premise needs quali cations, but which qualifications 
to accept is itself a conceptual issue, and would vary with our 
present desires, intuitions and beliefs. I pointed out that 
Gensler successfully argued against Tooley's position by 
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employing the universalisability principle, the prescript ty 
principle, and a third consistency requirement derived from 
these two principles - a version of the Golden Rule. Tooley's 
inconsistency was shown arise from his failure to distinguish 
between a being's present reaction to a hypothetical situation, 
and a being's reaction within the hypothetical situation. The 
Golden rule, and therefore consistency, is only valid in the 
former instance. It was argued: 
(a) If you are consistent and believe that abortion 
ought to be permissible under normal circumstances, then 
you will consent to the idea of your having been aborted 
under normal circumstances (GR) . 
(b)You do not consent to your having been aborted 
under normal circumstances. 
(c)Therefore, if you are consistent, you will not hold 
abortion to be permissible under normal circumstances. 
It was shown that a being arguing for the permissibility of 
abortion under normal rcumstances runs the risk of being 
inconsistent. Tooley's argument in favour of rationality as the 
criterion determining personhood was similarly rejected due to 
inconsistency. I then showed that even if it were not 
inconsistent to argue for rationality determining personhood, 
this would lead to, and allow for practices we would almost 
certainly not be able to accept. Therefore, I dismissed 
rationality as a suitable criterion determining a being's right 
to life. 
In Chapter 3 I defended potential as the criterion by which 
persons receive a significant right to life. Viability, 
dependence, and quickening were dismissed as unsuitable 
criteria. The value of a being was also shown to lie not in its 
uniqueness, for example, by showing that identical twins 
(genetically identical beings) are not considered ss valuable. 
The shortcomings of Noonan's arguments were illuminated. I did 
not, however, dismiss the argument from potential regarding 
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abortion. An important distinction was made between possible 
persons, potential persons, having the capacity r personhood, 
and actual persons. The potentiality principle was also 
introduced. Noonan's argument ils in part because he failed 
to di inguish between possible and potential persons. It was 
shown, unlike possible persons, potential persons do indeed have 
a right to life, proportionate to, and derivat from the value 
they will have as actual pt=rsons. I argued that foetuses are 
potential persons from the moment of implantation, and 
therefore, have a serious right to li from then on. 
In Chapter 4 I defended a woman's right to an abortion if 
the pregnancy is hostile, i~e. came about as a result of rape, 
or poses a serious threat to the mother. Jane Engl 's self-
defence model and arguments formulated by Judith Jarvis Thomson 
were examined. The ambiguous conclusions of English's model 
were pointed out. though I criticised Thomson on many points, 
I agreed with her regarding right of a woman to an abortion 
when her pregnancy is the result of rape, or when it is a 
serious threat to her. A pregnancy resulting from rape was not 
in any. way consented to by. the woman. She gave the foetus no 
right to use her body, did not invite it in. In such an 
tance, therefore, she is morally fully justified having an 
abortion. If the pregnancy becomes threatening, the woman is 
also morally justified in terminating it because it does not 
proceed according to conditions implicitly agreed to by the 
woman. At the end of her article, Thomson reminded us that she 
only assumed the personhood status of the foetus for the purpose 
of her investigation. Since she does not actually consider 
foetuses to be persons, however, she maintained that abortion is 
always permissible. It was, therefore, necessary to examine 
whether a being has no right to li in virtue of its being a 
nonperson. It was argued that Thomson's assumption is invalid. 
Nonpersons have rights too, and in not infrequent instances even 
a right to li 
Having established a woman's right to abort a rape 
pregnancy, I deemed it necessary in Chapter 5 to argue that such 
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abortions ought only to be permitted during the initial stages 
of pregnancy. In this regard, it was necessary to find a 
suitable criterion, which explains our belief that a late 
abortion is significantly more serious morally than an early 
abortion. The answer was found in sentience. The arguments of 
L.W. Sumner were examined and evaluated. I argued that 
Sumner's insistence that ience serves both as the inclusion 
and comparison criterion, purchases simplicity at the price of 
accuracy. Instead, I argued that three teria are necessary, 
namely (1) "Being alive" as the inclusion criterion, (2) 
"sentience'' as the comparison criterion within a species, and 
(3) "potenti " as the comparison criterion between different 
species. If we apply this to the foetus, we see that it has 
greater moral standing than any other creature of a different 
species, because it has a potential to develop into a being 
having full personhood, whi no other known species has such a 
potential. However, an early foetus has less moral standing 
than an almost mature foetus or infant, because the former has 
at least a much smaller degree of sentience. For this reason it 
is morally more serious to abort a late-term foetus than an 
early-term one. Having previously established that abortion is 
permissible in the case of a rape pregnancy, I was then able to 
argue that such abortions ought only to be performed during the 
least objectionable period, i.e. before the foetus becomes 
sentient. For this reason such abortions ought to be per rmed 
before the end of the first trimester. A woman who does not 
terminate a rape pregnancy during the rst trimester has 
implicitly accepted the pregnancy, and has a moral obligation to 
continue with 
In Chapter 6 I then turned to late-term abortions. In the 
introduction to this dissertation I stated that I believe an 
abortion is also morally justified at any stage of pregnancy 
(even when the foetus is almost mature), if it becomes evident 
that the foetus is so severely retarded as to have no potential 
developing into a person. The question that then needed to 
be answered is whether we . are justified aborting severely 
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retarded individuals. The answer we give to this question 
depends on our judgement of life's value. It was necessary to 
examine whether life is always meaningful, whether life is 
always worthwhile. I argued that there are instances in which 
it would be morally acceptable to abort a severely retarded 
individual. However, this is never acceptable when the child 
would be only physically handicapped, or mildly or moderately 
mentally handicapped. Such people are also often capable of 
living meaningful lives. 
when the being would 
significant degree of 
biological, abortion is 
In cases of severe mental retardation, 
never be capable of attaining any 
personhood characteristics besides the 
morally defensible. Beings such as 
anencephalies would fall into this category, never attaining 
personhood status, and living a usually very short life filled 
with nothing but hardship and misery. 
Having argued for a liberal conservative defence of 
abortion, I deemed it necessary to explain in Chapter 7, why I 
adopted a rights-oriented perspective when dealing with 
abortion. In recent decades, several philosophers have argued 
for the adoption of a virtue-oriented approach when dealing with 
moral issues. The nature, advantages, and shortcomings of 
virtue ethics were discussed, and I explained why I believe a 
rights-oriented approach to be superior when dealing with issues 
such as abortion. Its main. value lies in its precise nature of 
approaching and defining a problem. I furthermore pointed out 
that the conclusions I argued for are commensurate with those a 
virtue philosopher might give. 
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APPENDIX A 
ABORTION: FROM THE PAST 
TO THE PRESENT 
It is widely agreed among anthropologists that abortion has been 
practised in almost all human societies. Contrary to popular 
opinion, it is not just a problem of the modern world. It has 
been a problem throughout the ages. Laws concerning it range 
from the restrictive to the permissive. In either case, it is 
clear that abortion was a reality. iest references to it 
have been found in Ancient China, dating back more than 4600 
years. The Chinese environment was probably p'ermiss Other 
societies were more restrictive. The Semi tic Code of 2000 BC, 
the Assyrian Code of 1500 BC, the Hammurabic and Hittite Codes 
of 1300 BC, and the Persi~n Code of 600 BC all prohibited 
abortion (Simmons 1983: 67). 
Our Western society, as we know it, has its roots in three 
main cultural sources, namely those of the Greeks, the Hebrews, 
and the Romans. There are many indications that abortion was a 
common and accepted phenomenon among the Greeks and Romans, but 
the Old Testament has only one reference to it, (Exodus 21: 22) 
suggesting that it was not .common among the Hebrews (Mace 1972: 
51) . 
If we examine the Greeks, we find that Plato and Aristotle 
referred to abortions. In· his "Republic, 11 and in his "Laws, 11 
Plato mentions abortions, seeing the practice as a method of 
population control in the· ideal state. However, he also 
mentions the possibili of sending surplus citizens abroad to 
found new colonies, indicating that Plato was not to rely on 
abortions for population control. Aristotle too, in his 
"Politics," advocated abortion for a couple that already has as 
many children as it can manage. However, for him this only was 
defensible in the early periods of pregnancy. He was only 
prepared to sanction abortion prior to forty days of development 
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of a male, and ninety for a female (Mace 1972: 52 55). He 
believed that the developing person at first only developed a 
vegetative soul, and at this time it was still permissible to 
perform abortions. Once the person was in possession of an 
animal soul, and thus able to have sensations, abortion was no 
longer to be approved. 
Population control is not likely to have been a significant 
motivator for abortion. Mace (1972: 53) gives three main 
reasons for abortion: to remove the evidence of adultery, to 
maintain feminine beauty, and for medical reasons, if the womb 
of the woman was too small to carry a child. 
Among the wealthy Roman families, abortion was practised to 
keep down the number of heirs, among whom the family fortune 
would be divided. Mace (1972: 53) states that evidence 
indicates that abortion in ancient Rome was a common phenomenon. 
Roman law explicitly gave the father control of li and death 
over his children, and a wdman could only be punished for having 
an abortion if was carried out without his cons~nt. 
Not only was abortion an accepted practice in Ancient 
Greece and Rome, but also infanticide. In his "Republic," Plato 
argues that the well-being of soc y was to be maintained by 
killing deformed or inferior infants. Aristotle too argued for 
a law that would allow no deformed child to live. The opinions 
of these philosophers seem accurately to reflect the attitudes 
of their society in general. Athenian and Spartan laws as well 
as those of Rome, prescribed the killing of deformed infants 
(Kuhse & Singer 1985: 111). 
The divine command, "be fruitful and multiply," inculcated 
in the Hebrews a profound respect for life, seeing it as a 
special gift from God. Genesis tells us that God created Adam 
and Eve and blessed them, and then gave them his first command, 
"Be fruitful and increase. 11 the earth and subdue it." The 
command was repeated to Noah after the flood, and Jacob too was 
told to be fruitful and found a nation (Genesis 2: 17). It can 
thus be stated that a strong emphasis was laid on procreation. 
God put Abraham to the test by asking him to sacrifice his only 
son. He was about to do so, when God told him · to take a ram 
instead. His reward is the characteristic one, in which God 
promised to make his descendants as numerous as the stars in the 
sky and the grains of sand on the sea shore. References to 
child sacrifice can be found in Leviticus 18: 21, and Isaiah 57: 
5. Such a practice was strictly forbidden, but the fact that it 
is mentioned in the Old Testament indicates that it was not 
unknown to the Hebrews. The Christian church certainly adopted 
its views from the Hebrews; generally voicing stern opposition 
toward~ abortion. "You shall not kill a child by abortion, you 
shall not slay what is generated," clearly expresses the 
teaching of the Twelve Apostles in one of their early writings 
outside the New Testament (Mace 1972: 54). A consistent message 
of the church is that li is only created by God, and, 
therefore, may not be destroyed. This stance sharply opposed 
the attitude of the pagans who regarded the lives of slaves or 
of infants as of inferior value. The Jewish teaching, that man 
was created when God breathed life into him, became a premise 
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f()~ t:_!:J.e argument that a person only received a soul at birth, 
and thus abortion is permissible in situations such as when a 
pregnancy endangers the li of the mother (Mace 1972: 55). The 
Roman Catholic church, however, firmly clung to the extreme 
position that abortion, regardless of the rcumstances, is the 
taking of another's life and hence homicide. There were times, 
however, when the Catholic church examined the Aristotelian 
philosophy, that there may be a time in the early stages of a 
person's development when is not yet possession of a human 
soul, and consequently may not be regarded as completely human. 
Augustine, for instance, contended that it cannot be said 
that there is a live soul in a body that lacks sensation. He 
did not support abortion, but claimed that the pract in the 
early stages was less sinful than in later stages and not 
equivalent to murder. The question, when the human foetus 
received a human soul, kept reappearing throughout the ages. 
The only point on which the authorities were agreed was that 
once the foetus is in possession of a rational soul, it could no 
longer be denied that the being must be classified as a living 
person, and thus the taking of its life subsequent to ional 
ensoulment is comparable to homicide. Not only the Roman 
Catholic Church was opposed to abortion. Both Luther and Calvin 
were ardent opponents of the practice. The Lutheran Church has 
maintained this conservative position until recently. Only in 
1952 did the American Lutheran church warrant the performing of 
abortions in cases of medical complications, such as to save the 
life of the mother. In recent years, however, some of the more 
liberal Protestant churches· and ,Jewish groups have adopted more 
liberal stances towards the issue of abortion (Mace 1972: 58). 
Because the church played such a dominant role in Western 
society until the end of the Middle-Ages, a closer look their 
positions regarding abortion is useful since it litates 
understanding how many of the views now still prevalent, or 
being reacted against, came about. 
Harrison insists that in the extent writings of the ic 
fathers of the Christian Church, abortion was generally placed 
in the same category as sex without creation, adultery, and 
contraception (because it enables sex without procreative 
intentions) . All were simil y condemned. Prostitution was 
often linked to contraception and abortion, considering all as 
violations against the God-given blessing of procreation. 
Almost all early Christian objections to abortion based their 
moral objections either on want in women (those who would seek 
to avoid pregnancy), or denounced the triad of pleasure-oriented 
sex, contraception and abortion (Harrison 1983: 131). 
The bas view held by the celibate Christian fathers was 
that the essentially pious and virtuous woman was also to be 
celibate. Any married woman, however, that refused childbearing 
was thereby a murderer. The reason for this extreme ascet sm 
on sexuality was that Chri ians were frequently accused of 
being licentious. In reaction to this, some Christians 
advocated extreme asceticism, even encouraging the youth to be 
castrated, rather than be licentious. Harrison maintains, 
however, that these writings are too limited in number be 
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considered an accurate depi ion of general attitudes and 
practices of the time. She po out that much Christian 
writing of that period makes no mention of abortion, which 
raises the question, why abortion failed to receive greater 
attention by those concerned with regulating and determining 
moral practices. Harrison believes that the answer is that 
abortion was a minor episodic matter until the nineteenth 
century. She also adds that she led to find any evidence 
that attitudes expressed prior to the nineteenth century against 
the practice of abortion wete greatly concerned with the well-
being of the unborn child. When attacks against abortion were 
made, these were usually accompanied by disapproval of all 
sexual activities other than for procreation (Harrison 1983: 
131) . 
The foetus's human status was not discussed, but only 
assumed, since conception was held to be a direct act from God -
conception was always an instance of divine intervention. Only 
once the connection between abortion and homicide had been 
firmly established, and reinforced by continuous rhetoric 
denouncing all non-creative sex as murder, did the focus begin 
to shift to the question, when the prohibition against abortion 
ought to be applied. At what stage, prior to or after 
animation, should abortion be prohibited? Pope Pius IX 
entrenched the position that humanity is fully present at 
conception. Abortion was explicitly declared to be homicide and 
particularly evil since it involves the taking of an innocent 
human life. This view was, however, not only limited to 
abortion, but was held to an equal degree of contraception, or 
sexual activity not intended for procreation. During the tenth 
and eleventh centuries, a let by Bishop Caesarius, a sixth 
century bishop, was taken up and enforced by the most ascetic 
groups. Caesarius reasoned as follows: 
"tf someone is to satisfy his lust, or in deliberate hatred 
does something to a man or a woman, so that no children be 
born of him or her, or gives him drink so that he cannot 
generate or she conceive, let it be held as homicide" 
(Harrison 1983: 132). 
Today, even the most conservative opinions make a distinction 
between contraception and homicide, and there also a 
distinction between contraception and abortion. 
"Therefore, from the moment of s conception, li must be 
guarded with the greatest of care, while abortion and 
infanticide are unspeakable crimes" (Harrison 1983: 132). 
The fir Christian texts on abortion are the Didache, as 
well as the Epi le of Barnabas a secondary text of the 
Didache~ Attention is paid to the Didache because it is one of 
the few extent Chris an writings from the second century. In 
it the writer stipulates rules a person must uphold in order to 
follow ·the Christian ways of life. Among these is: "You shall 
not kiil an unborn child or murder an infant" (Beach & Niebuhr 
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1955: 58-59). Besides this text, explicit denunciation of 
abortion is rare, apart from rules laid out for·procreation. 
John Noonan maintains that by 450 AD the teachings on 
abortion had been clearly set out with consistency and coherence 
(Noonan 1970b: 18). Harrison is doubtful of this claim, 
however, arguing that the fragmentary evidence available makes 
it impossible to identify dogmatism of any kind (Harrison 1983: 
133) . 
If, as is widely believed, abortion was a common practice 
in Imperial Rome, then it is to be assumed that the practice of 
abortion would have received heightened attention from abortion 
opponents. If as is often assumed, the Christian church 
fervently opposed abortion from the beginning, then the 
widespread silence on the topic in early Christian writings 
calls for an explanation. Harrison maintains that the rst 
elaborate denunciation of abortion after the Didache, in 
Christian writings, appears to have had the purpose of defending 
Christians against the accusation that they were antisocial and 
immoral. She maintains that Christians were accused of eating 
the body and drinking the blood of their Leader, and perhaps 
therefore were also sometimes accused of infanticide (Harrison 
1983: 134). Christians were often accused of moral 
permissiveness, against which many reacted by adopting stringent 
moral conduct. Tertullian, a third-century theologian, 
denounced the accusations of such immorality,· referring to 
Christian attitudes towards abortion as an example of the strong 
opposition among Christians towards homicide. He believed that 
the whole human is actually already present within the sperm, 
i.e. the man provided the seed, whi the woman only provided 
the place for the seed to germinate. For this reason, any waste 
of semen was considered a homicidal act by some Christians, but 
not by Tertullian. He believed abortion to be permissible if it 
is necessary to save the mother's life, seeing it as a necessary 
evil such cases {Harrison 1983: 134-135). Tertullian's 
writings are, however, not only significant for the consistent 
denunciations of abortion, but also for holding that body and 
soul coexist from the moment of conception {"traducianism"). He 
did not formulate this view, but accepted the prevalent belief 
of his time, that spi t unites with matter to form human life. 
Harrison (1983: 135) asserts that the theory of 
traducianism did not have much influence on the theologians of 
the first centuries, and the question of how body and spirit 
united· was still debated strongly at the time of the 
Reformation. Early Christian theologians, Origen and Clement of 
Alexandria, to mention only two, were hostile towards women. 
Clement maintained that abortion was a grave sin for two 
reasons, firstly, because it wasted the seed God meant to come 
to fruition, and secondly, because it was invariably practised 
by women to hide sexual infidelity. Although Tertullian was 
marked ant sexual during his later years, his views on abortion 
can be described as relatively moderate. Nevertheless, he 
qualifies as one of the early antiabortion writers in the 
Christian tradition {Harrison 1983: 135). 
177 
Most subsequent theorising within the Christian sphere was 
not primarily concerned with determining the meaning of 
abortion, but rather when and how human responsibility for sin 
and evil arose. They were also preoccupied with the discrepancy 
of divine ensoulment and the l of man. By the time of St 
Augustine (354-430) Christians were fairly divided over how 
human sinfulness was related to divine salvation. They opposed 
Tertullian's traducianist view, maintaining that it was 
unspiritual (Augustine 1 165-2 03) . Augustine denied the 
simultaneity of the ensoulment of a rational soul (an entirely 
spiritual phenomenon), and conception (a material phenomenon) . 
He nevertheless rmly opposed the abortion of a formed foetus, 
and was strongly opposed to any sexual intercourse other than 
for procreation within marriage. 
"This ... cruel lust comes to this: that they even procure 
poisons of sterility, and if these do not work, extinguish 
and destroy the foetus in some way in the womb, preferring 
that their offspring dies before it lives, or if it was 
already al in the womb, to kill it before it is born. 
Assuredly, if both husband and wife are alike in this, they 
are not married, and if they were like this from the 
beginning, they came together not in matrimony, but in 
seduction. If both are not like this, I dare to say, that 
either the wi is in a fashion the harlot of her husband, 
or he is an adulterer of his own wife" (Harrison 1983: 
137) . 
Harrison (1983: 137) asserts that Augustine's teachings did 
not have a profound effect on subsequent Catholic theology. His 
"fall of mankind" only again became the centre of discussions 
during the Reformation. The Protestant reformers, especially 
Luther and Calvin, believed that innocence was no longer a 
possibility since sin had entered the world in such a drastic 
manner. Roman Catholic thinkers still maintained the innocence 
of natural existence. Augustine still agreed with Tertullian's 
belief that the man provided the seed for human development, 
while the woman provided the germinative space. He further 
believed that the woman provided some of her menstrual blood for 
development. As has already been indicated, Augustine 
distinguished between a formed and an unformed foetus. The 
abortion of the latter was not necessarily sinful. Moreover, 
sympathies for the life of the woman may be found, since he 
maintained that removal of an embryo to save the life of the 
mother would not diminish a foetus's prospects for participating 
in the resurrection of the dead. Harrison, (1983: 138) rms 
that it has never been the dominant Chri ian view that an 
abortion is wrong performed to save the li of the mother. St. 
Jerome too believed that the truly Christian person would 
refrain from all sexual activities and not marry, but he 
accepted marriage as a necessary evil for procreation without 
fear (Harrison 1983: 138; Connery 1978: 53). Jerome believed 
that woman's fallen state could be undone, if she accepted a 
life of asceticism, and he commended those who abandoned their 
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children for a monastic life (Clark 197 9: 51) . Harrison ( 1983: 
138) argues that Augustine's views should not be seen as an 
accurate indication of the attitudes of his time, describing him 
as holding a minority position. She defends her claim by 
referring to repeated criticisms by Augustine against various 
groups, notably the Pelagians, moral practices that were too 
permissive for his standards. Jerome too was seen as an extreme 
moralist by his contemporaries. 
Contrary to common opinion, abortion and sexual matters do 
not seem to have occupied a prominent place on the list of 
concerns of the early church. The reason for this claim is that 
abortion is not found as a major topic in the writings nor is 
this issue strongly reflected in developing church disciplines, 
as laid down at church councils. In 309, the Council of Elvira 
laid down various degrees of penance according to the magnitude 
of the sin committed. This council did not specifically point 
to abortion, but considered all sexual activities as sinful. 
Abortion in it f was not condemned, but rather abortion 
undertaken by a baptised woman to conceal adultery: 
"If a woman, while her husband is 
adultery, and after that crime commits 
not be given communion even at the 
doubled her crime" (Samuel 1972: 133) . 
away, conceives by 
abortion, she shall 
end, since she has 
Abortion was not set apart from other crimes, but was considered 
as homicide only because all non-creative sexual activity was 
judged as homicide. This serves as another indication that the 
early church did not consider the well-being of the foetus as a 
significant matter, but only the motive of the woman. The 
Councii·of Elvira laid down the principles of the early Western 
Church. In 314, the Council of Ancrya similarly did so for the 
Eastern Church. It is not absolutely clear from the still 
extent texts, whether this council even dealt with the issue of 
abortion, but if it did, then it was considered together with 
adultery. Adultery and abortion to conceal ·adultery were 
conferred lesser penances than at the Council of Elvira (Connery 
1978: 48). It may be suggested that the fairly moderate 
penances prescribed for abortion at these councils is not an 
indication of the church's normative position of that time, but 
rather ·compassion with the moral weakness of people. Harrison 
(1983: 140-141) does not accept this view, claiming that it is 
an indication of the disinterestedness of the church towards 
abortion, apart from sexual sin. The evidence shows that the 
strongest denunciations of abortion came from those also most 
strongly opposed to all non-creat sexual activities. 
The Decretum, formulated in around 1140, became the 
authoritative source for Roman Catholic theology up to the 
modern period. It adopted the views of St Augustine, making no 
signi cant distinction between abortion and other sexual sins. 
Its compiler accepted the distinction between the unformed and 
formed foetus. He did not prescribe penances for the sins of 
abortion. Harrison points out that Connery believes that he 
dropped the penances for abortion because it was "certainly 
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simpler to do this, than to attempt to reconcile a confusing 
mass of prescriptions from the past" (Harrison 1983: 141). 
Sexuality, clerical celibacy, and sexual mores were highly 
disputed issues within the church during the Middle-Ages. A few 
centuries elapsed until the group most opposed to sexuality 
attained victory. This naturally so cemented the most 
vivacious criticism of abortion. Harrison (1983: 142) asserts 
that it took several centuries before clerical celibacy became 
the norm, and Christian practices seldom strictly followed 
canonical prescriptions. The victory of the sex-negative 
theologians entrenched the belief that contraception and non-
creative sexuality are equated with homicide. Pope Gregory IX 
used the term "homicide" to refer to abortion, other canonists 
used the term to refer to contraception and non-creative sex as 
well. 
Most theologians during the Middle-Ages accepted the 
distinction between a formed and an unformed foetus. Various 
distinctions were made, but there was no widespread consensus on 
s issue. It was only the fourteenth century that 
Aristotle's philosophy began to have a profound influence on 
Roman catholic theology. As has already been mentioned, 
Aristotle distinguished between the vegetative, the animal and 
the rational soul. Only when full integration of all three 
components had occurred, did full humanisation take place. He 
maintained that the male foetus integrated the rational 
component at forty days after conception, but the female foetus 
took longer because it did not fully integrate the third 
element, and thus was only fully ensouled after ninety days. 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), a scholar and admirer of Aristotle, 
reintroduced the distinction into Christian theology. However, 
he did not have much to say on abortion, but denounced abortion 
of a formed foetus, and declared the act to be · homicide. It 
should again be asked, as often claimed, that if abortion was 
a central issue within the medieval church, why did one of the 
most prominent theologians . of the middle-Ages mention it only 
marginally? Aquinas distinguished between natural and unnatural 
sexual acts. A fact most people will find surprising and 
difficult to understand is that Aquinas considered rape a 
natural sexual act, whereas masturbation and oral and anal 
intercourse were unnatural sexual acts. All noncoital sexual 
acts were considered unnatural, and all coital acts natural 
(Harrison 1983: 294). 
Only in the fourteenth century did theologians become 
increasingly concerned with clarifying the then already widely 
accepted denunciations of abortion. It was held to be a 
fundamental wrong, but the discussions revolved around whether 
this applied to a formed, or also to an unformed foetus. In the 
sixteenth century, controversy arose over the ~uestion under 
which circumstances a therapeutic abortion could be justified. 
The trend from the thirteenth century was clearly to denounce 
the practice of abortion, but to simultaneously search for 
exceptional rcumstances under which the practice may be 
permissible. Harrison points out, however, that the quest in 
search ·of acceptable exceptions was not a continuous process, 
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but rather appeared sporadically when attempts at reform were 
undertaken. In 1588, Sixtus V, one of the reforming popes, 
decreed excommunication for any woman undergoing an abortion, as 
well as for anyone assisting in such an act. Sixtus no longer 
recognised the distinction between a formed and an unformed 
foetus, and equated sterilisation with abortion. His decrees 
did not enjoy unchallenged support. Evidence for this may be 
found in the fact that his successor again reintroduced the 
distinction between a formed and unformed foetus, and demanded 
excommunication only for the abortion of a formed foetus 
(Harrison 1983: 143-144). 
During the seventeenth century, a further distinction, 
namely between a direct and.an indirect abortion, was also made. 
A direct abortion is one performed to kill the foetus, while an 
indirect abortion is one performed to save the life of the 
mother with the involuntary death of the foetus. This 
distinction is still prevalent in Roman Catholic theology today, 
and s 11 is the central issue determining whether an abortion 
is acceptable or not. 
Turning to Protestant theology, it is immediately evident 
that Martin Luther reinstated the traducianist view, i.e. that 
body and soul coexist from the moment of conception. The 
reformers emphasised the centrality of the family, and concerned 
themselves with stressing the procreative function of sexuality. 
Harrison points out that Williams maintains that Luther's 
adoption of the view that spirit united with body at conception, 
was not motivated by the abortion issue, but rather because he 
was determined to involve both body and soul in the issue of 
original sin. Luther's views departed from that of the roman 
Catholic Church in one important respect: he did not believe 
that God willed the birth or life of badly deformed infants. 
This opened the door for believers to interpret God's influence 
in natural processes in new ways (Simmons 1983: 69). Calvin 
interpreted Exodus 21: 22 to mean that abortion ought not to be 
a capital offence, if either the woman or the unborn child were 
killed: 
"If some men are fighting and hurt a pregnant woman, so 
that she loses her child, but she is not injured in any 
other way, the one who hurt her is to be fined whatever 
amount the woman's husband demands, subject to the approval 
of the judges" (Exodus 21: 22). 
Williams further maintains that due to Luther's stance on this 
matter and Calvin's determined views on this issue 1 the Roman 
Cathol Church saw itself compelled to adapt its doctrine in a 
similar manner 1 and that by the nineteenth century the Roman 
Catholic Church had also fully adopted a view that there is no 
period in the development of a human being in which not both 
body and soul are present. Harrison is doubtful of Williams's 
claims, arguing that most Catholic theologians were not well 
acquainted with Luther's and Calvin's teachings, and their later 
attitudes towards abortion seem to have little bearing on 
Reformation theological thinking. She concedes that there is 
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evidence that Catholic thinking did shift to the position 
claimed by Williams, but denies that there is any evidence that 
this shi is a result of Protestant theology (Harrison 1983: 
145-146) . As has already been mentioned, Reformation 
theologians were concerned with the issue of ensoulment, because 
they were concerned with the nature of man's position with 
regard to original s , and not because they wished to clarify 
the implications for abortion. Neither Luther nor Calvin was 
directly concerned with the issue of abortion. Both denounced 
abortions summarily. Luther was well acquainted with the views 
holding all non-creative sex as sinful, having studied the 
Decretum. Lutheran Protestantism, however, also did not 
proclaim a consistent message regarding ensoulment. For 
instance, not all accepted the traducian view, claiming that 
God's grace cannot be equated with the "simple quickening of 
beasts~" Although Calvin clearly denounced· all abortion 
practices, equating them with murder, there are reasons 
refusing to label him as a strong anti-abortionist. He was only 
marginally concerned with the issue, and since he not only laid 
down the theological position, but so the legal position of 
Geneva, one would expect the laws or legal practices to reflect 
a strong prohibition of abortion, if he were to have considered 
it as a central issue. Sexual offences were punished, but 
abortion self was not mentioned. 
From the foregoing it is evident that neither the Roman 
Catholic Church nor Ref:ormation theologians based their 
denunc ions of abortion on the basis of the life of a foetus. 
It was not foetal development, but rather the divine purpose of 
sexual activity, and the divine ensoulment of a person, that 
conferred personhood status upon tuses. Although an 
antiabortion ethic was accepted, it was accepted that abortions 
in exceptional circumstances are acceptable. Therefore, reasons 
on when the abortion of a foetus might be justified were 
undertaken to clarify the acceptability of the exceptions. In 
the seventeenth century, Catholic theology clearly distinguished 
itself from Aristotelian assumptions on ensoulment by 
maintaining that ensoulment takes place on the third day after 
conception (Harrison 1983: 144-146). At the Second Vatican 
council it was, however,· again proclaimed that li and 
ensoulment both begin at conception. This proclamation was 
based on scientific evidence that clearly shows that at the time 
of conception, a new and pnique individual comes into being. 
The council insisted, "life from its conception is to be guarded 
with the greatest care, abortion and infanticide are horrible 
crimes." This was proclaimed as of cial Catholic doctrine by 
Pope Paul in December 1965 (Mace 1972: 57-58}. 
The present pope, John-Paul II, defends the intimate 
connection between procreation and sex within marriage and the 
condemnation of abortion. On November 2, 1982, he publicly 
denounced both abortion and divorce, demanding that Christians 
live in indissoluble unions. He quoted Paul VI, insisting that 
every conjugal act must be le open to the transmission of 
li He further said: 
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"I speak on the absolute respect for human life 
therefore, whoever denies defence to the frailest and most 
innocent human person, to the human person conceived but 
not yet born, commits a most grave violation of the moral 
order" (Kamm 1982: A3). 
It was shown that Luther and Calvin were also strongly 
opposed to abortion. The Protestant churches maintained this 
conservative position until very recently. The American 
Lutheran Conference adopted a resolution in 1952 that maintains: 
"Abortion must be regarded as the destruction of a living being, 
and, except as a medical measure to save the mother's life, will 
not be used by a Christian to avoid an unwanted birth" (Mace 
1972: 58) . Mace maintains that this accurately depicts the 
attitude adopted by the more conservative Protestant churches, 
and maintains that other Protestant churches tended to take no 
formal position on the subject, rather leaving each to follow 
his or her own conscience. More recently, however, The American 
Baptist Convention, the Lutheran Church in America, the 
Presbyterian Church in the US, the United Church of Christ, the 
United Church in the US, and the United Presbyterian Church in 
the USA have adopted more liberal positions (Mace 1972: 58-59). 
Regarding the church's policy on abortion, it is 
appropriate to shortly mention its stance regarding baptism and 
fate. It was consistently held that baptism is the means 
towards eternal happiness, therefore, infants that die 
unbaptized cannot enjoy supernatural happiness. The doctrine of 
the Catholic church maintains that such infants go into Limbo, 
rather than to heaven. Pope Pius XII reaffirmed this position 
in 1951, when he stated that only baptised infants are imparted 
a life with Christ (Kuhse & Singer 1985: 116). It would seem 
obvious that no difference is here made between a new-born 
infant and an ensouled foetus. It is difficult to say precisely 
which influence the dif~erent aspects of Judaic-Christian belief 
had, i.e. that one should be fruitful and multiply, the belief 
that human life is in God's hands and is only his to take the 
belief that every human being has an immortal soul, and the 
belief that unbaptized infants (and therefore also foetuses) go 
into Limbo. It is appropriate to ask, how much weight the 
latter doctrine carries since it is difficult to believe that a 
benevolent God would condemn innocent infants. This point is 
especially valid, since a continual message in the Bible is that 
God is abounding in love. The Christian influence changed roman 
attitudes to slaves, gladiators, and infants, though later 
slaves and savages at the mercy of Christians all over the world 
might have wondered about ·this. Christian theologians still 
object to suicide, voluntary euthanasia, infanticide and 
abortion. In this too, they differ from the Romans and other 
cultures. It thus seems that beliefs about immortality, as well 
as that God has absolute authority over our lives; had a greater 
influence than the special fears over the fate· of unbaptized 
infants. A central message of Christianity is that all human 
life has special value (Kuhse & Singer 1985: 117). 
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Besides religious opinions, laws passed on the issue give 
us a fairly clear indication regarding the general attitude held 
on the matter. For present purposes it will suffice merely to 
mention that laws passed on abortion may conveniently be 
classified into seven groups, namely: (1) laws absolutely 
prohibiting abortion; ( 2) laws prohibiting abortion unless the 
pregnancy poses a threat to the woman's life; ( 3) laws 
prohibiting abortion unless the woman's physical well-being is 
severely compromised; ( 4) laws prohibiting abortion unless the 
woman's physical or psychological well-being is severely 
compromised; ( 5) laws prohibiting abortion unless the woman's 
physical or psychological well-being is severely compromised, or 
the pregnancy is the result of a crime such as rape or incest; 
(6) laws accepting abortion sanctioning the conditions mentioned 
in 5, as well as when the mother's social environment is not 
conducive towards furthering the prospective child's well-being; 
and (7) laws liberally permitting abortion on request (Mace 
1972: 70-84). 
Having now given the official positions on abortion, it is 
important to mention that theologians and officials do not have 
absolute power to control the practices of people. For almost 
two millennia the church vehemently opposed the practice of 
abortion, but abortions were still being performed. They could 
call them immoral and make them illegal, but they could not stop 
them. Theories on abortion were almost exclusively made by men, 
and very often by celibate priests, and laws too were 
predominantly written by men. The reality of abortion, however, 
primarily concerns women, and they were hardly ever consulted. 
The twentieth century has witnessed a dramatic shift in 
attitudes towards abortion and sexual matters in general. At 
the turn of this century, the psychology of Sigmund Freud 
already brought the discussion of sexual matters out into the 
open, but the liberalisation of whole societies, together with 
their laws, gained momentum only in the second. half of this 
century. The rapidity with which laws changed from extremely 
conservative, to moderate, to liberal in some societies is 
astonishing to say the least. Mace ( 1972: 63) holds that four 
main streams of interest groups lobbying for the legalisation of 
abortions are identifiable~ the movement for greater sexual 
freedom; (2) movements advocating abortion as a population 
control method; (3) the women's liberation movements (advocating 
laws imparting women with the right to freely make decisions on 
their own sexuality' particularly their procreative ability) ; 
and (4) the medical lobby. It has seldom, if ever, been 
thoroughly investigated rationally by these groups under what 
conditions it can or may be morally right tb terminate a 
pregnancy. The question has usually been side-stepped by 
maintaining that the woman has the right to decide on the issue 
of abortion in consultation with her physician; and thereby 
society has generally refused to responsibly look at the matter. 
Almost all Western societies have given the women more freedom 
to choose, but have failed to assist the women in making this 
choice.· 
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APPENDIX B 
THIS MORAL TREATMENT SHOULD 
NOT BECOME A LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Having argued in this dissertation that abortion is morally 
justified only when ( 1) the pregnancy seriously threatens the 
woman's life or long-term health, (2) if the pregnancy is a 
result of rape, but only prior to the foetus's attaining 
sentience, i.e. prior to the end of the first trimester, and 
(3) if the foetus is abnormal to such a degree that, to a high 
degree of scientific certainty, it will not be capable of 
attaining any personhood characteristics besides the basic 
biological, it is pertinent to pose the question, whether this 
moral defence should also serve as the basis for a law on 
abortion. The answer I am now about to give may surprise many 
readers, but I shall give reasons for holding this position. 
This restricted moral defence of abortion should only partially 
be the basis of a legal framework. 
If a law were to be written that would follow this moral 
approach to the letter, it would lead to a fairly restricted 
legal position. Women would, for instance, not be allowed to 
procure an abortion, if, for instance, their contraceptive 
failed, or they disapprove of an abortion after voluntary sexual 
intercourse. If such a law could be upheld without any 
violations, there may be strong grounds for arguing that the 
moral approach should become law. No country, however, not even 
where an extremely restrictive law was in force, has managed to 
eliminate the practice of abortion completely. 
Daniel Callahan, in his book published in 1970, "Abortion: 
law, choice and morality," examined numerous countries with 
restrictive, moderate, or permissive abortion laws. Under the 
restrictive laws he studied the United States, Great Britain 
before and after 1967 (iri 1967 their law was liberalised), 
India, ·Columbia, Mexico, and Chile (Callahan 1970: 126-183). 
Under moderate legal codes Callahan (1970: 184-217) examined 
Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway. In the cases of Sweden and 
Denmark, a comparison was made between the differences prior and 
following 1965 (in that year their laws also were further 
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liberalised). Countries examined with liberal abortion laws 
were the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, East Germany, and Japan (Callahan 
1970: 218-283). Clear differences in the carrying out of 
abortions, but also the overall rate of abortions were found 
among the three groups. Countries with restrictive abortion 
laws generally had a high rate. of nonprofessionally done 
abortions compared to the moderate or permissive countries, but 
a relatively low rate of overall abortions. Countries with 
moderate laws had a higher overall rate of abortions, but a 
significantly lower rate of abortions done by non-professionals. 
The liberal abortion law countries had a high rate of overall 
abortions, but a very low rate of abortions done 
nonprofessionally. Deaths and serious injuries from abortions 
were most frequent in restrictive countries, less so in moderate 
countries, and very low in permissive countries. The reason for 
this can mainly be found in the fact that when women are legally 
permitted to seek professionally done abortions, they will do so 
in preference to back-street abortions. Professionally done 
abortions pose only a minimal risk to the woman, whereas back-
street abortions pose a fairly high risk. 
If women will seek abortions, and men will encourage their 
partners to do so, whether we legally permit or prohibit them, 
whether we morally tolerate or censure them, then I believe it 
to be the state's duty to ensure that abortions are performed 
with as low a risk as possible to the pregnant woman. With 
permissive abortion laws, · one can encourage women seeking 
abortions (whether they are moral or not) to have their 
abortions carried out in suitably equipped clinics, with 
appropriate medical care. Certainly, it could be possible to 
allow such abortions only during the first trimester, i.e. only 
during the foetus's pre-sentient existence. Women proceeding 
beyond this period may be described has having accepted the 
pregnancy. Most women voluntarily having an abortion will do so 
at the.earliest possible time, and this is almost always in the 
first trimester. 
To reiterate, I do not advocate that my moral treatment of 
abortion serves as a basis of a law on abortion. The reason is, 
no matter what law is laid down, abortions will not be 
eliminated, and therefore a permissive law should be in force 
since thereby the lowest death rate of actual persons, and the 
lowest · injury rate can be attained. Any woman procuring an 
abortion, and any man encouraging his partner to do so, should 
realise that they may be legally justified in attaining an 
abortion, but their act is not morally justified, unless the 
exceptions argued for in this dissertation pertain. People 
should be encouraged to act according to the moral viewpoint I 
have here defended, but this ideal should not be rigidly 
enforced by law. 
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NOTES 
CHAPTER 1 
1. In his 1989 article, "Why abortion is immoral," Don 
Marquis argues that abortion is just as wrong as killing an 
adult human being, because both killings deprive the being of a 
future. 
2. In her article, "On the moral and legal status of 
abortion" ( 1973), Mary Anne Warren also sees the status of the 
foetus as central to the issue of abortion. She makes a 
distinction between a biological human being and the moral 
community, whose members enjoy full and equal human rights. 
Merely being a member of the species Homo sapiens is not, she 
argues, sufficient to qualify as a member of the moral 
community. She suggests that the traits most central to moral 
personhood are: (1) consciousness, (2) reasonirig, (3) self-
motivated activity, (4) the capacity to communicate by whatever 
means with an indefinite variety of messages, and (5) the 
presence of a self-concept and self-awareness. Not all these 
features need be present, but Warren claims that foetuses fail 
to exhibit any of these traits. She thus does not classify them 
as moral persons, and hence she grants them no moral right to 
life. In an appendix she attempts to dismiss the claim that her 
theory would also permit infanticide by employing a utilitarian 
approach to the problem. The killing of infants would deprive 
childless couples who want children of the pleasures of adopting 
children. 
3. In her 1971 article, "A defence of abortion," Judith Jarvis 
Thomson attempts to avoid . what is usually considered as the 
central issue in the abortion controversy, namely, the status of 
the foetus. She argues for a defence of abortion, even if it is 
assumed that the foetus has the same moral status as a child. 
It is often claimed that the morality of abortion depends 
entirely on when a developing human is alive, or becomes a 
person. Thomson disputes this, employing a set of analogies, 
including one about a violinist who requires the use of your 
kidneys for nine months. She argues that a mother's right over 
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her body allows her to "unplug" herself from the foetus, even if 
the foetus is a person. 
4. If not otherwise specified, I use the term "foetus" to 
refer to prenatal development from conception to birth. The 
term therefore also refers to zygotes and embryos. 
5. An "early-term" foetus is a foetus prior to the end of 
its third month of development from conception. It is 
distinguished from a "mid-term" foetus and a "late-term" foetus, 
the former being from the beginning of forth to end of 
the sixth month of its development, and the latter from the end 
of the sixth month to birth. 
6. In his 1972 article, "Abortion and Infanticide," 
Michael Tooley argues that a being has a right to X, only if it 
desires that X. For a being to have a right to life, therefore, 
the being must desire to have a continuous existence. A being 
can only understand and hence desire something of which it 
possesses the relevant concepts. Foetuses and infants do not 
possess the concepts of having a continued existence, and 
therefore cannot desire a continued existence, and thus do not 
have a right to life. He claims to have morally defended the 
practices of abortion and infanticide. 
7. John Noonan, his 1970 article, "An almost absolute 
value in history," defends a conservative stance on abortion, 
denying the permissibility thereof, unless the mother's life is 
endangered, by arguing from probability. 
8. Edward A. Langerak, in his 1979 article, "Abortion: 
listening to the middle," expresses the beliefs that there is 
something about the foetus itself that makes abortion 
problematic (and late-term abortions significantly more 
problematic than early-term ones}, and Potent ·persons have a 
right to life that is derived from and proportional to their 
future claims as actual persons. He defends the second belief 
through a theory of conferred claims of personhood, a theory 
based on the bad social consequences of killing foetuses at 
various stages of development. He argues even if foetuses 
are not complete persons with full claims to life, we should 
treat them as persons if the social stakes are suff ly 
high. 
9. The term "person" is used to stand for any being with 
moral rights. 
Hi. In her 1975 article, "Abortion and the concept of a 
person," Jane English investigates whether it is personhood that 
gives a being a right to li She aptly points out that many 
nonpersons have some moral standing, and that even beings that 
do not have an absolute right to life have a right not to be 
killed without significant reason. 
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11. In his 1981 book, "Abortion and moral theory," L.W. 
Sumner argues for sentience as the criterion by which beings 
receive moral standing, and hence have a right to 1 i The 
implication abortion is made clear: foetuses the first 
trimester are not sentient, while in third they certainly 
are. The line between permissibility of abortion, under normal 
circumstances thus lies somewhere in the second trimester of 
pregnancy. 
12. Anencephaly is a congenital absence of the brain or 
anencephalic 
higher brain 
spinal cord, or large portions thereof. Some 
infants, for instance, are born without the 
structures. Almost all die within a few months. 
13. Ro ind Hursthouse, 
"Virtue theory and abortion," 
concerning abortion is not 
the foetus or the mother 
1 a righteous and virtuous 
CHAPTER 2 
in her interesting 1991 article, 
claims that the central question 
status of the foetus, nor whether 
rights, but rather, how one is to 
life. 
1. "Practical ethics" (1993), a concise book by Peter 
Singer, deals with a number. of ethical issues: equal y and its 
implications; equality for animals; why it is wrong to kill; 
taking the li of animals, of the embryo, and of humans; rich 
and poor; in-groups and out-groups; the environment; ends and 
means; and why we should morally. Chapters 4 to 6 raise 
issues and arguments pertinent to the issue of abortion. On 
this latter issue, Singer defends abortion in a similar manner 
to Michael Tooley. 
2. I 11 henceforth use the term "human" to stand for 
any being having the genetic code of the species Homo sapiens. 
3. In his 1986 article, "An appeal for consistency," H. J. 
Gensler rejects utilitarian and Tooley's arguments against 
abortion, claiming that they lead to inconsistencies. He argues 
that only a ection of abortion in the traditional sense can 
be consistently argued for. 
4. In Chapter 3 potential will defended as the 
criterion determining a being's ght to life. 
5. R.M. Hare, in his article, "A Kantian approach to 
abortion" ( 1995) , rejects arguments in the abortion debate that 
appeal to the right of the foetus or of the woman. The 
important que ion is, Hare maintains, whether there is anything 
about the that gives us a reason not to kill it. He 
argues that the foetus's potential provides one reason. 
Pregnancies ought not to be rminated because the beings would 
later be glad they were not aborted. He gives Kantian and 
utilitarian arguments for this claim. 
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6. The American philosopher, John Rawls, has probably 
attracted more attention in the form of commentaries and 
criticism with his book published in 1971, "A theory of 
justice," than any other social theorist since World War II 
(Flew 1979). Ryan (1994: 101) mentions, that in the books first 
major review, which appeared in 1972, Hampshire considered it to 
be the most significant work in more than a century to have been 
produced in moral and political philosophy. Rawls was initially 
attracted to the utilitarian theory of ethics, but became 
convinced of its shortcomings in respect of justice and rights. 
His own theory is an attempt to explain justice in terms of 
rational self-interest, linking it to the idea of a social 
contract (Raphael 1991: 145). 
CHAPTER 3 
1. In his 1970 treatment of abortion, "An almost absolute 
value irt history," John T. Noonan defends a conservative stance 
on abortion by arguing from the probability of a being to 
develop further into a person. He concludes that only abortions 
to save the life of the mother are permissible, such as to 
remove a cancerous uterus, or terminate an ectopic pregnancy. 
2. The term "viability" refers to the foetus's ability to 
survive when detached from its mother. 
3. John T. Noonan makes these claims in his 1970 article, 
"An almost absolute value in history." 
4. "Nineteen-eighty~four" is a horrifying imaginative 
story of life in some future time by George Orwell. The world 
is divided up by three great powers between which there is 
perpetual warfare. One of these powers, Oceania, is ruled by 
"Big Brother" and 
the "Party" that comprise 15% of the population. The remaining 
85% are "Proles", the despi~ed masses. 
5. In the now famous 197 3 US Supreme Court decision of 
"Row vs Wade," a woman's right to an abortion was legally 
granted up to the end of the second trimester. The court's 
decision was based to a large degree on the foetus's viability. 
It laid down that no law may prohibit a woman's right to an 
abortion during the first three months of pregnancy. During the 
second· trimester of pregnartcy, abortion may be regulated only 
insofar as it is related to the preservation and protection of 
maternal health. When the foetus becomes viable (not before the 
beginning of the third trimester) , abortion may be prohibited, 
but only subject to the exception that an abortion may always be 
performed to preserve the pregnant woman's life or health. 
6. Edward A. Langerak, in his 1979 article, "Abortion: 
listening to the middle," expresses the beliefs that there is 
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something about the foetus itself that makes abortion 
problematic (and late-term abortions significantly more 
problematic than early-term ones), and Potential persons have a 
right to life that is derived from and proportional to their 
future claims as actual persons. He defends the second belief 
through a theory of conferred claims of personhood, a theory 
based on the bad social consequences of killing foetuses at 
various stages of development. He argues that even if foetuses 
are not complete persons with full claims to life, we should 
treat them as persons if the social stakes are sufficiently 
high. 
7. Langerak uses the term "claims." 
8. For scientific evidence of this, 
book, "Abortion: law, choice and morality" 
CHAPTER 4 
see Daniel Callahan's 
(1970). 
1. In her 1975 article, "Abortion and the concept of a 
person," Jane English applies a self-defence model to the issue 
of abortion. She also investigates whether it is personhood 
that gives a being a right to life. She aptly points out that 
many criteria are involved in personhood, and that even beings 
that do not have an absolute right to life have a right not to 
be killed without significant reason. 
2. With her now famous 1971 article, "A defence of 
abortion," Judith Jarvis Thomson attempts to avoid what is 
usually considered as the central issue in the abortion 
controversy, namely, the status of the foetus. She argues for a 
defence of abortion, even if it is assumed that the foetus has 
the same moral status as a child. It is often claimed that the 
morality of abortion depends entirely on when a developing human 
is alive, or becomes a person. Thomson disputes this, employing 
a set of analogies, including one about a violinist who requires 
the use of your kidneys for nine months. She argues that a 
mother's right over her body allows her to "unplug" herself from 
the foetus, even if the foetus is a person. 
3. The theory of Michael Tooley was discussed, evaluated 
and criticised in Chapter 2. 
4. In his book, "Abortion and the sanctity of human life" 
(1975), Baruch Brody argues for an extreme conservative defence 
of abortion, arguing that abortion is only permissible when a 
continuation of the pregnancy would result in the death of both 
the mother and child. Merely to save the life of .the mother, he 
maintains, is not sufficient. 
5. In her 1973 article, "Rights and deaths," Thomson 
argues that being innocent does not always mean being free from 
guilt. Her views therefore strongly oppose those of Brody. 
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6. This point was argued and explained in Chapter 3. 
CHAPTER 5 
1. In his 1981 book, "Abortion and moral theory," L. W. 
Sumner defends sentience as a sui table criterion by which a 
being acquires moral standing, and hence a right to life. The 
implication for abortion is made clear: foetuses in the first 
trimester are not sentient, while in the third they certainly 
are. The line between permissibility of abortion, under normal 
circumstances, thus lies somewhere in the second trimester of 
pregnancy. 
2. The theory of John Noonan was dealt with in Chapter 3. 
3. The theory of Michael Tooley was examined and 
criticised in Chapter 2. 
4. A.I. Melden argues in s 1977 book, "Rights and 
persons," that only beings possessing moral agency possess moral 
standing, and hence have a right to life. 
5. In 
elucidated. 
Chapter 3 his potentiality principle was 
6. Sumner also sees rationality as a subset of sentience, 
although it is likely that artificial rationality, or artificial 
intelligence, be created before artificial sentience. 
7. In "Speciesism and the idea of equality" (1978), 
Steinbock ects Peter Singer's arguments against species ism. 
She argues that membership of the human species is in itself 
important. Human beings have important characteristics that 
call for treating them differently from nonhuman animals, even 
though she admits, animal fering is so morally important. 
Peter Singer argued in "All animals are equal" (1977) that 
equality applies to animals as well as to humans. Nonhuman 
attitudes towards animals is bias toward our species, similar to 
the attitudes of a racist or s st. Our eating habits, as well 
as our use of animals in scientific experiments are morally 
wrong. 
CHAPTER 6 
1. In his 1978 arti , "Suffering: a Christian view," 
Donnelly suggests that the term " ing" be distinguished 
from the term "pain." He argues that suffering often has 
significant instrumental value. The meaning of li is 
contained in suffering. 
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2. In her 1978 essay, "If there is life, make it worth 
living: the quality of life of an infant born with a birth-
defect," C.M. Metzler maintains that because we abhor sufferirig, 
we have a tendency to kill defective children. We deprive them 
of love, care and concern, the fundamentals of a quality _life. 
She urges us to change our attitudes and become more loving, and 
thereby enhance the quality of life of the handicapped. 
3. Joseph Margolis, in his 1978 essay, "Human life: its 
worth and bringing it to an end," argues that we are not able to 
determine whether it ought to be forbidden to end life; judging 
that it is better to die thart continue living doe~ not mean that 
life is no longer worth living; criteria justifying suicide, 
infanticide, abortion, and the like must be based on moral 
principles, not on empirical investigations. 
4. Steven Nathanson examines the 
rationality and the value of life in 
"Nihilism, reason, and the value of life." 
relationship 
his 1978 
between· 
article, 
5. Kohl examines whether it is permissible to terminate a 
human life, if that life is judged to be meaningless in 
"Voluntary death and meaningless existence" ( 1978) . Where and 
when are we to permit the termination of a life? He argues that 
death may be the best thing when life is too awful. 
Purdy, in "Can having children be immoral?" (1989), argues 
that having children with the prior knowledge that they will 
have a high probability of suffering from a serious congenital 
defect is immoral. He argues that it is not only morally 
justified to abort such foetuses, but also immoral. not to do so. 
Arthur Asch, in "Can aborting imperfect children be 
immoral?" (1989), supports the legal justification for all 
abortions, but questions their moral defence. Sex selection, 
for instance, is morally wrong, because it suggests to others 
that being of the wrong sex gives someone the right to make a 
life or death decision over the being. Abortion for foetal 
defects is similar, especially when the defect is not life-
threatening, or is not very severe. Many people can live 
fulfilling lives with their disabilities. Many of their 
problems stem from social barriers to equal treatment and access 
to the handicapped, rather than biological handicaps. 
Parenthood is not a controlled activity, and parents should 
accept and love the children they bear. 
Richard Brandt does n6t regard personhood or the right to 
life as the fundamental issue to the problem. In "Defective 
newborns and the morality of termination" ( 1978), he discusses 
various problems for morality, including duty, consent and 
quality of life. He concludes that if the lives of some 
defective new-borns will be bad on the whole, it would be a 
favour to them if their lives were terminated. Infanticide and 
abortion are thus justified if severe abnormality is evident. 
J. Fletcher discusses the relation between suicide, 
euthanasia, and infanticide in "Infanticide and the ethics of 
loving concern" ( 197 8) . He holds a utili tar ian view, arguing 
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that abortion and infanticide 
results outweigh the bad. He 
can be justified if the good 
maintains that neither abortion 
nor infanticide are immoral. A.A. Morris also holds in "Law, 
morality and euthanasia for the defective child" (1978) that 
laws prohibiting infanticide to alleviate continuous suffering 
are not required and often harmful. G. Williams already 
expressed similar views in "Legal evaluation of infanticide" 
( 1957). 
6. 
article 
( 1978) . 
For evidence of Seneca's 
by Kohl, "Voluntary death 
views I have relied on the 
and meaningless existence" 
7. In her article, "On the moral and legal status of 
abortion" (1973), Mary Anne Warren also sees the status of the 
foetus as central to the issue of abortion. She makes a 
distinction between a biological human being and the moral 
community, whose members enjoy full and equal human rights. 
Merely being a member ·of the species Homo sapiens is not, she 
argues, sufficient to qualify as a member of the moral 
community. She suggests that the traits most central to moral 
personhood are: (1) consciousness, (2) reasoning, (3) self-
motivated activity, (4) the capacity to communicate by whatever 
means with an indefinite variety of messages, and (5) the 
presence of a self-concept and self-awareness. Not all these 
features need be present, but Warren asserts that foetuses fail 
to exhibit any of these traits. She thus does not classify them 
as moral persons, and hence she grants them no moral right to 
life. In an appendix she attempts to dismiss the claim that her 
theory would also permit infanticide by employing a utilitarian 
approach to the problem. The killing of infants would deprive 
childless couples who want children of the pleasures of adopting 
children. 
CHAPTER 7 
1. In an article titled "Happiness and the virtues," 
appearing in a 1997 book by c. Sommers and F. Sommers, "Vice and 
virtue in everyday life: introductory readings in ethics," 
Aristotle defines happiness as functioning well. The function 
of human beings is to exercise their capacity to reason. Reason 
directs us to moderation. 
2. In "The ethics of virtue" (1986), James Rachels 
compares virtue based theories of ethics, such as by Aristotle, 
with duty or action based theories, by Kant or Mill. He 
considers the suggestion that moral philosophers should return 
to an exclusively virtue based approach. He rejects it, arguing 
that such a morality must always be incomplete, since it could 
not by itself explain why certain character traits are good. 
Rachels concludes that a combined approach, one encompassing 
both virtue and duty based approaches, is necessary for a 
comprehensive theory of ethics. 
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3. In her 1978 article, "Virtues and vices," Philippa Foot 
distinguishes between virtues and other beneficial traits, such 
as health or good memory. She denies that these are virtues, 
since they do not engage a person's will or character. A 
generous or courageous person has virtues in wanting the good 
fortune of others, and in having the strength of character to 
act. Wisdom poses a difficulty. Foot maintains that the wise 
person wants the proper ends. This engages the will. The 
virtues are also correctives, by inhibiting the tendency to 
yield to temptations. 
4. The bomber was so named because universities and 
airlines were the targets of his parcel bombs. 
5. Macintyre argues in his 1984 article, "The virtues, the 
unity of a human life, and the concept of a tradition," that 
impartiality and universality (elements of traditional liberal 
moral theories) are inadequate, since they fail to take into 
account the unique values and interests of a society. 
6. In her article, "Virtue theory and abortion" ( 1991), 
Rosalind Hursthouse claims that the central question concerning 
abortion is not the status of the foetus, nor on whether the 
foetus or the mother has rights, but rather how one is to live a 
righteous and virtuous life. 
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audio format, where this was available. Where I exclusively 
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